27 resultados para Collective organic intellectual
em Iowa Publications Online (IPO) - State Library, State of Iowa (Iowa), United States
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Tillage systems play a significant role in agricultural production throughout Iowa and the Midwest. It has been well documented that increased tillage intensities can reduce soil organic matter in the topsoil due to increased microbial activity and carbon (C ) oxidation. The potential loss of soil organic matter due to tillage operations is much higher for high organic matter soils than low organic matter soils. Tillage effects on soil organic matter can be magnified through soil erosion and loss of soil productivity. Soil organic matter is a natural reservoir for nutrients, buffers against soil erosion, and improves the soil environment to sustain soil productivity. Maintaining soil productivity requires an agriculture management system that maintains or improves soil organic matter content. Combining cropping systems and conservation tillage practices, such as no-tillage, strip-tillage, or ridge-tillage, are proven to be very effective in improving soil organic matter and soil quality.
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The choice of a research path in attacking scientific and technological problems is a significant component of firms’ R&D strategy. One of the findings of the patent races literature is that, in a competitive market setting, firms’ noncooperative choices of research projects display an excessive degree of correlation, as compared to the socially optimal level. The paper revisits this question in a context in which firms have access to trade secrets, in addition to patents, to assert intellectual property rights (IPR) over their discoveries. We find that the availability of multiple IPR protection instruments can move the paths chosen by firms engaged in an R&D race toward the social optimum.
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This paper reviews the economic effects of collective-quality promotion through a survey of the recent literature devoted to common labeling and professional groups. Benefits and costs of common labeling and professional groups for improving quality are detailed. Some empirical facts are presented, mainly focusing on some European examples, since many European countries have a long history of producer-owned marketing programs. This paper shows that in some cases the collective-quality promotion can be a successful strategy for firms/farmers.
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Evaluating the possible benefits of the introduction of genetically modified (GM) crops must address the issue of consumer resistance as well as the complex regulation that has ensued. In the European Union (EU) this regulation envisions the “co-existence” of GM food with conventional and quality-enhanced products, mandates the labelling and traceability of GM products, and allows only a stringent adventitious presence of GM content in other products. All these elements are brought together within a partial equilibrium model of the EU agricultural food sector. The model comprises conventional, GM and organic food. Demand is modelled in a novel fashion, whereby organic and conventional products are treated as horizontally differentiated but GM products are vertically differentiated (weakly inferior) relative to conventional ones. Supply accounts explicitly for the land constraint at the sector level and for the need for additional resources to produce organic food. Model calibration and simulation allow insights into the qualitative and quantitative effects of the large-scale introduction of GM products in the EU market. We find that the introduction of GM food reduces overall EU welfare, mostly because of the associated need for costly segregation of non-GM products, but the producers of quality-enhanced products actually benefit.
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This paper examines the incentive of atomistic agricultural producers within a specific geographical region to differentiate and collectively market products. We develop a model that allows us to analyze the market and welfare effects of the main types of real-world producer organizations, using it to derive economic insights regarding the circumstances under which these organizations will evolve, and describing implications of the results obtained in the context of an ongoing debate between the European Union and United States. As the anticipated fixed costs of development and marketing increase and the anticipated size of the market falls, it becomes essential to increase the ability of the producer organization to control supply in order to ensure the coverage of fixed costs. Whenever a collective organization allows a market (with a new product) to exist that otherwise would not have existed there is an increase in societal welfare. Counterintuitively, stronger property right protection for producer organizations may be welfare enhancing even after a differentiated product has been developed. The reason for this somewhat paradoxical result is that legislation aimed at curtailing the market power of producer organizations may induce large technological distortions.
Resumo:
Organic producers have limited methods of avoiding plant diseases that result in cosmetic damage to produce. Therefore, the appearance of organic produce is often less than perfect. We use an experimental auction to investigate how cosmetic damage affects consumers’ willingness to pay for organic apples. We find that 75% of the participants are willing to pay more for organic than for conventional apples given identical appearance. However, at the first sight of any imperfection in the appearance of the organic apples, this segment is significantly reduced. Furthermore, we find that there is a significant effect of interaction between cosmetic damage and product methods. Even though most consumers say they buy organic products to avoid pesticides, we find that cosmetic damage has a larger impact on the willingness to pay for organic apples than for conventional apples.
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This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a “research exemption” provision. The study of the welfare function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions, and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.
Resumo:
This Agreement made and entered into this 1st day of July 2007 at Des Moines, Iowa, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 20 of the Iowa Code, by and between the State of Iowa (hereinafter referred to as the Employer) and the State Police Officers Council, and its appropriate affiliated sub-organizations (hereinafter referred to as the Council), as representatives of employees employed by the State of Iowa, as set forth specifically in the Recognition Clause.
Resumo:
This Agreement made and entered into this 1st day of July 2007, at Des Moines, Iowa, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 20 of the Code of Iowa, by and between the State of Iowa (hereinafter referred to as the Employer) and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Iowa Public Employees Council 61, AFL-CIO (hereinafter referred to as the Union), and its appropriate affiliated locals, as representatives of employees employed by the State of Iowa, as set forth specifically in Appendix A.
Resumo:
This Agreement made and entered i into this 1 1st day of July 2007, at Des Moines, Iowa, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 20 of the Iowa Code, by and between the State of Iowa (hereinafter referred to as the Employer) and UE Local 893/Iowa United Professionals, and its appropriate affiliated locals, as representatives of employees employed by the State of Iowa, as set forth specifically in Appendix A (hereinafter referred to as the Union).
Resumo:
This agreement made and entered in to this 1st day of July 2007, at Des Moines, Iowa pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 20 of the Iowa code, by and between the State of Iowa (hereinafter referred to as the Employer) and UE Local 893/Iowa United Professionals, and it's appropriate affiliated locals, as representatives of employees employed by the State of Iowa, as set forth specifically in appendix A (hereinafter referred to as the Union).
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A newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship about the changes of organic farming and raising livestock in Iowa.
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A newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship about the changes of organic farming and raising livestock in Iowa.
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A newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship, this information is all about Iowa growers, what is new, what is going on around Iowa for growing.
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Newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship about Organic News in farming.