Infección por virus pandémico (H1N1) 2009 en Andalucía

In April 2009, in response to the WHO's alert due to the existence of human infection cases with a new AH1N1 influenza virus, known as swine flu, Andalusian Health Authorities trigger an specific action plan. The surveillance actions developped provided us with appropriate clinical, epidemiological and virological characteristics of the disease. During the first few days, contingency plans were set up based on epidemiological surveillance and outbreak control measures were adopted through early alert and rapid response systems. After phase 6 was declared, influenza sentinel and severe cases surveillance were used in order to plan healthcare services, to reduce transmission and to identify and protect the most vulnerable population groups. Behaviour of pandemic influenza in Andalusia was similar to that observed in the rest of the world. Atack rate was similar to a seasonal flu and the peak was reached at the 46th/2009 week. Most of them were mild cases and affected particularly to young people. The average age of hospitalised patients was 32. Prior pulmonary disease, smoking and morbid obesity (BMI>40) were the most common pathologies and risk factors in severe cases. An impact scenario of pandemic wave in Andalusia, with an expected attack rate from 2 to 5%, was prepared considering watt observed in the southern hemisphere. Characteristics of the epidemic concerning its extent, severity and mortality rate were adjusted to this scenario.

Plan Andaluz de Atención a las personas con dolor : 2010 - 2013

Publicado en la página web de la Consejería de Salud y Bienestar Social: www.juntadeandalucia.es/salud (Consejería de Salud y Bienestar Social / Ciudadanía / Quiénes somos / Planes y Estrategias)

Plan Andaluz de Cuidados Paliativos, 2008-2012

Publicado en la página web de la Consejería de Igualdad, Salud y Políticas Sociales: www.juntadeandalucia.es/salud (Consejería de Igualdad, Salud y Políticas Sociales / Ciudadanía / Quiénes somos / Planes y Estrategias)

Why Public Health Agencies Cannot Depend on Good Laboratory Practices as a Criterion for Selecting Data: The Case of Bisphenol A

In their safety evaluations of bisphenol A (BPA), the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and a counterpart in Europe, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), have given special prominence to two industry-funded studies that adhered to standards defined by Good Laboratory Practices (GLP). These same agencies have given much less weight in risk assessments to a large number of independently replicated non-GLP studies conducted with government funding by the leading experts in various fields of science from around the world. OBJECTIVES: We reviewed differences between industry-funded GLP studies of BPA conducted by commercial laboratories for regulatory purposes and non-GLP studies conducted in academic and government laboratories to identify hazards and molecular mechanisms mediating adverse effects. We examined the methods and results in the GLP studies that were pivotal in the draft decision of the U.S. FDA declaring BPA safe in relation to findings from studies that were competitive for U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding, peer-reviewed for publication in leading journals, subject to independent replication, but rejected by the U.S. FDA for regulatory purposes. DISCUSSION: Although the U.S. FDA and EFSA have deemed two industry-funded GLP studies of BPA to be superior to hundreds of studies funded by the U.S. NIH and NIH counterparts in other countries, the GLP studies on which the agencies based their decisions have serious conceptual and methodologic flaws. In addition, the U.S. FDA and EFSA have mistakenly assumed that GLP yields valid and reliable scientific findings (i.e., "good science"). Their rationale for favoring GLP studies over hundreds of publically funded studies ignores the central factor in determining the reliability and validity of scientific findings, namely, independent replication, and use of the most appropriate and sensitive state-of-the-art assays, neither of which is an expectation of industry-funded GLP research. CONCLUSIONS: Public health decisions should be based on studies using appropriate protocols with appropriate controls and the most sensitive assays, not GLP. Relevant NIH-funded research using state-of-the-art techniques should play a prominent role in safety evaluations of chemicals.

Behaviour of the pandemic H1N1 influenza virus in Andalusia, Spain, at the onset of the 2009-10 season.

In Andalusia, Spain, the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)v virus has spread throughout the community, being the dominant influenza strain in the season so far. The current objective of the Andalusia Health Service is focussed on the mitigation of the health and social impact by appropriate care of the patients at home or in health centres. The 2009-10 seasonal influenza epidemic started early compared with to previous seasons. This article analyses the influenza A(H1N1)v situation in Andalusia until the week 39/2009.

Anaphylaxis caused by imported red fire ant stings in Málaga, Spain.

A 27-year-old woman suffered from anaphylaxis after being stung by Solenopsis invicta ants while she was handling wood from South America. The patient reported no previous adverse reactions to stings by other hymenopteran species. Intradermal skin tests with hymenoptera venom (Vespula vulgaris, Polistes species, Apis melifera) were negative. Serum specific immunoglobulin (Ig) E yielded positive results for S invicta (5.28 kU/L) and negative results for A melifera, Ves v 5 and Pol a 5. Immunodetection assays showed the presence of serum IgE against the Sol i 2 allergen. The patient had probably been stung previously although inadvertently by red fire ants while she handled infested wood from South America, and precautionary measures are thus advisable when this material is to be handled. To our knowledge this is the first case of anaphylaxis from red fire ant stings reported in Europe.

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