The Recent International and Regulatory Decisions about Geographical Indications, 2007

As worldwide consumer demand for high-quality products and for information about these products increases, labels and geographical indications (GIs) can serve to signal quality traits to consumers. However, GI systems among countries are not homogeneous and can be used as trade barriers against competition. Philosophical differences between the European Union and the United States about how GIs should be registered and protected led to the formation of a WTO dispute settlement panel. In this paper we discuss the issues behind the dispute, the World Trade Organization (WTO) panel decision, and the EU response to the panel decision leading to the new Regulation 510/2006. Given the potential for GI labels to supply consumer information, context is provided for the discussion using recent literature on product labeling. Implications are drawn regarding the importance of the panel decision and the EU response relative to GI issues yet to be negotiated under the Doha Round.

How Much “Safety” Is Available under the U.S. Proposal to the WTO?, November 2005

Critics of the U.S. proposal to the World Trade Organization (WTO) made in October 2005 are correct when they argue that adoption of the proposal would significantly reduce available support under the current farm program structure. Using historical prices and yields from 1980 to 2004, we estimate that loan rates would have to drop by 9 percent and target prices would have to drop by 10 percent in order to meet the proposed aggregate Amber Box and Blue Box limits. While this finding should cheer those who think that reform of U.S. farm programs is long overdue, it alarms those who want to maintain a strong safety net for U.S. agriculture. The dilemma of needing to reform farm programs while maintaining a strong safety net could be resolved by redesigning programs so that they target revenue rather than price. Building on a base of 70 percent Green Box income insurance, a program that provides a crop-specific revenue guarantee equal to 98 percent of the product of the current effective target price and expected county yield would fit into the proposed aggregate Amber and Blue Box limits. Payments would be triggered whenever the product of the season-average price and county average yield fell below this 98 percent revenue guarantee. Adding the proposed crop-specific constraints lowers the coverage level to 95 percent. Moving from programs that target price to ones that target revenue would eliminate the rationale for ad hoc disaster payments. Program payments would automatically arrive whenever significant crop losses or economic losses caused by low prices occurred. Also, much of the need for the complicated mechanism (the Standard Reinsurance Agreement) that transfers most risk of the U.S. crop insurance to the federal government would be eliminated because the federal government would directly assume the risk through farm programs. Changing the focus of federal farm programs from price targeting to revenue targeting would not be easy. Farmers have long relied on price supports and the knowledge that crop losses are often adequately covered by heavily subsidized crop insurance or by ad hoc disaster payments. Farmers and their leaders would only be willing to support a change to revenue targeting if they see that the current system is untenable in an era of tight federal budgets and WTO limits.

International Update, December 2007/January 2008

News from the Iowa International Trade Team

International Update, January/February 2009

International Trade News from the Iowa International Trade Office

International Update, September-October 2009

International Business Development News from the International Trade Team

International Update, May-June 2010

International News from the Iowa International Trade Office of the Iowa Department of Economic Development's Business Development Division.

International Update, January-February 2011

International Trade Team news from the Business Development Division of the Iowa Department of Economic Development

International Update, May-June 2011

International Business News from the International Trade Team of the Iowa Department of Economic Development

International Update, November/December 2011

International Trade Office news from the Iowa Economic Development Authority

International Update March/April 2012

International Business news from the International Trade Office of the Iowa Economic Development Authority, Taipei, FIGAP/VIV, PTAP, Product Trade Asisstance Program,

Impact of Ownership Structure on the Performance of China’s Feed Mill Sector, April 2005

In the decade of the 1990s, China’s feed sector became increasingly privatized, more feed mills opened, and the scale of operation expanded. Capacity utilization remained low and multi-ministerial supervision was still prevalent, but the feed mill sector showed a positive performance overall, posting a growth rate of 11 percent per year. Profit margin over sales was within allowable rates set by the government of China at 3 to 5 percent. Financial efficiency improved, with a 20 percent quicker turnover of working capital. Average technical efficiency was 0.805, as more efficient feed mills increasingly gained production shares. This study finds evidence that the increasing privatization explains the improved performance of the commercial feed mill sector. The drivers that shaped the feed mill sector in the 1990s have changed with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. With the new policy regime in place, the study foresees that, assuming an adequate supply of soy meal and an excess capacity in the feed mill sector, it is likely that China will allow corn imports up to the tariff rate quota (TRQ) of 7.2 mmt since the in-quota rate is very low at 1 percent. However, when the TRQ is exceeded, the import duty jumps to a prohibitive out-quota rate of 65 percent. With an import duty for meat of only 10 to 12 percent, China would have a strong incentive to import meat products directly rather than bringing in expensive corn to produce meat domestically. This would be further reinforced if structural transformation in the swine sector would narrow the cost differential between domestic and imported pork.