Time Variation in the Dynamics of Worker Flows: Evidence from the US and Canada

VAR methods have been used to model the inter-relationships between inflows and outfl ows into unemployment and vacancies using tools such as impulse response analysis. In order to investigate whether such impulse responses change over the course of the business cycle or or over time, this paper uses TVP-VARs for US and Canadian data. For the US, we find interesting differences between the most recent recession and earlier recessions and expansions. In particular, we find the immediate effect of a negative shock on both in ow and out flow hazards to be larger in 2008 than in earlier times. Furthermore, the effect of this shock takes longer to decay. For Canada, we fi nd less evidence of time-variation in impulse responses.

The Changing Inter-Industry Wage Structure of the Organised Manufacturing Sector in India, 1973-74 to 2003-04

This study examines the inter-industry wage structure of the organised manufacturing sector in India for the period 1973-74 to 2003-04 by estimating the growth of average real wages for production workers by industry. In order to estimate the growth rates, the study adopts a methodological framework that differs from other studies in that the time series properties of the concerned variables are closely considered in order to obtain meaningful estimates of growth that are unbiased and (asymptotically) efficient. Using wage data on 51 manufacturing industries at three digit level of the National Industrial Classification 1998 (India), our estimation procedure obtains estimates of growth of real wages per worker that are deterministic in nature by accounting for any potential structural break(s). Our findings show that the inter-industry wage structure in India has changed a lot in the period 1973-74 to 2003-04 and that it provides some evidence that the inter-industry wage differences have become more pronounced in the post-reforms period. Thus this paper provides new evidence from India on the need to consider the hypothesis that industry affiliation is potentially an important determinant of wages when studying any relationship between reforms and wages.

Growth Rate Estimation in the presence of Unit Roots

This study addresses the issue of the presence of a unit root on the growth rate estimation by the least-squares approach. We argue that when the log of a variable contains a unit root, i.e., it is not stationary then the growth rate estimate from the log-linear trend model is not a valid representation of the actual growth of the series. In fact, under such a situation, we show that the growth of the series is the cumulative impact of a stochastic process. As such the growth estimate from such a model is just a spurious representation of the actual growth of the series, which we refer to as a “pseudo growth rate”. Hence such an estimate should be interpreted with caution. On the other hand, we highlight that the statistical representation of a series as containing a unit root is not easy to separate from an alternative description which represents the series as fundamentally deterministic (no unit root) but containing a structural break. In search of a way around this, our study presents a survey of both the theoretical and empirical literature on unit root tests that takes into account possible structural breaks. We show that when a series is trendstationary with breaks, it is possible to use the log-linear trend model to obtain well defined estimates of growth rates for sub-periods which are valid representations of the actual growth of the series. Finally, to highlight the above issues, we carry out an empirical application whereby we estimate meaningful growth rates of real wages per worker for 51 industries from the organised manufacturing sector in India for the period 1973-2003, which are not only unbiased but also asymptotically efficient. We use these growth rate estimates to highlight the evolving inter-industry wage structure in India.

Minu, Startu and all that:- Pitfalls in estimating the sensitivity of a worker’s wage to aggregate unemployment

In this paper we show that the inclusion of unemployment-tenure interaction variates in Mincer wage equations is subject to serious pitfalls. These variates were designed to test whether or not the sensitivity to the business cycle of a worker’s wage varies according to her tenure. We show that three canonical variates used in the literature - the minimum unemployment rate during a worker’s time at the firm(min u), the unemployment rate at the start of her tenure(Su) and the current unemployment rate interacted with a new hire dummy(δu) - can all be significant and "correctly" signed even when each worker in the firm receives the same wage, regardless of tenure (equal treatment). In matched data the problem can be resolved by the inclusion in the panel of firm-year interaction dummies. In unmatched data where this is not possible, we propose a solution for min u and Su based on Solon, Barsky and Parker’s(1994) two step method. This method is sub-optimal because it ignores a large amount of cross tenure variation in average wages and is only valid when the scaled covariances of firm wages and firm employment are acyclical. Unfortunately δu cannot be identified in unmatched data because a differential wage response to unemployment of new hires and incumbents will appear under both equal treatment and unequal treatment.

Cohort effects within firms, and their implications for labour market outcomes and the business cycle

The project aims to achieve two objectives. First, we are analysing the labour market implications of the assumption that firms cannot pay similarly qualified employees differently according to when they joined the firm. For example, if the general situation for workers improves, a firm that seeks to hire new workers may feel it has to pay more to new hires. However, if the firm must pay the same wage to new hires and incumbents due to equal treatment, it would either have to raise the wage of the incumbents, or offer new workers a lower wage than the firm would do otherwise. This is very different from the standard assumption in economic analysis that firms are free to treat newly hired workers independently of existing hires. Second, we will use detailed data on individual wages to try to gauge whether (and to what extent) equity is a feature of actual labour markets. To investigate this, we are using two matched employer-employee panel datasets, one from Portugal and the other from Brazil. These unique datasets provide objective records on millions of workers and their firms over a long period of time, so that we can identify which firms employ which workers at each time. The datasets also include a large number of firm and worker variables.

A labor market with targeted wage offers

We model a market for highly skilled workers, such as the academic job market. The outputs of firm-worker matches are heterogeneous and common knowledge. Wage setting is synchronous with search: firms simultaneously make one personalized o¤er each to the worker of their choice. With large frictions (delay costs), efficient coordination is not possible, but for small frictions efficient matching with Diamond-type monopsony wages is an equilibrium.

Unemployment Risk and Wage Differentials

Workers in less secure jobs are often paid less than identical-looking workers in more secure jobs. We show that this lack of compensating differentials for unemployment risk can arise in equilibrium when all workers are identical and firms differ only in job security (i.e. the probability that the worker is not sent into unemployment). In a setting where workers search for new positions both on and off the job, the worker's marginal willingness to pay for job security is endogenous: it depends on the behavior of all firms in the labor market and increases with the rent the employing firm leaves to the worker. We solve for the labor market equilibrium, finding that wages increase with job security for at least all firms in the risky tail of the distribution of firm-level unemployment risk. Meanwhile, unemployment becomes persistent for low-wage and unemployed workers, a seeming pattern of 'unemployment scarring' created entirely by firm heterogeneity. Higher in the wage distribution, workers can take wage cuts to move to more stable employment.

Overtime Working and Contract Efficiency

We present a wage-hours contract designed to minimize costly turnover given investments in specific training combined with firm and worker information asymmetries. It may be optimal for the parties to work ‘long hours’ remunerated at premium rates for guaranteed overtime hours. Based on British plant and machine operatives, we test three predictions. First, trained workers with longer tenure are more likely to work overtime. Second, hourly overtime pay exceeds the value of marginal product while the basic hourly wage is less than the value of marginal product. Third, the basic hourly wage is negatively related to the overtime premium.

Unemployment Risk and Wage Differentials

Workers in less-secure jobs are often paid less than identical-looking workers in more secure jobs. We show that this lack of compensating differentials for unemployment risk can arise in equilibrium when all workers are identical and firms differ only in job security (i.e. the probability that the worker is not sent into unemployment). In a setting where workers search for new positions both on and off the job, the worker’s marginal willingness to pay for job security is endogenous, increasing with the rent received by a worker in his job, and depending on the behavior of all firms in the labor market. We solve for the labor market equilibrium and find that wages increase with job security for at least all firms in the risky tail of the distribution of firm-level unemployment risk. Unemployment becomes persistent for low-wage and unemployed workers, a seeming pattern of ‘unemployment scarring’ created entirely by firm heterogeneity. Higher in the wage distribution, workers can take wage cuts to move to more stable employment.

The Extent and Cyclicality of Career Changes: Evidence for the UK

Using quarterly data for the U.K. from 1993 through 2012, we document that in economic downturns a smaller fraction of unemployed workers change their career when starting a new job. Moreover, the proportion of total hires that involves a career change for the worker also drops in recessions. Together with a simultaneous drop in overall turnover, this implies that the number of career changes declines during recessions. These results indicate that recessions are times of subdued reallocation rather than of accelerated and involuntary structural transformation. We back this interpretation up with evidence on who changes careers, which industries and occupations they come from and go to, and at which wage gains.

Directed Search over the Life Cycle

We develop a life-cycle model of the labor market in which different worker-firm matches have different quality and the assignment of the right workers to the right firms is time consuming because of search and learning frictions. The rate at which workers move between unemployment, employment and across different firms is endogenous because search is directed and, hence, workers can choose whether to seek low-wage jobs that are easy to find or high-wage jobs that are hard to find. We calibrate our theory using data on labor market transitions aggregated across workers of different ages. We validate our theory by showing that it predicts quite well the pattern of labor market transitions for workers of different ages. Finally, we use our theory to decompose the age profiles of transition rates, wages and productivity into the effects of age variation in work-life expectancy, human capital and match quality.

The Extent and Cyclicality of Career Changes: Evidence for the UK

Using quarterly data for the U.K. from 1993 through 2012, we document that the extent of worker reallocation across occupations or industries (a career change, in the parlance of this paper) is high and procyclical. This holds true after controlling for workers' previous labour market status and for changes in the composition of who gets hired over the business cycle. Our evidence suggests that a large part of this reallocation reflect excess churning in the labour market. We also find that the majority of career changes come with wage increases. During the economic expansion wage increases were typically larger for those who change careers than for those who do not. During the recession this is not true for career changers who were hired from unemployment. Our evidence suggests that understanding career changes over the business cycle is important for explaining labour market ows and the cyclicality of wage growth.

A Theory of Wage Setting Behavior

Concerns for fairness, workers' morale and reciprocity infuence firms' wage setting policy. In this paper we formalize a theory of wage setting behavior in a simple and tractable model that explicitly considers these behavioral aspects. A worker is assumed to have reference-dependent preferences and displays loss aversion when evaluating the fairness of a wage contract. The theory establishes a wage-effort relationship that captures the worker's reference-dependent reciprocity, which in turn in uences the firm's optimal wage policy. The paper makes two key contributions: it identifies loss aversion as an explanation for a worker's asymmetric reciprocity; and it provides realistic and generalized microfoundation for downward wage rigidity. We further illustrate the implications of our theory for both wage setting and hiring behavior. Downward wage rigidity generates several implications for the outcome of the initial employment contract. The worker's reference wage, his extent of negative reciprocity and the firms expectations are key drivers of the propositions derived.