24 resultados para stormwater pollution abatement
em Iowa Publications Online (IPO) - State Library, State of Iowa (Iowa), United States
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According to the 1972 Clean Water Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established a set of regulations for the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). The purpose of these regulations is to reduce pollution of the nation’s waterways. In addition to other pollutants, the NPDES regulates stormwater discharges associated with industrial activities, municipal storm sewer systems, and construction sites. Phase II of the NPDES stormwater regulations, which went into effect in Iowa in 2003, applies to construction activities that disturb more than one acre of ground. The regulations also require certain communities with Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems (MS4) to perform education, inspection, and regulation activities to reduce stormwater pollution within their communities. Iowa does not currently have a resource to provide guidance on the stormwater regulations to contractors, designers, engineers, and municipal staff. The Statewide Urban Design and Specifications (SUDAS) manuals are widely accepted as the statewide standard for public improvements. The SUDAS Design manual currently contains a brief chapter (Chapter 7) on erosion and sediment control; however, it is outdated, and Phase II of the NPDES stormwater regulations is not discussed. In response to the need for guidance, this chapter was completely rewritten. It now escribes the need for erosion and sediment control and explains the NPDES stormwater regulations. It provides information for the development and completion of Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plans (SWPPPs) that comply with the stormwater regulations, as well as the proper design and implementation of 28 different erosion and sediment control practices. In addition to the design chapter, this project also updated a section in the SUDAS Specifications manual (Section 9040), which describes the proper materials and methods of construction for the erosion and sediment control practices.
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In this paper, we examine the design of permit trading programs when the objective is to minimize the cost of achieving an ex ante pollution target, that is, one that is defined in expectation rather than an ex post deterministic value. We consider two potential sources of uncertainty, the presence of either of which can make our model appropriate: incomplete information on abatement costs and uncertain delivery coefficients. In such a setting, we find three distinct features that depart from the well-established results on permit trading: (1) the regulator’s information on firms’ abatement costs can matter; (2) the optimal permit cap is not necessarily equal to the ex ante pollution target; and (3) the optimal trading ratio is not necessarily equal to the delivery coefficient even when it is known with certainty. Intuitively, since the regulator is only required to meet a pollution target on average, she can set the trading ratio and total permit cap such that there will be more pollution when abatement costs are high and less pollution when abatement costs are low. Information on firms’ abatement costs is important in order for the regulator to induce the optimal alignment between pollution level and abatement costs.
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State Agency Audit Report State Revolving Fund - Clean Water & Drinking Programs
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Investigative report produced by Iowa Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman
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State Agency Audit Report
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Pigouvian taxes are typically imposed in situations where there is imperfect knowledge on the extent of damage caused by a producing firm. A regulator imposing imperfectly informed Pigouvian taxes may cause the firms that should (should not) produce to shut down (produce). In this paper we use a Bayesian information framework to identify optimal signal-conditioned taxes in the presence of such losses. The tax system involves reducing (increasing) taxes on firms identified as causing high (low) damage. Unfortunately, when an abatement decision has to be made, the tax system that minimizes production distortions also dampens the incentive to abate. In the absence of wrong-firm concerns, a regulator can solve the problem by not adjusting taxes for signal noise. When wrong-firm losses are a concern, the regulator has to trade off losses from distorted production incentives with losses from distorted abatement incentives. The most appropriate policy may involve a combination of instruments.
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State Audit Reports
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State Audit Reports
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Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program (Clean Water Program) and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program (Drinking Water Program), joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, for the year ended June 30, 2006
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Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program, joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources for the year ended June 30, 2007
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Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program, joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources for the year ended June 30, 2008
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Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program (Clean Water Program) and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program (Drinking Water Program), joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources for the year ended June 30, 2009
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Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program, joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, for the year ended June 30, 2010
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Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program, joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources for the year ended June 30, 2011
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Audit report on the Iowa Water Pollution Control Works Financing Program and the Iowa Drinking Water Facilities Financing Program, joint programs of the Iowa Finance Authority and the Iowa Department of Natural Resources for the year ended June 30, 2012