Ordering Policy Rules with an Unconditional Welfare Measure

The unconditional expectation of social welfare is often used to assess alternative macroeconomic policy rules in applied quantitative research. It is shown that it is generally possible to derive a linear - quadratic problem that approximates the exact non-linear problem where the unconditional expectation of the objective is maximised and the steady-state is distorted. Thus, the measure of pol icy performance is a linear combinat ion of second moments of economic variables which is relatively easy to compute numerically, and can be used to rank alternative policy rules. The approach is applied to a simple Calvo-type model under various monetary policy rules.

Median Independent Inequality Orderings

To date, inequality orderings for ordered response data are only suitable for comparing distributions that share a common median state. In this paper we propose a methodology for comparing distributions irrespective of their medians. We set out to do so by introducing a general pre-ordering and equivalence relation defined over distributions with different median responses, leading us naturally to derive a partial ordering over equivalence classes. We then discuss the implications of our results for the axiomatic derivation of inequality indices for ordered response data.

Competing for Attention: Is the Showiest also the Best?

We introduce attention games. Alternatives ranked by quality (producers, politicians, sexual partners...) desire to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by investing in their own salience. We prove that if alternatives can control the attention they get, then ”the showiest is the best”: the equilibrium ordering of salience (weakly) reproduces the quality ranking and the best alternative is the one that gets picked most often. This result also holds under more general conditions. However, if those conditions fail, then even the worst alternative can be picked most often.

Income stratification and the measurement of interdistributional inequality between multiple groups

This paper proposes a new class of stratification indices that measure interdistributional inequality between multiple groups. The class is based on a conceptualisation of stratification as a process that results in a hierarchical ordering of groups and therefore seeks to capture not only the extent to which groups form well-defined strata in the income distribution but also the scale of the resultant differences in income standards between them, where these two factors play the same role as identification and alienation respectively in the measurement of polarisation. The properties of the class as a whole are investigated as well as those of selected members of it: zeroth and first power indices may be interpreted as measuring the overall incidence and depth of stratification respectively, while higher power indices members are directly sensitive to the severity of stratification between groups. An illustrative application provides an empirical analysis of global income stratification by regions in 1993.

Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition

Bilateral oligopoly is a strategic market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, such a game approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied.