New Evidence on Allyn Young’s Style and Influence as a Teacher

This paper publishes the hitherto unpublished correspondence between Allyn Abbott Young’s biographer Charles Blitch and 17 of Young’s former students or associates. Together with related biographical and archival material, the paper shows the way in which this adds to our knowledge of Young’s considerable influence as a teacher upon some of the twentieth century’s greatest economists. The correspondents are as follows: James W Angell, Colin Clark, Arthur H Cole, Lauchlin Currie, Melvin G de Chazeau, Eleanor Lansing Dulles, Howard S Ellis, Frank W Fetter, Earl J Hamilton, Seymour S Harris, Richard S Howey, Nicholas Kaldor, Melvin M Knight

Factors Affecting Audit Quality in the 2007 UK Regulatory Environment: Perceptions of Chief Financial Officers, Audit Committee Chairs and Audit Engagement Partners

In line with global changes, the UK regulatory regime for audit and corporate governance has changed significantly since the Enron scandal, with an increased role for audit committees and independent inspection of audit firms. UK listed company chief financial officers (CFOs), audit committee chairs (ACCs) and audit partners (APs) were surveyed in 2007 to obtain views on the impact of 36 economic and regulatory factors on audit quality. 498 usable responses were received, representing a response rate of 36%. All groups rated various audit committee interactions with auditors among the factors most enhancing audit quality. Exploratory factor analysis reduces the 36 factors to nine uncorrelated dimensions. In order of extraction, these are: economic risk; audit committee activities; risk of regulatory action; audit firm ethics; economic independence of auditor; audit partner rotation; risk of client loss; audit firm size; and, lastly, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and audit inspection. In addition to the activities of the audit committee, risk factors for the auditor (both economic and certain regulatory risks) are believed to most enhance audit quality. However, ISAs and the audit inspection regime, aspects of the ‘standards-surveillance compliance’ regulatory system, are viewed as less effective. Respondents commented that aspects of the changed regime are largely process and compliance driven, with high costs for limited benefits, supporting psychological bias regulation theory that claims there is overconfidence that a useful regulatory intervention exists.