Intra-Industry Trade, Multilateral Trade Integration, and Invasive Species Risk, December 2006

We analyze the linkage between protectionism and invasive species (IS) hazard in the context of two-way trade and multilateral trade integration, two major features of real-world agricultural trade. Multilateral integration includes the joint reduction of tariffs and trade costs among trading partners. Multilateral trade integration is more likely to increase damages from IS than predicted by unilateral trade opening under the classic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework because domestic production (the base susceptible to damages) is likely to increase with expanding export markets. A country integrating its trade with a partner characterized by relatively higher tariff and trade costs is also more likely to experience increased IS damages via expanded domestic production for the same reason. We illustrate our analytical results with a stylized model of the world wheat market.

Greenhouse Gas and Nitrogen Fertilizer Scenarios for U.S. Agriculture and Global Biofuels, June 2011

This analysis uses the 2011 FAPRI-CARD (Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute–Center for Agricultural and Rural Development) baseline to evaluate the impact of four alternative scenarios on U.S. and world agricultural markets, as well as on world fertilizer use and world agricultural greenhouse gas emissions. A key assumption in the 2011 baseline is that ethanol support policies disappear in 2012. The baseline also assumes that existing biofuel mandates remain in place and are binding. Two of the scenarios are adverse supply shocks, the first being a 10% increase in the price of nitrogen fertilizer in the United States, and the second, a reversion of cropland into forestland. The third scenario examines how lower energy prices would impact world agriculture. The fourth scenario reintroduces biofuel tax credits and duties. Given that the baseline excludes these policies, the fourth scenario is an attempt to understand the impact of these policies under the market conditions that prevail in early 2011. A key to understanding the results of this fourth scenario is that in the absence of tax credits and duties, the mandate drives biofuel use. Therefore, when the tax credits and duties are reintroduced, the impacts are relatively small. In general, the results show that the entire international commodity market system is remarkably robust with respect to policy changes in one country or in one sector. The policy implication is that domestic policy changes implemented by a large agricultural producer like the United States can have fairly significant impacts on the aggregate world commodity markets. A second point that emerges from the results is that the law of unintended consequences is at work in world agriculture. For example, a U.S. nitrogen tax that might presumably be motivated for environmental benefit results in an increase in world greenhouse gas emissions. A similar situation occurs in the afforestation scenario in which crop production shifts from high-yielding land in the United States to low-yielding land and probably native vegetation in the rest of the world, resulting in an unintended increase in global greenhouse gas emissions.

Collective Marketing Arrangements for Geographically Differentiated Agricultural Products: Welfare Impacts and Policy Implications, May 2006

This paper examines the incentive of atomistic agricultural producers within a specific geographical region to differentiate and collectively market products. We develop a model that allows us to analyze the market and welfare effects of the main types of real-world producer organizations, using it to derive economic insights regarding the circumstances under which these organizations will evolve, and describing implications of the results obtained in the context of an ongoing debate between the European Union and United States. As the anticipated fixed costs of development and marketing increase and the anticipated size of the market falls, it becomes essential to increase the ability of the producer organization to control supply in order to ensure the coverage of fixed costs. Whenever a collective organization allows a market (with a new product) to exist that otherwise would not have existed there is an increase in societal welfare. Counterintuitively, stronger property right protection for producer organizations may be welfare enhancing even after a differentiated product has been developed. The reason for this somewhat paradoxical result is that legislation aimed at curtailing the market power of producer organizations may induce large technological distortions.