Iowa 2008 Summer Storms After-Action Report, April 27, 2009

In the summer of 2008, the state of Iowa suffered from a series of severe storms that produced tornadoes and heavy rainfall, which resulted in widespread flooding. The Summer Storms1 lasted from late May through mid-August, with the most intense storms occurring over a month-long period from May 25 to June 25. The Summer Storms exacted a major human and economic toll on Iowa, resulting in 18 fatalities and 106 injuries, forcing the evacuation of approximately 38,000 Iowans, and impacting 21,000 housing units. Iowa’s public and private sectors suffered significant monetary damages. Eighty-six of the ninety-nine counties in the state were included in the Governor’s disaster declarations.

Iowa 2088 Summer Storms After-Action Report Final, April 27, 2009

In the summer of 2008, the state of Iowa suffered from a series of severe storms that produced tornadoes and heavy rainfall, which resulted in widespread flooding. The Summer Storms1 lasted from late May through mid-August, with the most intense storms occurring over a month-long period from May 25 to June 25. The Summer Storms exacted a major human and economic toll on Iowa, resulting in 18 fatalities and 106 injuries, forcing the evacuation of approximately 38,000 Iowans, and impacting 21,000 housing units. Iowa’s public and private sectors suffered significant monetary damages. Eighty-six of the ninety-nine counties in the state were included in the Governor’s disaster declarations. Presidential disaster declarations made residents in 84 counties eligible for Public Assistance and 78 counties for Individual Assistance. The Rebuild Iowa Advisory Commission estimated $798.3 million in damages to publicly owned buildings and infrastructure, including damages of $53 million to public transportation and $342 million to public utilities. The 2008 Summer Storms presented unique coordination challenges for the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division (HSEMD) and the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). These challenges arose from three interrelated factors: the large number of local jurisdictions and areas impacted, the prolonged period of time that response operations were conducted, and the increasing complexity of overall response operations. These events caused the SEOC to coordinate response, mitigation, recovery, and preparedness operations simultaneously. HSEMD and the SEOC implemented a variety of measures to enhance their ability to coordinate operations and assistance to localities. The SEOC expanded its organizational structure, implemented innovative techniques, and incorporated new partners into its activities. These steps enabled HSEMD and SEOC to coordinate operations more effectively, which undoubtedly helped save lives and property, while mitigating the effects of the 2008 Summer Storms.

Missouri River Flood Coordination Task Force Report, September 25, 2011

The Missouri River floods of 2011 will go down in history as the longest duration flooding event this state has seen to date. The combination of above normal snowfall in the upper Missouri River basin followed by the equivalent of nearly one year’s worth of rainfall in May created an above normal runoff situation which filled the Missouri River and the six main reservoirs within the basin. Compounding this problem was colder than normal temperatures which kept much of the snowpack in the upper basin on the ground longer into the spring, setting the stage for this historic event. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) began increasing the outflow at Gavin’s Point, near Yankton, South Dakota in May. On June 14, 2011, the outflow reached a record rate of over 160,000 cubic feet per second (cfs), over twice the previous record outflow set in 1997. This increased output from Gavin’s Point caused the Missouri River to flow out of its banks covering over 283,000 acres of land in Iowa, forcing hundreds of evacuations, damaging 255,000 acres of cropland and significantly impacting the levee system on the Missouri River basin. Over the course of the summer, approximately 64 miles of primary roads closed due to Missouri River flooding, including 54 miles of Interstate Highway. Many county secondary roads were closed by high water or overburdened due to the numerous detours and road closures in this area. As the Missouri River levels began to increase, municipalities and counties aided by State and Federal agencies began preparing for a sustained flood event. Citizens, businesses, state agencies, local governments and non‐profits made substantial preparations, in some cases expending millions of dollars on emergency protective measures to protect their facilities from the impending flood. Levee monitors detected weak spots in the levee system in all affected counties, with several levees being identified as at risk levees that could potentially fail. Of particular concern was the 28 miles of levees protecting Council Bluffs. Based on this concern, Council Bluffs prepared an evacuation plan for the approximately 30,000 residents that resided in the protected area. On May 25, 2011, Governor Branstad directed the execution of the Iowa Emergency Response Plan in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act. On May 31, 2011, HSEMD Administrator, Brigadier General J. Derek Hill, formally requested the USACE to provide technical assistance and advanced measures for the communities along the Missouri River basin. On June 2, 2011 Governor Branstad issued a State of Iowa Proclamation of Disaster Emergency for Fremont, Harrison, Mills, Monona, Pottawattamie, and Woodbury counties. The length of this flood event created a unique set of challenges for Federal, State and local entities. In many cases, these organizations were conducting response and recovery operations simultaneously. Due to the length of this entire event, the State Emergency Operations Center and the local Emergency Operations Centers remained open for an extended period of time, putting additional strain on many organizations and resources. In response to this disaster, Governor Branstad created the Missouri River Recovery Coordination Task Force to oversee the State’s recovery efforts. The Governor announced the creation of this Task Force on October 17, 2011 and appointed Brigadier General J. Derek Hill, HSEMD Administrator as the chairman. This Task Force would be a temporary group of State agency representatives and interested stakeholders brought together to support the recovery efforts of the Iowa communities impacted by the Missouri River Flood. Collectively, this group would analyze and share damage assessment data, coordinate assistance across various stakeholders, monitor progress, capture best practices and identify lessons learned.

Performance of Randomly Oriented, Fiber-Reinforced Roadway Soils, HR-211, 1982

Several primary techniques have been developed through which soil aggregate road material properties may be improved. Such techniques basically involve a mechanism of creating a continuous matrix system of soil and/or aggregate particles, interlocked through the use of some additive such as portland cement, lime, or bituminous products. Details by which soils are stabilized vary greatly, but they are dependent on the type of stabilizing agent and nature of the soil, though the overall approach to stabilization has the common feature that improvement is achieved by some mechanism(s) forcing individual particles to adhere to one another. This process creates a more rigid material, most often capable of resisting the influx of water during freezing, loss of strength due to high moisture content and particle dispersion during thawing, and loss of strength due to migration of fines and/or water by capillarity and pumping. The study reported herein, took a new and relatively different approach to strengthening of soils, i.e., improvement of roadway soils and/or soil-aggregate materials by structural reinforcement with randomly oriented fibers. The purpose of the study was to conduct a laboratory and field investigation into the potential of improving (a) soil-aggregate surfaced and subgrade materials, including those that are frost-prone and/or highly moisture susceptible, and (b) localized base course materials, by uniting such materials through fibrous reinforcement. The envisioned objective of the project was the development of a simple construction technique(s) that could be (a) applied on a selective basis to specific areas having a history of poor performance, or (b) used for improvement of potential base materials prior to surfacing. Little background information on such purpose and objective was available. Though the envisioned process had similarities to fibrous reinforced concrete, and to fibrous reinforced resin composites, the process was devoid of a cementitious binder matrix and thus highly dependent on the cohesive and frictional interlocking processes of a soil and/or aggregate with the fibrous reinforcement; a condition not unlike the introduction of reinforcing bars into a concrete sand/aggregate mixture without benefit of portland cement. Thus the study was also directed to answering some fundamental questions: (1) would the technique work; (2) what type or types of fibers are effective; (3) are workable fibers commercially available; and (4) can such fibers be effectively incorporated with conventional construction equipment, and employed in practical field applications? The approach to obtaining answers to these questions, was guided by the philosophy that an understanding of basic fundamentals was essential to developing a body of engineering knowledge, that would serve as the basis for eventual development of design procedures with fibrous products for the applications previously noted.

Dynamics of Highway Bridges, HR-67, 1961

The AASHO specifications for highway bridges require that in designing a bridge, the live load must be multiplied by an impact factor for which a formula is given, dependent only upon the length of the bridge. This formula is a result of August Wohler's tests on fatigue in metals, in which he determined that metals which are subjected to large alternating loads will ultimately fail at lower stresses than those which are subjected only to continuous static loads. It is felt by some investigators that this present impact factor is not realistic, and it is suggested that a consideration of the increased stress due to vibrations caused by vehicles traversing the span would result in a more realistic impact factor than now exists. Since the current highway program requires a large number of bridges to be built, the need for data on dynamic behavior of bridges is apparent. Much excellent material has already been gathered on the subject, but many questions remain unanswered. This work is designed to investigate further a specific corner of that subject, and it is hoped that some useful light may be shed on the subject. Specifically this study hopes to correlate, by experiment on a small scale test bridge, the upper limits of impact utilizing a stationary, oscillating load to represent axle loads moving past a given point. The experiments were performed on a small scale bridge which is located in the basement of the Iowa Engineering Experiment Station. The bridge is a 25 foot simply supported span, 10 feet wide, supported by four beams with a composite concrete slab. It is assumed that the magnitude of the predominant forcing function is the same as the magnitude of the dynamic force produced by a smoothly rolling load, which has a frequency determined by the passage of axles. The frequency of passage of axles is defined as the speed of the vehicle divided by the axle spacing. Factors affecting the response of the bridge to this forcing function are the bridge stiffness and mass, which determine the natural frequency, and the effects of solid damping due to internal structural energy dissipation.

Iowa 2008 Summer Storms After Action Report, April 27, 2009

In the summer of 2008, the state of Iowa suffered from a series of severe storms that produced tornadoes and heavy rainfall, which resulted in widespread flooding. The Summer Storms1 lasted from late May through mid-August, with the most intense storms occurring over a month-long period from May 25 to June 25. The Summer Storms exacted a major human and economic toll on Iowa, resulting in 18 fatalities and 106 injuries, forcing the evacuation of approximately 38,000 Iowans, and impacting 21,000 housing units. Iowa’s public and private sectors suffered significant monetary damages. Eighty-six of the ninety-nine counties in the state were included in the Governor’s disaster declarations. Presidential disaster declarations made residents in 84 counties eligible for Public Assistance and 78 counties for Individual Assistance. The Rebuild Iowa Advisory Commission estimated $798.3 million in damages to publicly owned buildings and infrastructure, including damages of $53 million to public transportation and $342 million to public utilities.

Investigation of the Lane-Wells Road Logger, HR-113, 1966

The Lane-Wells Road Logger was utilized primarily to determine the feasibility of employing such a device for moisture and density control in Iowa highway construction. A secondary objective was the use of the Road Logger to obtain information concerning moisture content and density during and after construction. Correlation studies with conventional test results required a small portion of the lease period. Practically all phases of construction and most materials utilized in base and surface courses were surveyed. Results of this study were good, in general, with the Road Logger indicating dry density slightly higher and the moisture content slightly lower than conventional results in most instances. Economic feasibility seemed to pose the greatest problem for the acceptance of the Road Logger as a standard compaction control device. It would appear from the findings of this study that probably only large projects, or several smaller contracts tested simultaneously, could justify the expense of the Logger. A total of about 128 miles were surveyed with the Logger during the lease period. Approximately 16 days of downtime due to minor breakdowns were recorded. Inclement weather forcing construction delays resulted in several idle days in which the Logger's full capabilities were not realized.

07040-015 Saylor Creek Watershed Final Report

Phase 2 of the Saylor Creek Improvement Project is focused on channel restoration. The existing stream channel is generally incised, running through areas primarily covered with heavy trees, brush and weeds. The ravine ranges from 6 to 20 feet deep through the corridor with very steep slopes in several areas. In two areas storm outlets are undercut or suspended above the channel. Tall undercut, eroded banks exist along several of the outside bends. Sediment deposition on the inside bends limits the cross-section of the channel, increasing flow velocity and forcing this faster flow toward the eroded outside bank. A wide array of practices will need to be implemented to address channel erosion. Improvements will be specifically tailored to address problems observed at each bend. The result will be a channel with a more natural appearance, and reduced use of hard armor and revetment. Some sections will require minimal grading with removal of underbrush for improved maintenance access and more sun exposure, better allowing deep­ rooted plants and flowers to establish to provide further erosion protection. Straight sections with steep banks will require grading to pull back slopes, increasing the creek's capacity to convey storm flows at slower velocities. Sections with sharp bends will require slope pull back and armor protection. A constructed wetland will collect and treat runoff from a small sub-watershed, before being discharged into the main tributary.