Audit report on the Disaster Grants – Public Assistance program of the Iowa River - Flint Creek Levee District in Des Moines County and Louisa County, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Disaster Grants – Public Assistance program of the Iowa River - Flint Creek Levee District in Des Moines County and Louisa County, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Great River Regional Waste Authority for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Great River Regional Waste Authority for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Great River Regional Waste Authority for the year ended June 30, 2011

Audit report on the Great River Regional Waste Authority for the year ended June 30, 2011

Cedar-Iowa River Rail Transit Project Feasibility Study, November 9, 2006

Five Seasons Transportation & Parking (FSTP) and the Johnson County Council of Governments (JCCOG) are interested in evaluating the feasibility of prospective passenger rail service(s) that would operate over existing trackage of the Cedar Rapids and Iowa City Railway Company (CRANDIC), seen below left, and/or the Iowa Interstate Railroad System (IAIS), seen below right, connecting Cedar Rapids, Iowa City and the Amana Colonies. To perform the study, FSTP and JCCOG selected R.L. Banks & Associates, Inc. (RLBA) as Prime Contractors, HNTB Corporation (HNTB) and Snyder & Associates, Inc. (Snyder) as Subcontractors, hereafter Consultant Team. Both railroads participated in the study and contributed time and resources, as did many local government and civic organizations. The purpose of the study is to determine whether it is feasible to establish regularly scheduled passenger rail service and/or special event excursion rail service, in conjunction with the Five Seasons Transit system, Iowa City Transit, East Central Iowa Transit, Coralville Transit and the University of Iowa CAMBUS.

Missouri River Flood Recovery, January 27, 2012 Vol. 1, no. 5

The Missouri River Flood Recovery newsletter is published by the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division in cooperation with members of the Missouri River Recovery Coordination Task Force.

Missouri River Flood Recovery, December 2, 2012 Vol. 1, no. 3

The Missouri River Flood Recovery newsletter is published by the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division in cooperation with members of the Missouri River Recovery Coordination Task Force.

Missouri River Flood Recovery, November 4, 2012 Vol. 1, no. 1

The Missouri River Flood Recovery newsletter is published by the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division in cooperation with members of the Missouri River Recovery Coordination Task Force.

Missouri River Flood Recovery, November 18, 2012 Vol. 1, no. 2

The Missouri River Flood Recovery newsletter is published by the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division in cooperation with members of the Missouri River Recovery Coordination Task Force.

Missouri River Flood Recovery, December 23, 2012 Vol. 1, no. 4

The Missouri River Flood Recovery newsletter is published by the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division in cooperation with members of the Missouri River Recovery Coordination Task Force.

Missouri River Flood Coordination Task Force Report, September 25, 2011

The Missouri River floods of 2011 will go down in history as the longest duration flooding event this state has seen to date. The combination of above normal snowfall in the upper Missouri River basin followed by the equivalent of nearly one year’s worth of rainfall in May created an above normal runoff situation which filled the Missouri River and the six main reservoirs within the basin. Compounding this problem was colder than normal temperatures which kept much of the snowpack in the upper basin on the ground longer into the spring, setting the stage for this historic event. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) began increasing the outflow at Gavin’s Point, near Yankton, South Dakota in May. On June 14, 2011, the outflow reached a record rate of over 160,000 cubic feet per second (cfs), over twice the previous record outflow set in 1997. This increased output from Gavin’s Point caused the Missouri River to flow out of its banks covering over 283,000 acres of land in Iowa, forcing hundreds of evacuations, damaging 255,000 acres of cropland and significantly impacting the levee system on the Missouri River basin. Over the course of the summer, approximately 64 miles of primary roads closed due to Missouri River flooding, including 54 miles of Interstate Highway. Many county secondary roads were closed by high water or overburdened due to the numerous detours and road closures in this area. As the Missouri River levels began to increase, municipalities and counties aided by State and Federal agencies began preparing for a sustained flood event. Citizens, businesses, state agencies, local governments and non‐profits made substantial preparations, in some cases expending millions of dollars on emergency protective measures to protect their facilities from the impending flood. Levee monitors detected weak spots in the levee system in all affected counties, with several levees being identified as at risk levees that could potentially fail. Of particular concern was the 28 miles of levees protecting Council Bluffs. Based on this concern, Council Bluffs prepared an evacuation plan for the approximately 30,000 residents that resided in the protected area. On May 25, 2011, Governor Branstad directed the execution of the Iowa Emergency Response Plan in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act. On May 31, 2011, HSEMD Administrator, Brigadier General J. Derek Hill, formally requested the USACE to provide technical assistance and advanced measures for the communities along the Missouri River basin. On June 2, 2011 Governor Branstad issued a State of Iowa Proclamation of Disaster Emergency for Fremont, Harrison, Mills, Monona, Pottawattamie, and Woodbury counties. The length of this flood event created a unique set of challenges for Federal, State and local entities. In many cases, these organizations were conducting response and recovery operations simultaneously. Due to the length of this entire event, the State Emergency Operations Center and the local Emergency Operations Centers remained open for an extended period of time, putting additional strain on many organizations and resources. In response to this disaster, Governor Branstad created the Missouri River Recovery Coordination Task Force to oversee the State’s recovery efforts. The Governor announced the creation of this Task Force on October 17, 2011 and appointed Brigadier General J. Derek Hill, HSEMD Administrator as the chairman. This Task Force would be a temporary group of State agency representatives and interested stakeholders brought together to support the recovery efforts of the Iowa communities impacted by the Missouri River Flood. Collectively, this group would analyze and share damage assessment data, coordinate assistance across various stakeholders, monitor progress, capture best practices and identify lessons learned.

Audit report on the Great River Regional Waste Authority for the year ended June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Great River Regional Waste Authority for the year ended June 30, 2012

Report on a special investigation of the City of Grand River for the period July 1, 2004 through March 7, 2012

Report on a special investigation of the City of Grand River for the period July 1, 2004 through March 7, 2012

The Raccoon River Valley Trail user study: summary and recommendations,1992.

This study is a concise summary of a study of trail users on the Raccoon River Valley Trail commissioned by the Dallas County Conservation Board. It provides information associated with natural and cultural resources.

Western Iowa Missouri River Flooding -- Geo-Infrastructure Damage Assessment, Repair and Mitigation Strategies, TR-638, 2013

The 2011 Missouri River flooding caused significant damage to many geo-infrastructure systems including levees, bridge abutments/foundations, paved and unpaved roadways, culverts, and embankment slopes in western Iowa. The flooding resulted in closures of several interchanges along Interstate 29 and of more than 100 miles of secondary roads in western Iowa, causing severe inconvenience to residents and losses to local businesses. The main goals of this research project were to assist county and city engineers by deploying and using advanced technologies to rapidly assess the damage to geo-infrastructure and develop effective repair and mitigation strategies and solutions for use during future flood events in Iowa. The research team visited selected sites in western Iowa to conduct field reconnaissance, in situ testing on bridge abutment backfills that were affected by floods, flooded and non-flooded secondary roadways, and culverts. In situ testing was conducted shortly after the flood waters receded, and several months after flooding to evaluate recovery and performance. Tests included falling weight deflectometer, dynamic cone penetrometer, three-dimensional (3D) laser scanning, ground penetrating radar, and hand auger soil sampling. Field results indicated significant differences in roadway support characteristics between flooded and non-flooded areas. Support characteristics in some flooded areas recovered over time, while others did not. Voids were detected in culvert and bridge abutment backfill materials shortly after flooding and several months after flooding. A catalog of field assessment techniques and 20 potential repair/mitigation solutions are provided in this report. A flow chart relating the damages observed, assessment techniques, and potential repair/mitigation solutions is provided. These options are discussed for paved/unpaved roads, culverts, and bridge abutments, and are applicable for both primary and secondary roadways.

Chlordane Contamination Study of the Cedar River, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Spring-Summer 1985

This report from the University Hygienic Laboratory contains the results of a chlordane study of the Cedar River taken in the spring and summer of 1985 after it was discovered from a routine fish tissue monitoring program in Iowa that it contained levels of chlordane in excess of the FDA action level.