Production and Abatement Distortions under Noisy Green Taxes, October 2005

Pigouvian taxes are typically imposed in situations where there is imperfect knowledge on the extent of damage caused by a producing firm. A regulator imposing imperfectly informed Pigouvian taxes may cause the firms that should (should not) produce to shut down (produce). In this paper we use a Bayesian information framework to identify optimal signal-conditioned taxes in the presence of such losses. The tax system involves reducing (increasing) taxes on firms identified as causing high (low) damage. Unfortunately, when an abatement decision has to be made, the tax system that minimizes production distortions also dampens the incentive to abate. In the absence of wrong-firm concerns, a regulator can solve the problem by not adjusting taxes for signal noise. When wrong-firm losses are a concern, the regulator has to trade off losses from distorted production incentives with losses from distorted abatement incentives. The most appropriate policy may involve a combination of instruments.

Multilateral Trade and Agricultural Policy Reforms in Sugar Markets, September 2005

We analyze the impact of trade liberalization, removal of production subsidies, and elimination of consumption distortions in world sugar markets using a partial-equilibrium international sugar model calibrated on 2002 market data and current policies. The removal of trade distortions alone induces a 27% price increase while the removal of all trade and production distortions induces a 48% increase by 2011/12 relative to the baseline. Aggregate trade expands moderately, but location of production and trade patterns change substantially. Protectionist OECD countries (the EU, Japan, the US) experience an import expansion or export reduction and significant contraction in production in unfettered markets. Competitive producers in both OECD countries (Australia) and non-OECD countries (Brazil, Cuba), and even some protected producers (Indonesia, Turkey), expand production when all distortions are removed. Consumption distortions have marginal impacts on world markets and location of production. We discuss the significance of these results in the context of mounting pressures to increase market access in highly protected OECD countries and the impact on non-OECD countries.

Inspection Intensity and Market Structure, October 2005

An investigation of financing an inspection policy while allowing the enforcement of a market regulation is described. A simple model shows that the intensity of controls depends on the market structure. Under a given number of firms, the per-firm probability of controls is lower than one, since firms’ incentive to comply with regulation holds under positive profits. In this case, a lump-sum tax is used for limiting distortions coming from financing with a fixed fee. Under free entry, the per-firm probability of controls is equal to one, and only a fixed fee that prevents excess entry is used to finance inspection.

Collective Marketing Arrangements for Geographically Differentiated Agricultural Products: Welfare Impacts and Policy Implications, May 2006

This paper examines the incentive of atomistic agricultural producers within a specific geographical region to differentiate and collectively market products. We develop a model that allows us to analyze the market and welfare effects of the main types of real-world producer organizations, using it to derive economic insights regarding the circumstances under which these organizations will evolve, and describing implications of the results obtained in the context of an ongoing debate between the European Union and United States. As the anticipated fixed costs of development and marketing increase and the anticipated size of the market falls, it becomes essential to increase the ability of the producer organization to control supply in order to ensure the coverage of fixed costs. Whenever a collective organization allows a market (with a new product) to exist that otherwise would not have existed there is an increase in societal welfare. Counterintuitively, stronger property right protection for producer organizations may be welfare enhancing even after a differentiated product has been developed. The reason for this somewhat paradoxical result is that legislation aimed at curtailing the market power of producer organizations may induce large technological distortions.

Global Prospects for Dairy in Argentina and Chile: Evidence from Field Visits and Model Simulations, August 2006

We assess the international competitiveness of the dairy industries in Argentina and Chile, combining recent market intelligence gathered from field visits with quantitative simulations of global policy reform scenarios. Both countries exhibit strong potential for export growth but face significant internal and external barriers to expanding their dairy industries. Global policy reforms would resolve some of the international obstacles to their expansion. Argentina has great potential, but it is handicapped by its current macroeconomic policies, trade policy distortions, and the uncertainty associated with policy implementation. Chile is more limited in terms of natural capacity for expansion, but it has a positive trade and investment environment.