Hilton Coliseum Revenue Bond Funds, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Independent Auditor's Report, Financial Statements and Supplemental Information, June 30, 2005

State University Audit Report

Ice Arena Facility Revenue Note Funds, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Independent Auditor's Report, Financial Statements and Supplemental Information, June 30, 2005

State University Audit Report

Academic Building Revenue Bond Funds, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Independent Auditor's Report, Financial Statements and Supplemental Information, June 30, 2005

State University Audit Report

Dormitory and Dining Services Revenue Bond Funds, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statements and Supplemental Information, June 30, 2005

State University Audit Report

Lottery Action, July 25-August 8, 2005, Vol. 12, no. 14

Iowa Lottery Authority Newsletter for Lottery retailers

Lottery Action, September 12-25, 2005, Vol. 12, no. 17

Iowa Lottery Newsletter for lottery retailers

Lottery Action Special Edition, October 10, 2005

Iowa Lottery newsletter for lottery retailers.

Iowa Lottery Action Newsletter Special Edition, Oct 31, 2005

Iowa Lottery newsletter for lottery retailers

Lottery Action Special Edition, October 31, 2005

Iowa Lottery newsletter for lottery retailers.

Iowa Health Focus, November 2005

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

ABD e-News November 11, 2005

Weekly Newsletter

ABD e-News October 14, 2005

Weekly Newsletter

ABD e-News October 21, 2005

Weekly Newsletter

IoWoman November/December 2005, Vol.35, no.6

Newsletter for the Iowa Commission on the Status of Women

Inspection Intensity and Market Structure, October 2005

An investigation of financing an inspection policy while allowing the enforcement of a market regulation is described. A simple model shows that the intensity of controls depends on the market structure. Under a given number of firms, the per-firm probability of controls is lower than one, since firms’ incentive to comply with regulation holds under positive profits. In this case, a lump-sum tax is used for limiting distortions coming from financing with a fixed fee. Under free entry, the per-firm probability of controls is equal to one, and only a fixed fee that prevents excess entry is used to finance inspection.