Who Matters in Coordination Problems?

We consider a common investment project that is vulnerable to a self-ful lling coordination failure and hence is strategically risky. Based on their private information, agents - who have heterogeneous investment incentives - form expectations or 'sentiments' about the project's outcome. We find that the sum of these sentiments is constant across di erent strategy profiles and it is independent of the distribution of incentives. As a result, we can think of sentiment as a scarce resource divided up among the di erent payo types. Applying this nding, we show that agents who bene t little from the project's success have a large impact on the coordination process. The agents with small bene ts invest only if their sentiment towards the project is large per unit investment cost. As the average sentiment is constant, a subsidy decreasing the investment costs of these agents will \free up" a large amount of sentiment, provoking a large impact on the whole economy. Intuitively, these agents, insensitive to the project's outcome and hence to the actions of others, are in uential because they modify their equilibrium behavior only if the others change theirs substantially.

Complexity and Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Problemsing.

I develop a model of endogenous bounded rationality due to search costs, arising implicitly from the problems complexity. The decision maker is not required to know the entire structure of the problem when making choices but can think ahead, through costly search, to reveal more of it. However, the costs of search are not assumed exogenously; they are inferred from revealed preferences through her choices. Thus, bounded rationality and its extent emerge endogenously: as problems become simpler or as the benefits of deeper search become larger relative to its costs, the choices more closely resemble those of a rational agent. For a fixed decision problem, the costs of search will vary across agents. For a given decision maker, they will vary across problems. The model explains, therefore, why the disparity, between observed choices and those prescribed under rationality, varies across agents and problems. It also suggests, under reasonable assumptions, an identifying prediction: a relation between the benefits of deeper search and the depth of the search. As long as calibration of the search costs is possible, this can be tested on any agent-problem pair. My approach provides a common framework for depicting the underlying limitations that force departures from rationality in different and unrelated decision-making situations. Specifically, I show that it is consistent with violations of timing independence in temporal framing problems, dynamic inconsistency and diversification bias in sequential versus simultaneous choice problems, and with plausible but contrasting risk attitudes across small- and large-stakes gambles.

Representations and the Corruption of Goods

The traditional view of the economic agent is of an individual who is self-interested, rational and perceives the world “correctly”. However, there is a lot of experimental and other evidence that undermines this view of agents. It is argued that an attempt to model these agents properly requires the cognitive science idea of a mental representation- a mental state with content. It is shown that this idea gives economists resources to discuss critiques of economics by Sandel (2012) and Grant (2012). In particular, it allows us to think clearly about the notion of goods being “corrupted” by a change in context from a non-market to a market situation.