The Conservation Reserve Program in the Presence of a Working Land Alternative: Implications for Environmental Quality, Program Participation, and Income Transfer, August 2005

The United States has invested large sums of resources in multiple conservation programs for agriculture over the past century. In this paper we focus on the impacts of program interactions. Specifically, using an integrated economic and bio-physical modeling framework, we consider the impacts of the presence of working land programs on a land retirement for an important agricultural region—the Upper Mississippi River Basin (UMRB). Compared to a land retirement only program, we find that the presence of a working land program for conservation tillage results in significantly lower predicted signups for land retirement at a given rental rate. We also find that the presence of both a large working land and land retirement program can result in more environmental benefits and income transfers than a land retirement only program can achieve.

Cooperatives and Contracting in Agriculture: The Case of West Liberty Foods, October 2005

The West Liberty Foods turkey cooperative was formed in 1996 to purchase the assets and assume operations of Louis Rich Foods (an investor-owned processing rm), which, at the time, announced the imminent shutdown of its West Liberty, Iowa, processing facility. We study the creation and performance of this �new generation� cooperative using eld interviews with grower members and company management. We describe changes, before and after the buyout, in the contractual apparatus used for procuring live turkeys, and in the communication requirements, work expectations, and nancial positions of growers. During the private ownership period, most of the inputs (except labor and facilities) were provided by the rm; there was substantial supervision of the growers' actions; growers faced little price and production risk; and growers' equity was due largely to ownership of land and other farm assets. Our interviews reveal that, after cooperative formation, growers were exposed to considerable additional risk; monitoring of growers by the rm was less intensive; grower time and effort commitments to turkey production increased substantially; and a signicant fraction of rm (cooperative) equity came from growers' willingness to leverage their farm and personal assets (and hence indirectly their existing relationships with local lenders). We argue that some of these changes are consistent with a nancial contract where asset pledging and its corollary risk generate higher work effort by growers and a reduction in agency rents. These economies likely compensate for an organizational deadweight loss traditionally associated with cooperative governance.

Greenhouse Gas and Nitrogen Fertilizer Scenarios for U.S. Agriculture and Global Biofuels, June 2011

This analysis uses the 2011 FAPRI-CARD (Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute–Center for Agricultural and Rural Development) baseline to evaluate the impact of four alternative scenarios on U.S. and world agricultural markets, as well as on world fertilizer use and world agricultural greenhouse gas emissions. A key assumption in the 2011 baseline is that ethanol support policies disappear in 2012. The baseline also assumes that existing biofuel mandates remain in place and are binding. Two of the scenarios are adverse supply shocks, the first being a 10% increase in the price of nitrogen fertilizer in the United States, and the second, a reversion of cropland into forestland. The third scenario examines how lower energy prices would impact world agriculture. The fourth scenario reintroduces biofuel tax credits and duties. Given that the baseline excludes these policies, the fourth scenario is an attempt to understand the impact of these policies under the market conditions that prevail in early 2011. A key to understanding the results of this fourth scenario is that in the absence of tax credits and duties, the mandate drives biofuel use. Therefore, when the tax credits and duties are reintroduced, the impacts are relatively small. In general, the results show that the entire international commodity market system is remarkably robust with respect to policy changes in one country or in one sector. The policy implication is that domestic policy changes implemented by a large agricultural producer like the United States can have fairly significant impacts on the aggregate world commodity markets. A second point that emerges from the results is that the law of unintended consequences is at work in world agriculture. For example, a U.S. nitrogen tax that might presumably be motivated for environmental benefit results in an increase in world greenhouse gas emissions. A similar situation occurs in the afforestation scenario in which crop production shifts from high-yielding land in the United States to low-yielding land and probably native vegetation in the rest of the world, resulting in an unintended increase in global greenhouse gas emissions.