Labour Market Imperfections, International Integration and Selection

Although a large body of literature has focused on the effects of intra-firm differences on export performance, relatively little attention has been devoted to the interaction between firms' selection and international performance and labour market institutions - in contrast with the centrality of the latter to current policy and public debates on the implications of economic globalisation for national policies and institutions. In this paper, we study the effects of labour market unionisation on the process of competitive selection between heterogeneous firms and analyse how the interaction between the two is affected by trade liberalisation between countries with different unionisation patterns.

Growth and Survival Determinants of Chinese Private Firms: Fieldwork evidence and econometric estimates

This paper reports on one of the first empirical attempts to investigate small firm growth and survival, and their determinants, in the Peoples’ Republic of China. The work is based on field work evidence gathered from a sample of 83 Chinese private firms (mainly SMEs) collected initially by face-to-face interviews, and subsequently by follow-up telephone interviews a year later. We extend the models of Gibrat (1931) and Jovanovic (1982), which traditionally focus on size and age alone (e.g. Brock and Evans, 1986), to a ‘comprehensive’ growth model with two types of additional explanatory variables: firm-specific (e.g. business planning); and environmental (e.g. choice of location). We estimate two econometric models: a ‘basic’ age-size-growth model; and a ‘comprehensive’ growth model, using Heckman’s two-step regression procedure. Estimation is by log-linear regression on cross-section data, with corrections for sample selection bias and heteroskedasticity. Our results refute a pure Gibrat model (but support a more general variant) and support the learning model, as regards the consequences of size and age for growth; and our extension to a comprehensive model highlights the importance of location choice and customer orientation for the growth of Chinese private firms. In the latter model, growth is explained by variables like planning, R&D orientation, market competition, elasticity of demand etc. as well as by control variables. Our work on small firm growth achieves two things. First, it upholds the validity of ‘basic’ size-age-growth models, and successfully applies them to the Chinese economy. Second, it extends the compass of such models to a ‘comprehensive’ growth model incorporating firm-specific and environmental variables.

The regional electricity generation mix in Scotland: A portfolio selection approach

Standalone levelised cost assessments of electricity supply options miss an important contribution that renewable and non-fossil fuel technologies can make to the electricity portfolio: that of reducing the variability of electricity costs, and their potentially damaging impact upon economic activity. Portfolio theory applications to the electricity generation mix have shown that renewable technologies, their costs being largely uncorrelated with non-renewable technologies, can offer such benefits. We look at the existing Scottish generation mix and examine drivers of changes out to 2020. We assess recent scenarios for the Scottish generation mix in 2020 against mean-variance efficient portfolios of electricity-generating technologies. Each of the scenarios studied implies a portfolio cost of electricity that is between 22% and 38% higher than the portfolio cost of electricity in 2007. These scenarios prove to be “inefficient” in the sense that, for example, lower variance portfolios can be obtained without increasing portfolio costs, typically by expanding the share of renewables. As part of extensive sensitivity analysis, we find that Wave and Tidal technologies can contribute to lower risk electricity portfolios, while not increasing portfolio cost.

The Distributional Consequences of Supply-Side Reforms in General Equilibrium

This paper addresses the issue on whether tax reforms consisten with lower public debt-to-GDP in the long-run can lead to a more efficient and equitable economy. To this end we solve a heterogeneous agent model comprised of a government, a representative capitalist and representative skilled and unskilled workers, under both rational expectations and adaptive learning. Our main ndings are that (i) reductions in capital taxation, while bene cial at the aggregate level, lead to increased inequality mainly due to the substitutability of un- skilled labour and capital; (ii) a fall in taxation for skilled labour is Pareto improving, which is largely explained by its complementarity with the other factor inputs; (iii) all agents would prefer increasing the tax rate on capital to increasing the tax rate on skilled and un- skilled labour since it leads to relatively lower welfare losses; and (iv) heterogeneity in initial beliefs under adaptive learning quantitatively matters for welfare.

An Inquiry Into The Theory, Causes And Consequences Of Monitoring Indicators Of Health And Safety At Work

This paper engages in an interdisciplinary survey of the current state of knowledge related to the theory, determinants and consequences of occupational safety and health (OSH). First, it synthesizes the available theoretical frameworks used by economists and psychologists to understand the issues related to the optimal provision of OSH in the labour market. Second, it reviews the academic literature investigating the correlates of a comprehensive set of OSH indicators, which portray the state of OSH infrastructure (social security expenditure, prevention, regulations), inputs (chemical and physical agents, ergonomics, working time, violence) and outcomes (injuries, illnesses, absenteeism, job satisfaction) within workplaces. Third, it explores the implications of the lack of OSH in terms of the economic and social costs that are entailed. Finally, the survey identifies areas of future research interests and suggests priorities for policy initiatives that can improve the health and safety of workers.

Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game’s payoff levels—by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs—should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when the “payoffs” are actually money amounts. In particular, if individuals treat monetary gains and losses differently, then payoff–level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human–subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain– and possible–loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select among equilibria in such games.

Trade Costs, International Competition and Selection: The Effects of Unionisation on Market Size

Within a two-country model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms face firm-specific unions, we study the effects of different forms of trade liberalisation on market structure and competitive selection in the presence of inter-country asymmetries in size and labour market institutions. For given levels of trade openness, an increase in a country’s relative unions’ strength reduces the average productivity of its domestic producers but increases that of its exporters. Whilst an unfavourable union power differential, by increasing wages, weakens a country’s firms’ competitive position, the higher wages reinforce standard market access mechanisms to give rise to aggregate income effects. When the initial levels of trade openness are sufficiently low, this ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect can attract industry in the country with stronger unions and also result in an increase in the extensive margin of exports. For sufficiently large inter-country differences in the bargaining power of unions, trade liberalization can then result in a pro-variety effect, with an increase in the total availability of varieties to consumers in both countries, regardless of there being inter-country differences in size.

Growth and Survival Determinants of Chinese Private Firms: Fieldwork evidence and econometric estimates

This paper reports on one of the first empirical attempts to investigate small firm growth and survival, and their determinants, in the Peoples’ Republic of China. The work is based on field work evidence gathered from a sample of 83 Chinese private firms (mainly SMEs) collected initially by face-to-face interviews, and subsequently by follow-up telephone interviews a year later. We extend the models of Gibrat (1931) and Jovanovic (1982), which traditionally focus on size and age alone (e.g. Brock and Evans, 1986), to a ‘comprehensive’ growth model with two types of additional explanatory variables: firm-specific (e.g. business planning); and environmental (e.g. choice of location). We estimate two econometric models: a ‘basic’ age-size-growth model; and a ‘comprehensive’ growth model, using Heckman’s two-step regression procedure. Estimation is by log-linear regression on cross-section data, with corrections for sample selection bias and heteroskedasticity. Our results refute a pure Gibrat model (but support a more general variant) and support the learning model, as regards the consequences of size and age for growth; and our extension to a comprehensive model highlights the importance of location choice and customer orientation for the growth of Chinese private firms. In the latter model, growth is explained by variables like planning, R&D orientation, market competition, elasticity of demand etc. as well as by control variables. Our work on small firm growth achieves two things. First, it upholds the validity of ‘basic’ size-age-growth models, and successfully applies them to the Chinese economy. Second, it extends the compass of such models to a ‘comprehensive’ growth model incorporating firm-specific and environmental variables.

Suppliers of Priors: A Theory of Retailing Inspired by the Market for Chinese Antiquities

Adverse selection may thwart trade between an informed seller, who knows the probability p that an item of antiquity is genuine, and an uninformed buyer, who does not know p. The buyer might not be wholly uninformed, however. Suppose he can perform a simple inspection, a test of his own: the probability that an item passes the test is g if the item is genuine, but only f < g if it is fake. Given that the buyer is no expert, his test may have little power: f may be close to g. Unfortunately, without much power, the buyer's test will not resolve the difficulty of adverse selection; gains from trade may remain unexploited. But now consider a "store", where the seller groups a number of items, perhaps all with the same quality, the same probability p of being genuine. (We show that in equilibrium the seller will choose to group items in this manner.) Now the buyer can conduct his test across a large sample, perhaps all, of a group of items in the seller's store. He can thereby assess the overall quality of these items; he can invert the aggregate of his test results to uncover the underlying p; he can form a "prior". There is thus no longer asymmetric information between seller and buyer: gains from trade can be exploited. This is our theory of retailing: by grouping items together - setting up a store - a seller is able to supply buyers with priors, as well as the items themselves. We show that the weaker the power of the buyer�s test (the closer f is to g), the greater the seller�s profit. So the seller has no incentive to assist the buyer � e.g., by performing her own tests on the items, or by cleaning them to reveal more about their true age. The paper ends with an analysis of which sellers should specialise in which qualities. We show that quality will be low in busy locations and high in expensive locations.