The Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grant (JAIBG) Program in Iowa, 1999 – 2000

The issue of effectively holding juveniles accountable for criminal behavior is a topic of public concern and debate. Congress created the Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grant (JAIBG) program and appropriated new federal funds through the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). The goals of the program are to reduce juvenile delinquency, improve the juvenile justice system, and increase accountability for juvenile offenders.

Report on the Early Out Incentive (EOI) programs, including a Buy Out Program, for the period November 20, 2001 through February 28, 2006

Report on the Early Out Incentive (EOI) programs, including a Buy Out Program, for the period November 20, 2001 through February 28, 2006

Tax Credit Evaluation Study: Tax Incentive Programs Used by Biofuel Producers, March 2009

During the 2005 Legislative Session the Iowa Department of Revenue received an appropriation to establish the Tax Credits Tracking and Analysis Program (TCTAP) to track tax credit awards and claims. In addition, the Department was directed to perform periodic evaluations of tax credit programs. The purpose of these studies is three-fold: (1) To provide a comparison of the Iowa tax credit program to similar federal and other states’ programs (2) To summarize information related to the usage of the Iowa tax credit (3) To evaluate the economic impact of the tax credit program.

Use of Incentive/Disincentive Contracting to Mitigate Work Zone Traffic Impacts, 2012

Incentive/disincentive clauses (I/D) are designed to award payments to contractors if they complete work ahead of schedule and to deduct payments if they exceed the completion time. A previously unanswered question is, “Did the costs of the actual work zone impacts that were avoided justify the incentives paid?” This report answers that question affirmatively based on an evaluation of 20 I/D projects in Missouri from 2008 to 2011. Road user costs (RUC) were used to quantify work zone impacts and included travel delays, vehicle operating costs, and crash costs. These were computed using work zone traffic conditions for partial-closure projects and detour volumes and routes for full-closure projects. Conditions during construction were compared to after construction. Crash costs were computed using Highway Safety Manual methodology. Safety Performance Functions produced annual crash frequencies that were translated into crash cost savings. In considering an average project, the percentage of RUC savings was around 13% of the total contract amount, or $444,389 of $3,464,620. The net RUC savings produced was around $7.2 million after subtracting the approximately $1.7 million paid in incentives. In other words, for every dollar paid in incentives, approximately 5.3 dollars of RUC savings resulted. I/D provisions were very successful in saving RUC for projects with full-closure, projects in urban areas, and emergency projects. Rural, non-emergency projects successfully saved RUC but not at the same level as other projects. The I/D contracts were also compared to all Missouri Department of Transportation contracts for the same time period. The results show that I/D projects had a higher on-time completion percentage and a higher number of bids per call than average projects. But I/D projects resulted in 4.52% higher deviation from programmed costs and possibly more changes made after the award. A survey of state transportation departments and contractors showed that both agreed to the same issues that affect the success of I/D contracts. Legal analysis suggests that liquidated damages is preferred to disincentives, since enforceability of disincentives may be an issue. Overall, in terms of work zone impact mitigation, I/D contracts are very effective at a relatively low cost.

Incentive-Disincentive Clause, HR-521, 1985

There is an urgent need to complete projects in high traffic urban areas in the shortest possible time. These road user benefits resulting from faster construction will minimize public inconvenience, safety hazards and a total cost to the public. The incentive - disincentive clause in the contract will encourage the contractor to expedite all phases in the contract. A copy of this special provision is part of this work plan and other details of construction are included in the plan and specification of Project F-65-4(34)--20-77.

Student Loan Repayment & Incentive Programs

Brochure highlighting common Student Loan Forgiveness/Repayment and Incentive programs available from the State of Iowa and federal governments. Areas highlighted include programs in education, health care, legal and public service/government employment. Brochure also answers common questions about Loan Forgiveness/Repayment and Incentive programs. Product code: IC-INCENTIVE, Rev. date: 7/16

Impact of Ownership Structure on the Performance of China’s Feed Mill Sector, April 2005

In the decade of the 1990s, China’s feed sector became increasingly privatized, more feed mills opened, and the scale of operation expanded. Capacity utilization remained low and multi-ministerial supervision was still prevalent, but the feed mill sector showed a positive performance overall, posting a growth rate of 11 percent per year. Profit margin over sales was within allowable rates set by the government of China at 3 to 5 percent. Financial efficiency improved, with a 20 percent quicker turnover of working capital. Average technical efficiency was 0.805, as more efficient feed mills increasingly gained production shares. This study finds evidence that the increasing privatization explains the improved performance of the commercial feed mill sector. The drivers that shaped the feed mill sector in the 1990s have changed with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. With the new policy regime in place, the study foresees that, assuming an adequate supply of soy meal and an excess capacity in the feed mill sector, it is likely that China will allow corn imports up to the tariff rate quota (TRQ) of 7.2 mmt since the in-quota rate is very low at 1 percent. However, when the TRQ is exceeded, the import duty jumps to a prohibitive out-quota rate of 65 percent. With an import duty for meat of only 10 to 12 percent, China would have a strong incentive to import meat products directly rather than bringing in expensive corn to produce meat domestically. This would be further reinforced if structural transformation in the swine sector would narrow the cost differential between domestic and imported pork.

Dairy Food Consumption, Production, and Policy in Japan, August 2005

We explore and investigate Japanese dairy markets. We first provide an overview of consumer demand and how it evolved after World War II. Using historical data and econometric estimates of Japanese dairy demand, we identify economic, cultural, and demographic forces that have been shaping consumption patterns. Then we summarize the characteristics of Japanese milk production and dairy processing and policies affecting them. We next describe the import regime and trade flows in dairy products. The analysis of the regulatory system of the dairy sector shows how its incentive structure affects the long-term prospects of various segments of the industry. The paper concludes with policy recommendations of how to reform the Japanese dairy sector.

Farm-Level Analysis of Risk Management Proposals, March 2000

This paper presents a detailed report of the representative farm analysis (summarized in FAPRI Policy Working Paper #01-00). At the request of several members of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the U.S. Senate, we have continued to analyze the impacts of the Farmers’ Risk Management Act of 1999 (S. 1666) and the Risk Management for the 21st Century Act (S. 1580). Earlier analysis reported in FAPRI Policy Working Paper #04-99 concentrated on the aggregate net farm income and government outlay impacts. The representative farm analysis is conducted for several types of farms, including both irrigated and non-irrigated cotton farms in Tom Green County, Texas; dryland wheat farms in Morton County, North Dakota and Sumner County, Kansas; and a corn farm in Webster County, Iowa. We consider additional factors that may shed light on the differential impacts of the two plans. 1. Farm-level income impacts under alternative weather scenarios. 2. Additional indirect impacts, such as a change in ability to obtain financing. 3. Implications of within-year price shocks. Our results indicate that farmers who buy crop insurance will increase their coverage levels under S. 1580. Farmers with high yield risk find that the 65 percent coverage level maximizes expected returns, but some who feel that they obtain other benefits from higher coverage will find that the S. 1580 subsidy schedule significantly lowers the cost of obtaining the additional coverage. Farmers with lower yield risk find that the increased indemnities from additional coverage will more than offset the increase in producer premium. In addition, because S. 1580 extends its increased premium subsidy percentages to revenue insurance products, farmers will have an increased incentive to buy revenue insurance. Differences in the ancillary benefits from crop insurance under the baseline and S. 1580 would be driven by the increase in insurance participation and buy-up. Given the same levels of insurance participation and buy-up, the ancillary benefits under the two scenarios would be the same.

Production and Abatement Distortions under Noisy Green Taxes, October 2005

Pigouvian taxes are typically imposed in situations where there is imperfect knowledge on the extent of damage caused by a producing firm. A regulator imposing imperfectly informed Pigouvian taxes may cause the firms that should (should not) produce to shut down (produce). In this paper we use a Bayesian information framework to identify optimal signal-conditioned taxes in the presence of such losses. The tax system involves reducing (increasing) taxes on firms identified as causing high (low) damage. Unfortunately, when an abatement decision has to be made, the tax system that minimizes production distortions also dampens the incentive to abate. In the absence of wrong-firm concerns, a regulator can solve the problem by not adjusting taxes for signal noise. When wrong-firm losses are a concern, the regulator has to trade off losses from distorted production incentives with losses from distorted abatement incentives. The most appropriate policy may involve a combination of instruments.

Inspection Intensity and Market Structure, October 2005

An investigation of financing an inspection policy while allowing the enforcement of a market regulation is described. A simple model shows that the intensity of controls depends on the market structure. Under a given number of firms, the per-firm probability of controls is lower than one, since firms’ incentive to comply with regulation holds under positive profits. In this case, a lump-sum tax is used for limiting distortions coming from financing with a fixed fee. Under free entry, the per-firm probability of controls is equal to one, and only a fixed fee that prevents excess entry is used to finance inspection.

Collective Marketing Arrangements for Geographically Differentiated Agricultural Products: Welfare Impacts and Policy Implications, May 2006

This paper examines the incentive of atomistic agricultural producers within a specific geographical region to differentiate and collectively market products. We develop a model that allows us to analyze the market and welfare effects of the main types of real-world producer organizations, using it to derive economic insights regarding the circumstances under which these organizations will evolve, and describing implications of the results obtained in the context of an ongoing debate between the European Union and United States. As the anticipated fixed costs of development and marketing increase and the anticipated size of the market falls, it becomes essential to increase the ability of the producer organization to control supply in order to ensure the coverage of fixed costs. Whenever a collective organization allows a market (with a new product) to exist that otherwise would not have existed there is an increase in societal welfare. Counterintuitively, stronger property right protection for producer organizations may be welfare enhancing even after a differentiated product has been developed. The reason for this somewhat paradoxical result is that legislation aimed at curtailing the market power of producer organizations may induce large technological distortions.

The Long-Run Impact of Corn-Based Ethanol on the Grain, Oilseed, and Livestock Sectors: A Preliminary Assessment, November 2006

The ongoing growth of corn-based ethanol production raises some fundamental questions about what impact continued growth will have on U.S. and world agriculture. Estimates of the long-run potential for ethanol production can be made by calculating the corn price at which the incentive to expand ethanol production disappears. Under current ethanol tax policy, if the prices of crude oil, natural gas, and distillers grains stay at current levels, then the break-even corn price is $4.05 per bushel. A multi-commodity, multi country system of integrated commodity models is used to estimate the impacts if we ever get to $4.05 corn. At this price, corn-based ethanol production would reach 31.5 billion gallons per year, or about 20% of projected U.S. fuel consumption in 2015. Supporting this level of production would require 95.6 million acres of corn to be planted. Total corn production would be approximately 15.6 billion bushels, compared to 11.0 billion bushels today. Most of the additional corn acres come from reduced soybean acreage. Wheat markets would adjust to fulfill increased demand for feed wheat. Corn exports and production of pork and poultry would all be reduced in response to higher corn prices and increased utilization of corn by ethanol plants. These results should not be viewed as a prediction of what will eventually materialize. Rather, they indicate a logical end point to the current incentives to invest in corn-based ethanol plants.

Evaluation of PCC Long-Term Durability Using Intermediate Sized Gravels to Optimize Mix Gradations, April 2010

With the implementation of the 2000 Q-MC specification, an incentive is provided to produce an optimized gradation to improve placement characteristics. Also, specifications for slip-formed barrier rail have changed to require an optimized gradation. Generally, these optimized gradations have been achieved by blending an intermediate aggregate with the coarse and fine aggregate. The demand for this intermediate aggregate has been satisfied by using crushed limestone chips developed from the crushing of the parent concrete stone. The availability, cost, and physical limitations of crushed limestone chips can be a concern. A viable option in addressing these concerns is the use of gravel as the intermediate aggregate. Unfortunately, gravels of Class 3I durability are limited to a small geographic area in Mississippi river sands north of the Rock River. Class 3 or Class 2 durability gravels are more widely available across the state. The durability classification of gravels is based on the amount and quality of the carbonate fraction of the material. At present, no service histories or research exists to assess the impact of using Class 3 or 2 durability gravels would have on the long-term durability of Portland cement concrete (PCC) pavement requiring Class 3I aggregate.

National register of historic places in Iowa,1978.

This is a list of properties in Iowa in 1978 that are on the National Register of Historic Places. These properties are recognized as being historically, architecturally and archaeologically significant through a program of registration, financial aid and incentive, and partial protection from damage or destruction by federally-funded projects.