Formal development and quantitative verification of dependable systems

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Reusable formal architectures for networked systems

Today's networked systems are becoming increasingly complex and diverse. The current simulation and runtime verification techniques do not provide support for developing such systems efficiently; moreover, the reliability of the simulated/verified systems is not thoroughly ensured. To address these challenges, the use of formal techniques to reason about network system development is growing, while at the same time, the mathematical background necessary for using formal techniques is a barrier for network designers to efficiently employ them. Thus, these techniques are not vastly used for developing networked systems. The objective of this thesis is to propose formal approaches for the development of reliable networked systems, by taking efficiency into account. With respect to reliability, we propose the architectural development of correct-by-construction networked system models. With respect to efficiency, we propose reusable network architectures as well as network development. At the core of our development methodology, we employ the abstraction and refinement techniques for the development and analysis of networked systems. We evaluate our proposal by employing the proposed architectures to a pervasive class of dynamic networks, i.e., wireless sensor network architectures as well as to a pervasive class of static networks, i.e., network-on-chip architectures. The ultimate goal of our research is to put forward the idea of building libraries of pre-proved rules for the efficient modelling, development, and analysis of networked systems. We take into account both qualitative and quantitative analysis of networks via varied formal tool support, using a theorem prover the Rodin platform and a statistical model checker the SMC-Uppaal.

Preparing for CRIS: Challenges and Opportunities for Systems Integration at Finnish Universities

Poster at Open Repositories 2014, Helsinki, Finland, June 9-13, 2014

Formal development of resilient distributed systems

Resilience is the property of a system to remain trustworthy despite changes. Changes of a different nature, whether due to failures of system components or varying operational conditions, significantly increase the complexity of system development. Therefore, advanced development technologies are required to build robust and flexible system architectures capable of adapting to such changes. Moreover, powerful quantitative techniques are needed to assess the impact of these changes on various system characteristics. Architectural flexibility is achieved by embedding into the system design the mechanisms for identifying changes and reacting on them. Hence a resilient system should have both advanced monitoring and error detection capabilities to recognise changes as well as sophisticated reconfiguration mechanisms to adapt to them. The aim of such reconfiguration is to ensure that the system stays operational, i.e., remains capable of achieving its goals. Design, verification and assessment of the system reconfiguration mechanisms is a challenging and error prone engineering task. In this thesis, we propose and validate a formal framework for development and assessment of resilient systems. Such a framework provides us with the means to specify and verify complex component interactions, model their cooperative behaviour in achieving system goals, and analyse the chosen reconfiguration strategies. Due to the variety of properties to be analysed, such a framework should have an integrated nature. To ensure the system functional correctness, it should rely on formal modelling and verification, while, to assess the impact of changes on such properties as performance and reliability, it should be combined with quantitative analysis. To ensure scalability of the proposed framework, we choose Event-B as the basis for reasoning about functional correctness. Event-B is a statebased formal approach that promotes the correct-by-construction development paradigm and formal verification by theorem proving. Event-B has a mature industrial-strength tool support { the Rodin platform. Proof-based verification as well as the reliance on abstraction and decomposition adopted in Event-B provides the designers with a powerful support for the development of complex systems. Moreover, the top-down system development by refinement allows the developers to explicitly express and verify critical system-level properties. Besides ensuring functional correctness, to achieve resilience we also need to analyse a number of non-functional characteristics, such as reliability and performance. Therefore, in this thesis we also demonstrate how formal development in Event-B can be combined with quantitative analysis. Namely, we experiment with integration of such techniques as probabilistic model checking in PRISM and discrete-event simulation in SimPy with formal development in Event-B. Such an integration allows us to assess how changes and di erent recon guration strategies a ect the overall system resilience. The approach proposed in this thesis is validated by a number of case studies from such areas as robotics, space, healthcare and cloud domain.