The Effects of Expanding Ethanol Markets On Ethanol Production Feed Markets And the Iowa Economy, June 30 2001

Report produced by Iowa Departmment of Agriculture and Land Stewardship

Strip Tillage Effects on Crop Production and Soil Erosion, 2002

Report produced by Iowa Departmment of Agriculture and Land Stewardship

Dairy Food Consumption, Production, and Policy in Japan, August 2005

We explore and investigate Japanese dairy markets. We first provide an overview of consumer demand and how it evolved after World War II. Using historical data and econometric estimates of Japanese dairy demand, we identify economic, cultural, and demographic forces that have been shaping consumption patterns. Then we summarize the characteristics of Japanese milk production and dairy processing and policies affecting them. We next describe the import regime and trade flows in dairy products. The analysis of the regulatory system of the dairy sector shows how its incentive structure affects the long-term prospects of various segments of the industry. The paper concludes with policy recommendations of how to reform the Japanese dairy sector.

Production and Abatement Distortions under Noisy Green Taxes, October 2005

Pigouvian taxes are typically imposed in situations where there is imperfect knowledge on the extent of damage caused by a producing firm. A regulator imposing imperfectly informed Pigouvian taxes may cause the firms that should (should not) produce to shut down (produce). In this paper we use a Bayesian information framework to identify optimal signal-conditioned taxes in the presence of such losses. The tax system involves reducing (increasing) taxes on firms identified as causing high (low) damage. Unfortunately, when an abatement decision has to be made, the tax system that minimizes production distortions also dampens the incentive to abate. In the absence of wrong-firm concerns, a regulator can solve the problem by not adjusting taxes for signal noise. When wrong-firm losses are a concern, the regulator has to trade off losses from distorted production incentives with losses from distorted abatement incentives. The most appropriate policy may involve a combination of instruments.

Economies of Feedlot Scale, Biosecurity, Investment, and Endemic Livestock Disease, September 2006

Infectious livestock disease creates externalities for proximate animal production enterprises. The distribution of production scale within a region should influence and be influenced by these disease externalities. Taking the distribution of the unit costs of stocking an animal as primitive, we show that an increase in the variance of these unit costs reduces consumer surplus. The effect on producer surplus, total surplus, and animal concentration across feedlots depends on the demand elasticity. A subsidy to smaller herds can reduce social welfare and immiserize the farm sector by increasing the extent of disease. While Nash behavior involves excessive stocking, disease effects can be such that aggregate output declines relative to first-best. Disease externalities can induce more adoption of a cost-reducing technology by larger herds so that animals become more concentrated across herds. For strategic reasons, excess overall adoption of the innovation may occur. Larger herds are also more likely to adopt biosecurity innovations, explaining why larger herds may be less diseased in equilibrium.