Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities, September 2005

We analyze the entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market in which an entrant and an incumbent compete in prices. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” With a sequential choice of quality, a quality-dependent marginal production cost, and a fixed entry cost, we relate the entry-quality decision and the entry-deterrence strategies to the level of entry cost and the degree of consumer heterogeneity. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well as an incumbent’s aggressive entry-deterrence strategies of increasing its quality level toward potential entry. Welfare evaluation confirms that social welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.

Managing Quality under Heterogeneous Consumer Demand and Product Quality, October 2005

Based on accepted advances in the marketing, economics, consumer behavior, and satisfaction literatures, we develop a micro-foundations model of a firm that needs to manage the quality of a product that is inherently heterogeneous in the presence of varying customer tastes or expectations for quality. Our model blends elements of the returns to quality, customer lifetime value, and service profit chain approaches to marketing. The model is then used to explain several empirical results pertaining to the marketing literature by explicitly articulating the trade-offs between customer satisfaction and costs (including opportunity costs) of quality. In this environment firms will find it optimal to allow some customers to go unsatisfied. We show that the relationship between the expected number of repeated purchases by an individual customer is endogenous to the choice of quality by the firm, indicating that the number of purchases cannot be chosen freely to estimate a customer’s lifetime value.