Business Recovery Status Report #20: Presidential Disaster #1763, November 21, 2008

Safeguard Iowa Partnership launched a survey to the business community to capture the impact from the 2008 disasters. Five hundred eighty surveys were completed and compiled for the report submitted to the Rebuild Iowa Office Economic and Workforce Development Task Force on August 20, 2008.

Statewide Economic Impacts of Disaster-Related Payments to Support Household and Private and Public Sector Recovery in Iowa, January 2010

There have been a multitude of programs providing assistance to the state of Iowa in the past 18 months. Springtime 2008 disasters resulted in tornado damage and widespread flood damage to large fractions of the state. In consequence, there was a very large flow of federal and state resources dedicated to assisting community and statewide recovery efforts. The nation was in recession as well and continued to be in recession through much of 2009. A sizeable amount of assistance found its way to Iowa under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 in the forms of infrastructure stimulus spending, income supports and other safety net spending for households, and stabilization assistance for essential public services like education. On top of that, the state of Iowa authorized the I Jobs program as an additional infrastructure development program, and as a jobs stimulus program. The total amount of spending for all types of programs, disaster or economic recovery related, is perhaps as high as $7.5 billion over the next few years.

Long Term Recovery Planning Task Force Report, August 2008

Eighty-five of 99 Iowa counties were declared Presidential Disaster Areas for Public Assistance and/orIndividual Assistance as a result of the tornadoes, storms, and floods over the incident period May 25 through August 13, 2008. Response dominated the state’s attention for weeks, with a transition to recovery as the local situations warranted. The widespread damage and severity of the impact on Iowans and their communities required a statewide effort to continue moving forward despite being surrounded by adversity. By all accounts, it will require years for the state to recover from these disasters. With an eye toward the future, recovery is underway across Iowa. As part of the Rebuild Iowa efforts, the Long Term Recovery Planning Task Force was charged with responsibilities somewhat different from other topical Task Force assignments. Rather than assess damage and report on how the state might address immediate needs, the Long Term Recovery Planning Task Force is directed to discuss and discern the best approach to the lengthy recovery process. Certainly, the Governor and Lieutenant Governor expect the task to be difficult; when planning around so many critical issues and overwhelming needs, it is challenging to think to the future, rather than to rise to the current day’s needs.

Supplemental Information to the August 2008 Long Term Recovery Planning Task Force Report, August 2008

Eighty-five of 99 Iowa counties were declared Presidential Disaster Areas for Public Assistance and/orIndividual Assistance as a result of the tornadoes, storms, and floods over the incident period May 25 through August 13, 2008. Response dominated the state’s attention for weeks, with a transition to recovery as the local situations warranted. The widespread damage and severity of the impact on Iowans and their communities required a statewide effort to continue moving forward despite being surrounded by adversity. By all accounts, it will require years for the state to recover from these disasters. With an eye toward the future, recovery is underway across Iowa. As part of the Rebuild Iowa efforts, the Long Term Recovery Planning Task Force was charged with responsibilities somewhat different from other topical Task Force assignments. Rather than assess damage and report on how the state might address immediate needs, the Long Term Recovery Planning Task Force is directed to discuss and discern the best approach to the lengthy recovery process. Certainly, the Governor and Lieutenant Governor expect the task to be difficult; when planning around so many critical issues and overwhelming needs, it is challenging to think to the future, rather than to rise to the current day’s needs.

Missouri River Flood Coordination Task Force Report, September 25, 2011

The Missouri River floods of 2011 will go down in history as the longest duration flooding event this state has seen to date. The combination of above normal snowfall in the upper Missouri River basin followed by the equivalent of nearly one year’s worth of rainfall in May created an above normal runoff situation which filled the Missouri River and the six main reservoirs within the basin. Compounding this problem was colder than normal temperatures which kept much of the snowpack in the upper basin on the ground longer into the spring, setting the stage for this historic event. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) began increasing the outflow at Gavin’s Point, near Yankton, South Dakota in May. On June 14, 2011, the outflow reached a record rate of over 160,000 cubic feet per second (cfs), over twice the previous record outflow set in 1997. This increased output from Gavin’s Point caused the Missouri River to flow out of its banks covering over 283,000 acres of land in Iowa, forcing hundreds of evacuations, damaging 255,000 acres of cropland and significantly impacting the levee system on the Missouri River basin. Over the course of the summer, approximately 64 miles of primary roads closed due to Missouri River flooding, including 54 miles of Interstate Highway. Many county secondary roads were closed by high water or overburdened due to the numerous detours and road closures in this area. As the Missouri River levels began to increase, municipalities and counties aided by State and Federal agencies began preparing for a sustained flood event. Citizens, businesses, state agencies, local governments and non‐profits made substantial preparations, in some cases expending millions of dollars on emergency protective measures to protect their facilities from the impending flood. Levee monitors detected weak spots in the levee system in all affected counties, with several levees being identified as at risk levees that could potentially fail. Of particular concern was the 28 miles of levees protecting Council Bluffs. Based on this concern, Council Bluffs prepared an evacuation plan for the approximately 30,000 residents that resided in the protected area. On May 25, 2011, Governor Branstad directed the execution of the Iowa Emergency Response Plan in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act. On May 31, 2011, HSEMD Administrator, Brigadier General J. Derek Hill, formally requested the USACE to provide technical assistance and advanced measures for the communities along the Missouri River basin. On June 2, 2011 Governor Branstad issued a State of Iowa Proclamation of Disaster Emergency for Fremont, Harrison, Mills, Monona, Pottawattamie, and Woodbury counties. The length of this flood event created a unique set of challenges for Federal, State and local entities. In many cases, these organizations were conducting response and recovery operations simultaneously. Due to the length of this entire event, the State Emergency Operations Center and the local Emergency Operations Centers remained open for an extended period of time, putting additional strain on many organizations and resources. In response to this disaster, Governor Branstad created the Missouri River Recovery Coordination Task Force to oversee the State’s recovery efforts. The Governor announced the creation of this Task Force on October 17, 2011 and appointed Brigadier General J. Derek Hill, HSEMD Administrator as the chairman. This Task Force would be a temporary group of State agency representatives and interested stakeholders brought together to support the recovery efforts of the Iowa communities impacted by the Missouri River Flood. Collectively, this group would analyze and share damage assessment data, coordinate assistance across various stakeholders, monitor progress, capture best practices and identify lessons learned.

Iowa Emergency Response Plan, October, 2010

The State of Iowa has adopted a multi-hazard approach to managing the consequences of emergency/disaster response. Underlying this approach is the principle that a standard set of generic functional capabilities can be employed to effectively address a wide variety of hazardous conditions and categories of incidents, whether these have a known probability of occurring or are totally unforeseen. Therefore, to the greatest extent possible, the activities described and assigned in this plan are organized along functional lines first, rather than by agency, type of hazard, or type of incident. Contained in this section of the Plan, known as the ―Basic Plan,‖ are instructions, policies, and explanatory information related to many or all of the agencies/entities involved in emergency/ disaster response, as well as information about the legal and administrative foundations for the Plan, the state’s characteristics and significant hazards, lines of succession for the state’s chief executive, plan activation requirements, and the structure of the response organization.

Long-Term Care Facility Disaster Preparedness, June 19, 2014

Long-term care facilities have very difficult decisions to make in terms of evacuating residents/tenants or providing “shelter in place”. Long-term care facilities need to be actively involved with the Emergency Management Teams at the county level and work with them to develop effective disaster preparedness plans. When it comes to disaster preparedness it is important to write a plan, exercise the plan, revise the plan, re-exercise the plan and identify the best practices.

Serving Iowa Youth and Families with a Youth Development Approach : JJDP Act Formula Grant Application and Three-Year Comprehensive Plan

This report is Iowa’s Three-Year Plan, which serves as the application for federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act formula grant funding (JJDP Act). The Division of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning (CJJP) wrote Iowa’s Three-Year Plan. CJJP is the state agency responsible for administering the JJDP Act in Iowa. Federal officials refer to state administering agencies as the state planning agency (SPA). The Plan was developed and approved by Iowa’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Council. That Council assists with administration of the JJDP Act, and also provides guidance and direction to the SPA, the Governor and the legislature regarding juvenile justice issues in Iowa. Federal officials refer to such state level groups as state advisory groups (SAG’s). The acronyms SPA and SAG are used through this report.

Iowa Department for the Blind Agency Performance Plan

Agency Performance Plan of the Iowa Department for the Blind.

Office of Drug Control Policy, Agency Performance Plan

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance, Agency Performance Plan

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Natural Resources, Agency Performance Plan

Annual Report, Agency performance plan

Iowa Department of Public Defense, Agency Performance Plan

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Department of Human Right - Community Action, Agency Performance Plan

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Department of Human Rights - Latino Affairs, Agency Performance Plan

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan