Impacts of Rural Development on Iowa’s Secondary Road Systems, TR-548, September 2010

Today, many of Iowa’s counties are experiencing an increase in rural development. Two specific types of development were focused on for this research: rural residential subdivisions and livestock production operations. Rural residential developments are primarily year round single-family homes, though some are vacation homes. Livestock production in Iowa includes hog, beef, and poultry facilities. These two types of rural development, while obviously very different in nature and incompatible with each other, share one important characteristic: They each generate substantial amounts of new traffic for Iowa’s extensive secondary road system. This research brings together economic, spatial, and legal analysis methods to address the impacts of rural development on the secondary road system and provide county engineers, county supervisors, and state legislators with guidance in addressing the challenges associated with this development.

Inspection Intensity and Market Structure, October 2005

An investigation of financing an inspection policy while allowing the enforcement of a market regulation is described. A simple model shows that the intensity of controls depends on the market structure. Under a given number of firms, the per-firm probability of controls is lower than one, since firms’ incentive to comply with regulation holds under positive profits. In this case, a lump-sum tax is used for limiting distortions coming from financing with a fixed fee. Under free entry, the per-firm probability of controls is equal to one, and only a fixed fee that prevents excess entry is used to finance inspection.

Biosecurity and Infectious Animal Disease, November 2005

The spatial dimension of agricultural production is important when a communicable disease enters a region. This paper considers two sorts of biosecurity risk that producers can seek to protect against. One concerns the risk of spread: that neighboring producers do not take due care in protecting against being infected by a disease already in the region. In this case, producer efforts substitute with those of near neighbors. For representative spatial production structures, we characterize Nash equilibrium protection levels and show how spatial production structure matters. The other sort of risk concerns entry: that producers do not take due care in preventing the disease from entering the region. In this case, producer heterogeneity has subtle effects on welfare loss due to strategic behavior. Efforts by producers complement, suggesting that interfarm communication will help to redress the problem.