Correlated equilibria, good and bad: an experimental study

We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium, an important generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept. Specifically, we seek to understand the conditions under which subjects playing the game of Chicken will condition their behavior on private, third–party recommendations drawn from known distributions. In a “good–recommendations” treatment, the distribution we use is a correlated equilibrium with payoffs better than any symmetric payoff in the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoff vectors. In a “bad–recommendations” treatment, the distribution is a correlated equilibrium with payoffs worse than any Nash equilibrium payoff vector. In a “Nash–recommendations” treatment, the distribution is a convex combination of Nash equilibrium outcomes (which is also a correlated equilibrium), and in a fourth “very–good–recommendations” treatment, the distribution yields high payoffs, but is not a correlated equilibrium. We compare behavior in all of these treatments to the case where subjects do not receive recommendations. We find that when recommendations are not given to subjects, behavior is very close to mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium play. When recommendations are given, behavior does differ from mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium, with the nature of the differ- ences varying according to the treatment. Our main finding is that subjects will follow third–party recommendations only if those recommendations derive from a correlated equilibrium, and further, if that correlated equilibrium is payoff–enhancing relative to the available Nash equilibria.

Age, Life-satisfaction, and Relative Income – Insights from the UK and Germany

We first confirm previous results with the German Socio-Economic Panel by Layard et al. (2010), and obtain strong negative effects of comparison income. However, when we split the sample by age, we find quite different results for reference income. The effects on lifesatisfaction are positive and significant for those under 45, consistent with Hirschman’s (1973) ‘tunnel effect’, and only negative (and larger than in the full sample) for those over 45, when relative deprivation dominates. Thus for young respondents, reference income’s signalling role, indicating potential future prospects, can outweigh relative deprivation effects. Own-income effects are also larger for the older sample, and of greater magnitude than the comparison income effect. In East Germany the reference income effects are insignificant for all. With data from the British Household Panel Survey, we confirm standard results when encompassing all ages, but reference income loses significance in both age groups, and most surprisingly, even own income becomes insignificant for those over 45, while education has significant negative effects.