The Impact of Iodine Deficiency Eradication on Schooling: Evidence from the Introduction of Iodized Salt in Switzerland

This paper examines the impact of salt iodization in Switzerland in the 1920s and 1930s on schooling outcomes. Iodine deficiency in utero causes mental retardation, and correcting the deficiency is expected to increase the productivity of a population by increasing its cognitive ability. The exogenous increase in cognitive ability brought about by the iodization program is also useful in the context of disentangling the effects of innate ability and education in later-life outcomes. I identify the impact of iodization in three ways: first, in a differences-in-differences framework, I exploit geographic variation in iodine deficiency, as well as the fact that the nationwide campaign to decrease iodine deficiency began in 1922. Second, I use spatial and temporal variation in the introduction of iodized salt across Swiss cantons, and examine whether the level of iodized salt sales at the time of one’s birth affected one’s educational attainment. Third, I employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity design and use jumps in sales of iodized salt across Swiss cantons to identify the effect of iodization, by comparing outcomes for those born right before and right after these sudden changes in the treatment environment. These approaches indicate that the eradication of iodine deficiency in previously deficient areas increased the schooling of the population significantly. The effects are larger for females than for males, which is consistent with medical evidence showing that women are more likely to be affected by iodine deficiency disorders than men.

Policy Labels and Investment Decision-making

Much attention in recent years has turned to the potential of behavioural insights to improve the performance of government policy. One behavioural concept of interest is the effect of a cash transfer label on how the transfer is spent. The Winter Fuel Payment (WFP) is a labelled cash transfer to offset the costs of keeping older households warm in the winter. Previous research has shown that households spend a higher proportion of the WFP on energy expenditures due to its label (Beatty et al., 2011). If households interpret the WFP as money for their energy bills, it may reduce their willingness to undertake investments which help achieving the same goal, such as the adoption of renewable energy technologies. In this paper we show that the WFP has distortionary effects on the renewable technology market. Using the sharp eligibility criteria of the WFP in a Regression Discontinuity Design, this analysis finds a reduction in the propensity to install renewable energy technologies of around 2.7 percentage points due to the WFP. This is a considerable number. It implies that 62% of households (whose oldest member turns 60) would have invested in renewable energy but refrain to do so after receiving the WFP. This analysis suggests that the labelling effect spreads to products related to the labelled good. In this case, households use too much energy from sources which generate pollution and too little from relatively cleaner technologies.

Bayesian Model Averaging in the Instrumental Variable Regression Model

This paper considers the instrumental variable regression model when there is uncertainty about the set of instruments, exogeneity restrictions, the validity of identifying restrictions and the set of exogenous regressors. This uncertainty can result in a huge number of models. To avoid statistical problems associated with standard model selection procedures, we develop a reversible jump Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm that allows us to do Bayesian model averaging. The algorithm is very exible and can be easily adapted to analyze any of the di¤erent priors that have been proposed in the Bayesian instrumental variables literature. We show how to calculate the probability of any relevant restriction (e.g. the posterior probability that over-identifying restrictions hold) and discuss diagnostic checking using the posterior distribution of discrepancy vectors. We illustrate our methods in a returns-to-schooling application.

Model Switching and Model Averaging in Time- Varying Parameter Regression Models

This paper investigates the usefulness of switching Gaussian state space models as a tool for implementing dynamic model selecting (DMS) or averaging (DMA) in time-varying parameter regression models. DMS methods allow for model switching, where a different model can be chosen at each point in time. Thus, they allow for the explanatory variables in the time-varying parameter regression model to change over time. DMA will carry out model averaging in a time-varying manner. We compare our exact approach to DMA/DMS to a popular existing procedure which relies on the use of forgetting factor approximations. In an application, we use DMS to select different predictors in an in ation forecasting application. We also compare different ways of implementing DMA/DMS and investigate whether they lead to similar results.

Information Design

There are two ways of creating incentives for interacting agents to behave in a desired way. One is by providing appropriate payoff incentives, which is the subject of mechanism design. The other is by choosing the information that agents observe, which we refer to as information design. We consider a model of symmetric information where a designer chooses and announces the information structure about a payoff relevant state. The interacting agents observe the signal realizations and take actions which affect the welfare of both the designer and the agents. We characterize the general finite approach to deriving the optimal information structure for the designer - the one that maximizes the designer's ex ante expected utility subject to agents playing a Bayes Nash equilibrium. We then apply the general approach to a symmetric two state, two agent, and two actions environment in a parameterized underlying game and fully characterize the optimal information structure: it is never strictly optimal for the designer to use conditionally independent private signals; the optimal information structure may be a public signal or may consist of correlated private signals. Finally, we examine how changes in the underlying game affect the designer's maximum payoff. This exercise provides a joint mechanism/information design perspective.