An Empirical Examination of the R&D Boundaries of the Firm - A Problem-Solving Perspective

We consider, both theoretically and empirically, how different organization modes are aligned to govern the efficient solving of technological problems. The data set is a sample from the Chinese consumer electronics industry. Following mainly the problem solving perspective (PSP) within the knowledge based view (KBV), we develop and test several PSP and KBV hypotheses, in conjunction with competing transaction cost economics (TCE) alternatives, in an examination of the determinants of the R&D organization mode. The results show that a firm’s existing knowledge base is the single most important explanatory variable. Problem complexity and decomposability are also found to be important, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the PSP, but it is suggested that these two dimensions need to be treated as separate variables. TCE hypotheses also receive some support, but the estimation results seem more supportive of the PSP and the KBV than the TCE.

The Inflation Bias under Calvo and Rotemberg Pricing.

New Keynesian models rely heavily on two workhorse models of nominal inertia - price contracts of random duration (Calvo, 1983) and price adjustment costs (Rotemberg, 1982) - to generate a meaningful role for monetary policy. These alternative descriptions of price stickiness are often used interchangeably since, to a first order of approximation they imply an isomorphic Phillips curve and, if the steady-state is efficient, identical objectives for the policy maker and as a result in an LQ framework, the same policy conclusions. In this paper we compute time-consistent optimal monetary policy in bench-mark New Keynesian models containing each form of price stickiness. Using global solution techniques we find that the inflation bias problem under Calvo contracts is significantly greater than under Rotemberg pricing, despite the fact that the former typically significant exhibits far greater welfare costs of inflation. The rates of inflation observed under this policy are non-trivial and suggest that the model can comfortably generate the rates of inflation at which the problematic issues highlighted in the trend inflation literature emerge, as well as the movements in trend inflation emphasized in empirical studies of the evolution of inflation. Finally, we consider the response to cost push shocks across both models and find these can also be significantly different. The choice of which form of nominal inertia to adopt is not innocuous.

The Optimal Degree of Monetary-Discretion in a New Keynesian Model with Private Information

This paper considers the optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time, and the central bank takes these restrictions and the New Keynesian Phillips curve as constraints. By solving a dynamic mechanism design problem we find that it is optimal to grant "constrained discretion" to the central bank by imposing both upper and lower bounds on permissible inflation, and that these bounds must be set in a history-dependent way. The optimal degree of discretion varies over time with the severity of the time-inconsistency problem, and, although no discretion is optimal when the time-inconsistency problem is very severe, our numerical experiment suggests that no-discretion is a transient phenomenon, and that some discretion is granted eventually.