Tariff Equivalent of Technical Barriers to Trade with Imperfect Substitution and Trade Costs, November 2005

The price-wedge method yields a tariff-equivalent estimate of technical barriers to trade (TBT). An extension of this method accounts for imperfect substitution between domestic and imported goods and incorporates recent findings on trade costs. We explore the sensitivity of this revamped TBT estimate to its key determinants (substitution elasticity, preference for home good, and trade cost). We use the augmented approach to investigate the ongoing US-Japan apple trade dispute and find that removing the Japanese TBT would yield limited export gains to the United States. We then draw policy implications of our findings.

Production and Abatement Distortions under Noisy Green Taxes, October 2005

Pigouvian taxes are typically imposed in situations where there is imperfect knowledge on the extent of damage caused by a producing firm. A regulator imposing imperfectly informed Pigouvian taxes may cause the firms that should (should not) produce to shut down (produce). In this paper we use a Bayesian information framework to identify optimal signal-conditioned taxes in the presence of such losses. The tax system involves reducing (increasing) taxes on firms identified as causing high (low) damage. Unfortunately, when an abatement decision has to be made, the tax system that minimizes production distortions also dampens the incentive to abate. In the absence of wrong-firm concerns, a regulator can solve the problem by not adjusting taxes for signal noise. When wrong-firm losses are a concern, the regulator has to trade off losses from distorted production incentives with losses from distorted abatement incentives. The most appropriate policy may involve a combination of instruments.

The Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition, February 2007

This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety over investment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.