Education Task Force Report, August 2008

The Rebuild Iowa Education Task Force is composed of Iowans with experience and expertise related to the impact of the tornadoes, storms, and floods of 2008 on the educational system in Iowa. The massive damage greatly impacted educational facilities and enrollment, resulting in thousands of displaced students and significant long-term rebuilding needs. In addition, the education system is a “community center,” and in many ways acts as a first responder to Iowans experiencing the disasters. It is important to also recognize this role and the need for “non-educational” (and often non-quantifiable) supports as a part of the overall recovery effort. There are a few parts of the state that sustained significant structural and other damage as a result of the disasters. However, many school districts and educational institutions throughout the state experienced damage that resulted in re-allocating building usage, enrollment issues (because of housing and relocation issues in the community), or use of school facilities to assist in the recovery efforts (by housing displaced community agencies and providing temporary shelter for displaced Iowans). At this time, damage estimates are only estimates and numbers are revised often. Estimates of damage are being developed by multiple agencies, including FEMA, the Iowa Department of Education, insurance companies, and schools themselves, since there are many different types of damage to be assessed and repaired. In addition to structural damage, educational institutions and communities are trying to find ways to quantify sometimes unquantifiable data, such as future revenue capabilities, population declines, and impact on mental health in the long-term. The data provided in this report is preliminary and as up to date as possible; information is updated on a regular basis as assessments continue and damage estimates are finalized.

Supplemental Information to the August 2008 Education Task Force Report, August 2008

The Rebuild Iowa Education Task Force is composed of Iowans with experience and expertise related to the impact of the tornadoes, storms, and floods of 2008 on the educational system in Iowa. The massive damage greatly impacted educational facilities and enrollment, resulting in thousands of displaced students and significant long-term rebuilding needs. In addition, the education system is a “community center,” and in many ways acts as a first responder to Iowans experiencing the disasters. It is important to also recognize this role and the need for “non-educational” (and often non-quantifiable) supports as a part of the overall recovery effort. There are a few parts of the state that sustained significant structural and other damage as a result of the disasters. However, many school districts and educational institutions throughout the state experienced damage that resulted in re-allocating building usage, enrollment issues (because of housing and relocation issues in the community), or use of school facilities to assist in the recovery efforts (by housing displaced community agencies and providing temporary shelter for displaced Iowans). At this time, damage estimates are only estimates and numbers are revised often. Estimates of damage are being developed by multiple agencies, including FEMA, the Iowa Department of Education, insurance companies, and schools themselves, since there are many different types of damage to be assessed and repaired. In addition to structural damage, educational institutions and communities are trying to find ways to quantify sometimes unquantifiable data, such as future revenue capabilities, population declines, and impact on mental health in the long-term. The data provided in this report is preliminary and as up to date as possible; information is updated on a regular basis as assessments continue and damage estimates are finalized. Supplemental Information to the August 2008 Education Task Force Report

Flood Plain Management & Hazard Mitigation Task Force Report, August 2008

The Flood Plain Management and Hazard Mitigation Task Force emphasizes the long-term benefits of mitigation and management to the entire state in preventing or reducing damages from floods and other hazards faced in Iowa. Investments in efforts to manage watershed areas and to mitigate any damages from floods or other disaster events benefit individuals, families, communities, agriculture, business and industry, and certainly public entities and infrastructure. The Task Force encourages the Rebuild Iowa Advisory Commission to balance the immediate needs for rebuilding to include the beginning of the investments required to effectively mitigate future damage and maintain effective policy in Iowa’s watersheds. The significance of the damage seen in Iowa from the tornadoes, storms, and floods of 2008 include the loss of eighteen Iowans in disaster-related events. This alone should inspire investment in mitigation efforts for all hazards. Much of the damage resulting from the disasters can be tied to floodplain management and hazard mitigation, pointing the way toward enhanced efforts and new initiatives to safeguard lives, property, and communities’ economic health. Even so, it must be recognized that the weather events throughout last winter and spring added impetus to the rains and storms that ultimately resulted in record flooding. Some perspective must be maintained as planning progresses and significant investments in mitigation are considered to meet a specific level of safety and protection from future threats. The Task Force identified a number of issues, and four were agreed-upon as those with the highest priority to be addressed by the Task Force through a set of recommendations.

Supplemental Information to the August 2008 Flood Plain Management & Hazard Mitigation Task Force Report, August 2008

The Flood Plain Management and Hazard Mitigation Task Force emphasizes the long-term benefits of mitigation and management to the entire state in preventing or reducing damages from floods and other hazards faced in Iowa. Investments in efforts to manage watershed areas and to mitigate any damages from floods or other disaster events benefit individuals, families, communities, agriculture, business and industry, and certainly public entities and infrastructure. The Task Force encourages the Rebuild Iowa Advisory Commission to balance the immediate needs for rebuilding to include the beginning of the investments required to effectively mitigate future damage and maintain effective policy in Iowa’s watersheds. The significance of the damage seen in Iowa from the tornadoes, storms, and floods of 2008 include the loss of eighteen Iowans in disaster-related events. This alone should inspire investment in mitigation efforts for all hazards. Much of the damage resulting from the disasters can be tied to floodplain management and hazard mitigation, pointing the way toward enhanced efforts and new initiatives to safeguard lives, property, and communities’ economic health. Even so, it must be recognized that the weather events throughout last winter and spring added impetus to the rains and storms that ultimately resulted in record flooding. Some perspective must be maintained as planning progresses and significant investments in mitigation are considered to meet a specific level of safety and protection from future threats. The Task Force identified a number of issues, and four were agreed-upon as those with the highest priority to be addressed by the Task Force through a set of recommendations. Supplemental Information to the August 2008

Housing Task Force Report, August 2008

Few disaster recovery initiatives are more important than those that house the people and assist them to repair or replace their homes. The widespread damage to housing from the tornadoes, storms, and floods in 2008 creates greater challenges in housing than the state has faced from previous disasters. The Housing Task Force gratefully submits its Report to the Rebuild Iowa Advisory Commission as an opportunity to place data, issues, priorities and recommendations before residents, communities, state officials, and policymakers at all levels for consideration of how best to guide, support, and resource these efforts. Quantifying the impact of the disasters on communities is daunting. The many personal accounts and sets of community statistics paint pictures of Iowans who have emerged from the rubble or muck of their homes with a determination and commitment to rebuild not just like they were previous to the disasters, but better and stronger. Damage statistics are telling.

Supplemental Information to the August 2008 Housing Task Force Report, August 2008

Few disaster recovery initiatives are more important than those that house the people and assist them to repair or replace their homes. The widespread damage to housing from the tornadoes, storms, and floods in 2008 creates greater challenges in housing than the state has faced from previous disasters. The Housing Task Force gratefully submits its Report to the Rebuild Iowa Advisory Commission as an opportunity to place data, issues, priorities and recommendations before residents, communities, state officials, and policymakers at all levels for consideration of how best to guide, support, and resource these efforts. Quantifying the impact of the disasters on communities is daunting. The many personal accounts and sets of community statistics paint pictures of Iowans who have emerged from the rubble or muck of their homes with a determination and commitment to rebuild not just like they were previous to the disasters, but better and stronger. Damage statistics are telling. Supplemental Information to the August 2008

Mental Health Institute Task Force, December 2009

The Department shall staff a task force to be appointed by the governor consisting of knowledgeable citizen to perform an in-depth review of the four state mental health institutes, services provided, public benefits of the services provided, economic effects connected to the presence of the institutes that are realized by the communities in the areas served and the families of personnel and other public costs and benefits associated with the presence and availability of the four institutes. the review shall be coordinated with the proposal to be developed by the department under this section and shall submit a report providing findings and recommendations to the governor and general assembly on or before December, 15. 2009

Investigation of Des Moines Police Department, use of force in the Arrest of Larry Milton, 1992

Investigative report produced by Iowa Citizens' Aide/Ombudsman

Business Disaster Case Management Task Force, November 2010

During the 2010 session, the Iowa Legislature created per House File 2422 a Business Disaster Case Management Task Force. The purpose of the Task Force is to research disaster recovery case management assistance needed for businesses following a major disaster and to recommend steps for providing such assistance following disasters. The Task Force was duly constituted. Its recommendations are contained in this report. The Task Force focused on what the State of Iowa could do for itself without reliance on federal agencies or programs. It concluded that the hallmarks of any business disaster assistance must be speed of delivery and simplicity in execution. In addition, monies used to assist business recovery should be free of as many restraints on use as possible, relying on the affected businesses to judge for themselves how best to deploy capital resources.

Agreed upon procedures report on the Lee County Narcotics Task Force for the period July 1, 2010 through May 31, 2012

Agreed upon procedures report on the Lee County Narcotics Task Force for the period July 1, 2010 through May 31, 2012

Missouri River Flood Coordination Task Force Report, September 25, 2011

The Missouri River floods of 2011 will go down in history as the longest duration flooding event this state has seen to date. The combination of above normal snowfall in the upper Missouri River basin followed by the equivalent of nearly one year’s worth of rainfall in May created an above normal runoff situation which filled the Missouri River and the six main reservoirs within the basin. Compounding this problem was colder than normal temperatures which kept much of the snowpack in the upper basin on the ground longer into the spring, setting the stage for this historic event. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) began increasing the outflow at Gavin’s Point, near Yankton, South Dakota in May. On June 14, 2011, the outflow reached a record rate of over 160,000 cubic feet per second (cfs), over twice the previous record outflow set in 1997. This increased output from Gavin’s Point caused the Missouri River to flow out of its banks covering over 283,000 acres of land in Iowa, forcing hundreds of evacuations, damaging 255,000 acres of cropland and significantly impacting the levee system on the Missouri River basin. Over the course of the summer, approximately 64 miles of primary roads closed due to Missouri River flooding, including 54 miles of Interstate Highway. Many county secondary roads were closed by high water or overburdened due to the numerous detours and road closures in this area. As the Missouri River levels began to increase, municipalities and counties aided by State and Federal agencies began preparing for a sustained flood event. Citizens, businesses, state agencies, local governments and non‐profits made substantial preparations, in some cases expending millions of dollars on emergency protective measures to protect their facilities from the impending flood. Levee monitors detected weak spots in the levee system in all affected counties, with several levees being identified as at risk levees that could potentially fail. Of particular concern was the 28 miles of levees protecting Council Bluffs. Based on this concern, Council Bluffs prepared an evacuation plan for the approximately 30,000 residents that resided in the protected area. On May 25, 2011, Governor Branstad directed the execution of the Iowa Emergency Response Plan in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act. On May 31, 2011, HSEMD Administrator, Brigadier General J. Derek Hill, formally requested the USACE to provide technical assistance and advanced measures for the communities along the Missouri River basin. On June 2, 2011 Governor Branstad issued a State of Iowa Proclamation of Disaster Emergency for Fremont, Harrison, Mills, Monona, Pottawattamie, and Woodbury counties. The length of this flood event created a unique set of challenges for Federal, State and local entities. In many cases, these organizations were conducting response and recovery operations simultaneously. Due to the length of this entire event, the State Emergency Operations Center and the local Emergency Operations Centers remained open for an extended period of time, putting additional strain on many organizations and resources. In response to this disaster, Governor Branstad created the Missouri River Recovery Coordination Task Force to oversee the State’s recovery efforts. The Governor announced the creation of this Task Force on October 17, 2011 and appointed Brigadier General J. Derek Hill, HSEMD Administrator as the chairman. This Task Force would be a temporary group of State agency representatives and interested stakeholders brought together to support the recovery efforts of the Iowa communities impacted by the Missouri River Flood. Collectively, this group would analyze and share damage assessment data, coordinate assistance across various stakeholders, monitor progress, capture best practices and identify lessons learned.

Elder Abuse Task Force Report Pursuant to HF 2387: An Act Relating to Improvements to and Implementation of Laws Concerning Elder Abuse

During its 2012 session, Iowa’s 84th General Assembly passed House File 2387. The bill was signed into law by Governor Branstad and mandated a review of occurrences of and laws relating to abuse, neglect, or exploitation of individuals who are sixty years of age or older. After conducting the review, the twenty-three member Elder Abuse Task Force presents the following recommendations. These recommendations build upon current Iowa law and practice for the purpose of protecting older Iowans from abuse, neglect, and exploitation.

Iowa Sex Offender Treatment and Supervision Task Force Report to the Iowa General Assembly, January 15, 2007

Over the last several years, lawmakers have been responding to several highly publicized child abduction, assault and murder cases. While such cases remain rare in Iowa, the public debates they have generated are having far-reaching effects. Policy makers are responsible for controlling the nature of such effects. Challenges they face stem from the need to avoid primarily politically-motivated responses and the desire to make informed decisions that recognize both the strengths and the limitations of the criminal justice system as a vehicle for promoting safe and healthy families and communities. Consensus was reached by the Task Force at its first meeting that one of its standing goals is to provide nonpartisan guidance to help avoid or fix problematic sex offense policies and practices. Setting this goal was a response to the concern over what can result from elected officials’ efforts to respond to the types of sex offender-related concerns that can easily become emotionally laden and politically charged due to the universally held abhorrence of sex crimes against children. The meetings of the Task Force and the various work groups it has formed have included some spirited and perhaps emotionally charged discussions, despite the above-stated ground rule. However, as is described in the report, the Task Force’s first set of recommendations and plans for further study were approved through consensus. It is hoped that in upcoming legislative deliberations, it will be remembered that the non-legislative members of the Task Force all agreed on the recommendations contained in this report. The topics discussed in this first report from the Task Force are limited to the study issues specifically named in H.F. 619, the Task Force’s enabling legislation. However, other topics of concern were discussed by the Task Force because of their immediacy or because of their possible relationships with one or more of the Task Force’s mandated study issues. For example, it has been reported by some probation/parole officers and others that the 2000 feet rule has had a negative influence on treatment participation and supervision compliance. While such concerns were noted, the Task Force did not take it upon itself to investigate them at this time and thus broaden the agenda it was given by the General Assembly last session. As a result, the recently reinstated 2000 feet rule, the new cohabitation/child endangerment law and other issues of interest to Task Force members but not within the scope of their charge are not discussed in the body of this report. An issue of perhaps the greatest interest to most Task Force members that was not a part of their charge was a belief in the benefit of viewing Iowa’s efforts to protect children from sex crimes with as comprehensive a platform as possible. It has been suggested that much more can be done to prevent child-victim sex crimes than would be accomplished by only concentrating on what to do with offenders after a crime has occurred. To prevent child victimization, H.F. 619 policy provisions rely largely on incapacitation and future deterrent effects of increased penalties, more restrictive supervision practices and greater public awareness of the risk presented by a segment of Iowa’s known sex offenders. For some offenders, these policies will no doubt prevent future sex crimes against children, and the Task Force has begun long-term studies to look for the desired results and for ways to improve such results through better supervision tools and more effective offender treatment. Unfortunately, much of the effects from the new policies may primarily influence persons who have already committed sex offenses against minors and who have already been caught doing so. Task Force members discussed the need for a range of preventive efforts and a need to think about sex crimes against children from other than just a “reaction- to-the-offender” perspective. While this topic is not addressed in the report that follows, it was suggested that some of the Task Force’s discussions could be briefly shared through these opening comments. Along with incapacitation and deterrence, comprehensive approaches to the prevention of child-victim sex crimes would also involve making sure parents have the tools they need to detect signs of adults with sex behavior problems, to help teach their children about warning signs and to find the support they need for healthy parenting. School, faithbased and other community organizations might benefit from stronger supports and better tools they can use to more effectively promote positive youth development and the learning of respect for others, respect for boundaries and healthy relationships. All of us who have children, or who live in communities where there are children, need to understand the limitations of our justice system and the importance of our own ability to play a role in preventing sexual abuse and protecting children from sex offenders, which are often the child’s own family members. Over 1,000 incidences of child sexual abuse are confirmed or founded each year in Iowa, and most such acts take place in the child’s home or the residence of the caretaker of the child. Efforts to prevent child sexual abuse and to provide for early interventions with children and families at risk could be strategically examined and strengthened. The Sex Offender Treatment and Supervision Task Force was established to provide assistance to the General Assembly. It will respond to legislative direction for adjusting its future plans as laid out in this report. Its plans could be adjusted to broaden or narrow its scope or to assign different priority levels of effort to its current areas of study. Also, further Task Force considerations of the recommendations it has already submitted could be called for. In the meantime, it is hoped that the information and recommendations submitted through this report prove helpful.

Iowa Sex Offender Treatment and Supervision Task Force Report to the Iowa General Assembly, January 15, 2008

Over the last several years, lawmakers have been responding to several highly publicized child abduction, assault and murder cases. While such cases remain rare in Iowa, the public debates they have generated are having far-reaching effects. Policy makers are responsible for controlling the nature of such effects. Challenges they face stem from the need to avoid primarily politically-motivated responses and the desire to make informed decisions that recognize both the strengths and the limitations of the criminal justice system as a vehicle for promoting safe and healthy families and communities. Consensus was reached by the Task Force at its first meeting that one of its standing goals is to provide nonpartisan guidance to help avoid or fix problematic sex offense policies and practices. Setting this goal was a response to the concern over what can result from elected officials’ efforts to respond to the types of sex offender-related concerns that can easily become emotionally laden and politically charged due to the universally held abhorrence of sex crimes against children. The meetings of the Task Force and the various work groups it has formed have included some spirited and perhaps emotionally charged discussions, despite the above-stated ground rule. However, as is described in the report, the Task Force’s first set of recommendations and plans for further study were approved through consensus. It is hoped that in upcoming legislative deliberations, it will be remembered that the non-legislative members of the Task Force all agreed on the recommendations contained in this report. The topics discussed in this first report from the Task Force are limited to the study issues specifically named in H.F. 619, the Task Force’s enabling legislation. However, other topics of concern were discussed by the Task Force because of their immediacy or because of their possible relationships with one or more of the Task Force’s mandated study issues. For example, it has been reported by some probation/parole officers and others that the 2000 feet rule has had a negative influence on treatment participation and supervision compliance. While such concerns were noted, the Task Force did not take it upon itself to investigate them at this time and thus broaden the agenda it was given by the General Assembly last session. As a result, the recently reinstated 2000 feet rule, the new cohabitation/child endangerment law and other issues of interest to Task Force members but not within the scope of their charge are not discussed in the body of this report. An issue of perhaps the greatest interest to most Task Force members that was not a part of their charge was a belief in the benefit of viewing Iowa’s efforts to protect children from sex crimes with as comprehensive a platform as possible. It has been suggested that much more can be done to prevent child-victim sex crimes than would be accomplished by only concentrating on what to do with offenders after a crime has occurred. To prevent child victimization, H.F. 619 policy provisions rely largely on incapacitation and future deterrent effects of increased penalties, more restrictive supervision practices and greater public awareness of the risk presented by a segment of Iowa’s known sex offenders. For some offenders, these policies will no doubt prevent future sex crimes against children, and the Task Force has begun long-term studies to look for the desired results and for ways to improve such results through better supervision tools and more effective offender treatment. Unfortunately, much of the effects from the new policies may primarily influence persons who have already committed sex offenses against minors and who have already been caught doing so. Task Force members discussed the need for a range of preventive efforts and a need to think about sex crimes against children from other than just a “reaction- to-the-offender” perspective. While this topic is not addressed in the report that follows, it was suggested that some of the Task Force’s discussions could be briefly shared through these opening comments. Along with incapacitation and deterrence, comprehensive approaches to the prevention of child-victim sex crimes would also involve making sure parents have the tools they need to detect signs of adults with sex behavior problems, to help teach their children about warning signs and to find the support they need for healthy parenting. School, faithbased and other community organizations might benefit from stronger supports and better tools they can use to more effectively promote positive youth development and the learning of respect for others, respect for boundaries and healthy relationships. All of us who have children, or who live in communities where there are children, need to understand the limitations of our justice system and the importance of our own ability to play a role in preventing sexual abuse and protecting children from sex offenders, which are often the child’s own family members. Over 1,000 incidences of child sexual abuse are confirmed or founded each year in Iowa, and most such acts take place in the child’s home or the residence of the caretaker of the child. Efforts to prevent child sexual abuse and to provide for early interventions with children and families at risk could be strategically examined and strengthened. The Sex Offender Treatment and Supervision Task Force was established to provide assistance to the General Assembly. It will respond to legislative direction for adjusting its future plans as laid out in this report. Its plans could be adjusted to broaden or narrow its scope or to assign different priority levels of effort to its current areas of study. Also, further Task Force considerations of the recommendations it has already submitted could be called for. In the meantime, it is hoped that the information and recommendations submitted through this report prove helpful.

Governor's Youth Race and Detention Task Force; Full Force, May 2009

This report, the Full Report, is the culmination of the Task Force’s responsibilities as set out in Executive Order 5, dated October 30, 2007. The Executive Order specifies a number of goals and report requirements.There is a commonly held perception that the use of detention may serve as a deterrent to future delinquency. Data in this report reflect that approximately 40% of youth detained in 2006 were re-detained in 2006. Research conducted by national experts indicates that, particularly for low risk/low level offenders, that the use of detention is not neutral, and may increase the likelihood of recidivism. Comparable data for Iowa are not available (national data studied for this report provide level of risk, but risk level related to detention is not presently available for Iowa). The Task Force finds no evidence suggesting that recidivism levels (as related to detention risk) in Iowa should be different than found in other states. Data in this report also suggest that detention is one of the juvenile justice system’s more costly sanctions ($257 - $340 per day). Other sites and local jurisdictions have been able to redirect savings from the reduced use of juvenile detention to support less costly, community-based detention alternatives without compromising public safety.