Livestock Revenue Insurance, November 2000

This study outlines several possible structures for livestock revenue insurance. The policies take the form of an exotic option—an Asian basket option. The actuarially fair premiums for these policies are equal to the prices of the options they represent. Due to the complexity of pricing Asian basket options, we have combined two techniques for pricing options to reach the actuarially fair premiums. Projected premiums, producer welfare, and program efficiency are evaluated for the insurance products and existing market tools. Using efficiency ratios and certainty equivalent returns, we compare the insurance policies to strategies involving existing futures and options.

Farm-Level Analysis of Risk Management Proposals, March 2000

This paper presents a detailed report of the representative farm analysis (summarized in FAPRI Policy Working Paper #01-00). At the request of several members of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the U.S. Senate, we have continued to analyze the impacts of the Farmers’ Risk Management Act of 1999 (S. 1666) and the Risk Management for the 21st Century Act (S. 1580). Earlier analysis reported in FAPRI Policy Working Paper #04-99 concentrated on the aggregate net farm income and government outlay impacts. The representative farm analysis is conducted for several types of farms, including both irrigated and non-irrigated cotton farms in Tom Green County, Texas; dryland wheat farms in Morton County, North Dakota and Sumner County, Kansas; and a corn farm in Webster County, Iowa. We consider additional factors that may shed light on the differential impacts of the two plans. 1. Farm-level income impacts under alternative weather scenarios. 2. Additional indirect impacts, such as a change in ability to obtain financing. 3. Implications of within-year price shocks. Our results indicate that farmers who buy crop insurance will increase their coverage levels under S. 1580. Farmers with high yield risk find that the 65 percent coverage level maximizes expected returns, but some who feel that they obtain other benefits from higher coverage will find that the S. 1580 subsidy schedule significantly lowers the cost of obtaining the additional coverage. Farmers with lower yield risk find that the increased indemnities from additional coverage will more than offset the increase in producer premium. In addition, because S. 1580 extends its increased premium subsidy percentages to revenue insurance products, farmers will have an increased incentive to buy revenue insurance. Differences in the ancillary benefits from crop insurance under the baseline and S. 1580 would be driven by the increase in insurance participation and buy-up. Given the same levels of insurance participation and buy-up, the ancillary benefits under the two scenarios would be the same.

The Collective-Quality Promotion in the Agribusiness Sector: An Overview, October 2005

This paper reviews the economic effects of collective-quality promotion through a survey of the recent literature devoted to common labeling and professional groups. Benefits and costs of common labeling and professional groups for improving quality are detailed. Some empirical facts are presented, mainly focusing on some European examples, since many European countries have a long history of producer-owned marketing programs. This paper shows that in some cases the collective-quality promotion can be a successful strategy for firms/farmers.

Biosecurity and Infectious Animal Disease, November 2005

The spatial dimension of agricultural production is important when a communicable disease enters a region. This paper considers two sorts of biosecurity risk that producers can seek to protect against. One concerns the risk of spread: that neighboring producers do not take due care in protecting against being infected by a disease already in the region. In this case, producer efforts substitute with those of near neighbors. For representative spatial production structures, we characterize Nash equilibrium protection levels and show how spatial production structure matters. The other sort of risk concerns entry: that producers do not take due care in preventing the disease from entering the region. In this case, producer heterogeneity has subtle effects on welfare loss due to strategic behavior. Efforts by producers complement, suggesting that interfarm communication will help to redress the problem.

Collective Marketing Arrangements for Geographically Differentiated Agricultural Products: Welfare Impacts and Policy Implications, May 2006

This paper examines the incentive of atomistic agricultural producers within a specific geographical region to differentiate and collectively market products. We develop a model that allows us to analyze the market and welfare effects of the main types of real-world producer organizations, using it to derive economic insights regarding the circumstances under which these organizations will evolve, and describing implications of the results obtained in the context of an ongoing debate between the European Union and United States. As the anticipated fixed costs of development and marketing increase and the anticipated size of the market falls, it becomes essential to increase the ability of the producer organization to control supply in order to ensure the coverage of fixed costs. Whenever a collective organization allows a market (with a new product) to exist that otherwise would not have existed there is an increase in societal welfare. Counterintuitively, stronger property right protection for producer organizations may be welfare enhancing even after a differentiated product has been developed. The reason for this somewhat paradoxical result is that legislation aimed at curtailing the market power of producer organizations may induce large technological distortions.

Economies of Feedlot Scale, Biosecurity, Investment, and Endemic Livestock Disease, September 2006

Infectious livestock disease creates externalities for proximate animal production enterprises. The distribution of production scale within a region should influence and be influenced by these disease externalities. Taking the distribution of the unit costs of stocking an animal as primitive, we show that an increase in the variance of these unit costs reduces consumer surplus. The effect on producer surplus, total surplus, and animal concentration across feedlots depends on the demand elasticity. A subsidy to smaller herds can reduce social welfare and immiserize the farm sector by increasing the extent of disease. While Nash behavior involves excessive stocking, disease effects can be such that aggregate output declines relative to first-best. Disease externalities can induce more adoption of a cost-reducing technology by larger herds so that animals become more concentrated across herds. For strategic reasons, excess overall adoption of the innovation may occur. Larger herds are also more likely to adopt biosecurity innovations, explaining why larger herds may be less diseased in equilibrium.

Get a GRIP: Should Area Revenue Coverage Be Offered through the Farm Bill or as a Crop Insurance Program? 2007

The successful expansion of the U.S. crop insurance program has not eliminated ad hoc disaster assistance. An alternative currently being explored by members of Congress and others in preparation of the 2007 farm bill is to simply remove the “ad hoc” part of disaster assistance programs by creating a standing program that would automatically funnel aid to hard-hit regions and crops. One form such a program could take can be found in the area yield and area revenue insurance programs currently offered by the U.S. crop insurance program. The Group Risk Plan (GRP) and Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) programs automatically trigger payments when county yields or revenues, respectively, fall below a producer-elected coverage level. The per-acre taxpayer costs of offering GRIP in Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa for corn and soybeans through the crop insurance program are estimated. These results are used to determine the amount of area revenue coverage that could be offered to farmers as part of a standing farm bill disaster program. Approximately 55% of taxpayer support for GRIP flows to the crop insurance industry. A significant portion of this support comes in the form of net underwriting gains. The expected rate of return on money put at risk by private crop insurance companies under the current Standard Reinsurance Agreement is approximately 100%. Taking this industry support and adding in the taxpayer support for GRIP that flows to producers would fund a county target revenue program at the 93% coverage level.

Business Sphere, Vol. 18, no.4

As the nation’s leading producer of ethanol and biodiesel, Iowa is building upon its national reputation as an innovative renewable fuel and energy leader by aggressively pursuing more wind energy production. We invite you to take a closer look at Iowa as we harness the winds of renewable energy

Business Sphere, Special Issue

Food products are a specialization, an industry of excellence, and thelargest sector of manufacturing employment in the state of Iowa. All ofthe top five food companies have operations in Iowa. According to Harris Info Source, manufacturing of foods and ingredients in Iowa employs 58,826 people at 775 plants. Processing and value adding enterprises are fed by nation-leading agriculture. Iowa is the top producer of corn, soybeans, hogs and eggs in the United States.

Greenhouse Gas and Nitrogen Fertilizer Scenarios for U.S. Agriculture and Global Biofuels, June 2011

This analysis uses the 2011 FAPRI-CARD (Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute–Center for Agricultural and Rural Development) baseline to evaluate the impact of four alternative scenarios on U.S. and world agricultural markets, as well as on world fertilizer use and world agricultural greenhouse gas emissions. A key assumption in the 2011 baseline is that ethanol support policies disappear in 2012. The baseline also assumes that existing biofuel mandates remain in place and are binding. Two of the scenarios are adverse supply shocks, the first being a 10% increase in the price of nitrogen fertilizer in the United States, and the second, a reversion of cropland into forestland. The third scenario examines how lower energy prices would impact world agriculture. The fourth scenario reintroduces biofuel tax credits and duties. Given that the baseline excludes these policies, the fourth scenario is an attempt to understand the impact of these policies under the market conditions that prevail in early 2011. A key to understanding the results of this fourth scenario is that in the absence of tax credits and duties, the mandate drives biofuel use. Therefore, when the tax credits and duties are reintroduced, the impacts are relatively small. In general, the results show that the entire international commodity market system is remarkably robust with respect to policy changes in one country or in one sector. The policy implication is that domestic policy changes implemented by a large agricultural producer like the United States can have fairly significant impacts on the aggregate world commodity markets. A second point that emerges from the results is that the law of unintended consequences is at work in world agriculture. For example, a U.S. nitrogen tax that might presumably be motivated for environmental benefit results in an increase in world greenhouse gas emissions. A similar situation occurs in the afforestation scenario in which crop production shifts from high-yielding land in the United States to low-yielding land and probably native vegetation in the rest of the world, resulting in an unintended increase in global greenhouse gas emissions.

Iowa Power Fund Board Project Report Update, November 12, 2008

ISU’s proposed research will (1) develop methods for designing clean and efficient burners for low‐Btu producer gas and medium‐Btu syngas, (2) develop catalysts and flow reactors to produce ethanol from medium‐Btu synthesis gas, and (3) upgrade the BECON gasifier system to enable medium‐Btu syngas production and greatly enhanced capabilities for detailed gas analysis needed by both (1) and (2). This project addresses core development needs to enable grain ethanol industry reduce its natural gas demand and ultimately transition to cellulosic ethanol production.

1012-007 Yellow River Headwaters Final Report

The Yellow River Headwaters Watershed (YRHW) drains 26,730 acres of rural land within Winneshiek and Allamakee Counties. While portions of the river have been designated as a High Quality Resource by the State of Iowa, other portions appear on the State's 303(d) List of Impaired Waters due to excessive nutrients, sediment and other water quality issues. The Winneshiek SWCD was fortunate enough to secure WSPF/WPF funds for FY2009 to begin addressing many of the sources of the identified problems, especially along the all-to-critical stream corridor. Initial landowner I producer interest has exceeded expectations and several key BMPs have been installed within the identified critical areas. Yet due to the current budget constraints in the WSPF/WPF programs, we currently have greater landowner I producer interest than we do funds, which is why the District is applying for WIRB funding, to provide supplemental incentives to continue the installation of needed Grade Stabilization Structures, Terraces and Manure Management Systems in identified critical areas. Other funding, currently available to the District, will cover the remaining portions of the project's budget, including staff and our outreach efforts.

06004-003 Big Sioux River Watershed Final Report

Controlling and managing manure-contaminated runoff is a responsibility of every livestock producer. The minimum requirement of all confined feeding operations in Iowa, regardless of size, is to settle solids. Two separate watershed assessments conducted in 2003-2004 by the Lyon SWCD of 141 feedlot sites indicated only 29% have solid settling basins in place. Regulating agencies generally recommend a holding pond followed by irrigation land application which require large capital investments, specialized machinery and additional management skill sets. Producers are looking for more cost-effective alternatives for controlling feedlot runoff and regulating agencies need to know these alternatives will protect the environment.