The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

The Rise and Fall of the ABS Market

The nancial crisis has raised some concern about the quality of information available on some traded assets on the securities markets to market participants and regulators. Asset-backed securitization in general got partial blame for the paucity of liquidity on bank balance sheets and the consequent credit crunch. After the Asset-Backed Security (ABS) market fell to near inactivity in 2009, the US federal government's Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) provided backing and a boost to the issuance of asset-backed securitization. In this market condition, given the nature of ABS, it is di¢ cult for them not to be relatively illiquid, and this has resulted in unacceptable levels of market risk for most investors. Their liquidity before the crisis was driven by a market in continuous expansion, fed by Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), Conduits, and other low capitalized term-transformation vehicles. Nowadays, the industry is concerned with the ongoing ABS reforms and how these will be implemented. This article reviews the ABS market in the last decade and the possible consequences of the recent regulatory proposals. It proposes a retention policy and the institution of a new nancial body to supervise the quality of the security in an ABS pool, its liquidity, and the model risk implied by the issuer's valuation model.

The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality

During the past four decades both between and within group wage inequality increased significantly in the US. I provide a microfounded justification for this pattern, by introducing private employer learning in a model of signaling with credit constraints. In particular, I show that when financial constraints relax, talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducated pool, this decreases unskilled inexperienced wages and boosts wage inequality. This explanation is consistent with US data from 1970 to 1997, indicating that the rise of the skill and the experience premium coincides with a fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time skilled or experienced wages do not change much. The model accounts for: (i) the increase in the skill premium despite the growing supply of skills; (ii) the understudied aspect of rising inequality related to the increase in the experience premium; (iii) the sharp growth of the skill premium for inexperienced workers and its moderate expansion for the experienced ones; (iv) the puzzling coexistence of increasing experience premium within the group of unskilled workers and its stable pattern among the skilled ones. The results hold under various robustness checks and provide some interesting policy implications about the potential conflict between inequality of opportunity and substantial economic inequality, as well as the role of minimum wage policy in determining the equilibrium wage inequality.