Native Grassland Conversion: the Roles of Risk Intervention and Switching Costs

We develop a real option model of the irreversible native grassland conversion decision. Upon plowing, native grassland can be followed by either a permanent cropping system or a system in which land is put under cropping (respectively, grazing) whenever crop prices are high (respectively, low). Switching costs are incurred upon alternating between cropping and grazing. The effects of risk intervention in the form of crop insurance subsidies are studied, as are the effects of cropping innovations that reduce switching costs. We calibrate the model by using cropping return data for South Central North Dakota from 1989 to 2012. Simulations show that a risk intervention that offsets 20% of a cropping return shortfall increases the sod-busting cost threshold, below which native sod will be busted, by 41% (or $43.7/acre). Omitting cropping return risk across time underestimates this sod-busting cost threshold by 23% (or $24.35/acre), and hence underestimates the native sod conversion caused by crop production.

Farm-Level Analysis of Risk Management Proposals, March 2000

This paper presents a detailed report of the representative farm analysis (summarized in FAPRI Policy Working Paper #01-00). At the request of several members of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the U.S. Senate, we have continued to analyze the impacts of the Farmers’ Risk Management Act of 1999 (S. 1666) and the Risk Management for the 21st Century Act (S. 1580). Earlier analysis reported in FAPRI Policy Working Paper #04-99 concentrated on the aggregate net farm income and government outlay impacts. The representative farm analysis is conducted for several types of farms, including both irrigated and non-irrigated cotton farms in Tom Green County, Texas; dryland wheat farms in Morton County, North Dakota and Sumner County, Kansas; and a corn farm in Webster County, Iowa. We consider additional factors that may shed light on the differential impacts of the two plans. 1. Farm-level income impacts under alternative weather scenarios. 2. Additional indirect impacts, such as a change in ability to obtain financing. 3. Implications of within-year price shocks. Our results indicate that farmers who buy crop insurance will increase their coverage levels under S. 1580. Farmers with high yield risk find that the 65 percent coverage level maximizes expected returns, but some who feel that they obtain other benefits from higher coverage will find that the S. 1580 subsidy schedule significantly lowers the cost of obtaining the additional coverage. Farmers with lower yield risk find that the increased indemnities from additional coverage will more than offset the increase in producer premium. In addition, because S. 1580 extends its increased premium subsidy percentages to revenue insurance products, farmers will have an increased incentive to buy revenue insurance. Differences in the ancillary benefits from crop insurance under the baseline and S. 1580 would be driven by the increase in insurance participation and buy-up. Given the same levels of insurance participation and buy-up, the ancillary benefits under the two scenarios would be the same.

Production and Abatement Distortions under Noisy Green Taxes, October 2005

Pigouvian taxes are typically imposed in situations where there is imperfect knowledge on the extent of damage caused by a producing firm. A regulator imposing imperfectly informed Pigouvian taxes may cause the firms that should (should not) produce to shut down (produce). In this paper we use a Bayesian information framework to identify optimal signal-conditioned taxes in the presence of such losses. The tax system involves reducing (increasing) taxes on firms identified as causing high (low) damage. Unfortunately, when an abatement decision has to be made, the tax system that minimizes production distortions also dampens the incentive to abate. In the absence of wrong-firm concerns, a regulator can solve the problem by not adjusting taxes for signal noise. When wrong-firm losses are a concern, the regulator has to trade off losses from distorted production incentives with losses from distorted abatement incentives. The most appropriate policy may involve a combination of instruments.

How Much “Safety” Is Available under the U.S. Proposal to the WTO?, November 2005

Critics of the U.S. proposal to the World Trade Organization (WTO) made in October 2005 are correct when they argue that adoption of the proposal would significantly reduce available support under the current farm program structure. Using historical prices and yields from 1980 to 2004, we estimate that loan rates would have to drop by 9 percent and target prices would have to drop by 10 percent in order to meet the proposed aggregate Amber Box and Blue Box limits. While this finding should cheer those who think that reform of U.S. farm programs is long overdue, it alarms those who want to maintain a strong safety net for U.S. agriculture. The dilemma of needing to reform farm programs while maintaining a strong safety net could be resolved by redesigning programs so that they target revenue rather than price. Building on a base of 70 percent Green Box income insurance, a program that provides a crop-specific revenue guarantee equal to 98 percent of the product of the current effective target price and expected county yield would fit into the proposed aggregate Amber and Blue Box limits. Payments would be triggered whenever the product of the season-average price and county average yield fell below this 98 percent revenue guarantee. Adding the proposed crop-specific constraints lowers the coverage level to 95 percent. Moving from programs that target price to ones that target revenue would eliminate the rationale for ad hoc disaster payments. Program payments would automatically arrive whenever significant crop losses or economic losses caused by low prices occurred. Also, much of the need for the complicated mechanism (the Standard Reinsurance Agreement) that transfers most risk of the U.S. crop insurance to the federal government would be eliminated because the federal government would directly assume the risk through farm programs. Changing the focus of federal farm programs from price targeting to revenue targeting would not be easy. Farmers have long relied on price supports and the knowledge that crop losses are often adequately covered by heavily subsidized crop insurance or by ad hoc disaster payments. Farmers and their leaders would only be willing to support a change to revenue targeting if they see that the current system is untenable in an era of tight federal budgets and WTO limits.

Intra-Industry Trade, Multilateral Trade Integration, and Invasive Species Risk, December 2006

We analyze the linkage between protectionism and invasive species (IS) hazard in the context of two-way trade and multilateral trade integration, two major features of real-world agricultural trade. Multilateral integration includes the joint reduction of tariffs and trade costs among trading partners. Multilateral trade integration is more likely to increase damages from IS than predicted by unilateral trade opening under the classic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework because domestic production (the base susceptible to damages) is likely to increase with expanding export markets. A country integrating its trade with a partner characterized by relatively higher tariff and trade costs is also more likely to experience increased IS damages via expanded domestic production for the same reason. We illustrate our analytical results with a stylized model of the world wheat market.

Community-Based Corrections Substance Abuse Treatment for the Higher Risk Offender, Iowa Department of Corrections Performance Audit Report, September 2007

The performance audit conducted by the Department of Management concerned the licensed substance abuse treatment programs in Department of Corrections’ institutions. This report uses the same methodology, modified for community-based corrections populations, to examine the delivery of substance abuse treatment for higher risk offenders under field supervision, and all offenders who were assigned to community corrections residential facilities.

Decision Support Model for Assessing Archaeological Survey Needs for Bridge Replacement Projects in Iowa, 2006

The Bridges Decision Support Model is a geographic information system (GIS) that assembles existing data on archaeological sites, surveys, and their geologic contexts to assess the risk of bridge replacement projects encountering 13,000- to 150-year-old Native American sites. This project identifies critical variables for assessing prehistoric sites potential, examines the quality of available data about the variables, and applies the data to creating a decision support framework for use by the Iowa Department of Transportation (Iowa DOT) and others. An analysis of previous archaeological surveys indicates that subsurface testing to discover buried sites became increasingly common after 1980, but did not become routine until after the adoption of guidelines recommending such testing, in 1993. Even then, the average depth of testing has been relatively shallow. Alluvial deposits of sufficient age, deposited in depositional environments conducive to human habitation, are considerably thicker than archaeologists have routinely tested.