Monetary policy strategies, financial institutions and financial markets in the Middle East and North Africa: an overview

Three polar types of monetary architecture are identified together with the institutional and market infrastructure required for each type and the kinds of monetary policy feasible in each case: a ‘basic’ architecture where there is little or no financial system as such but an elementary central bank which is able to fix the exchange rate, as a substitute for a proper monetary policy; a ‘modern’ monetary architecture with developed banks, financial markets and central bank where policy choices include types of inflation targeting; and an ‘intermediate’ monetary architecture where less market-based monetary policies involving less discretion are feasible. A range of data is used to locate the various MENA countries with respect to these polar types. Five countries (Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria and Yemen) are identified as those with the least developed monetary architecture, while Bahrain and Jordan are identified as the group at the other end of the spectrum, reaching beyond the intermediate polar type in some dimensions but not others. The countries in between vary on different dimensions but all lie between basic and intermediate architectures. The key general findings are that the MENA countries are both less differentiated and less ‘developed’ than might have been expected. The paper ends by calling for research on the costs and benefits of different types of monetary architecture.

Tracking cost savings from competitive tendering in the short and long run

A major initiative of the Thatcher and Major Conservative administrations was that public sector ancillary and professional services provided by incumbent direct service organisations [DSOs] be put out to tender. Analyses of this initiative, in the UK and elsewhere, found costs were often reduced in the short run. However, few if any studies went beyond the first round of tendering. We analyze data collected over successive rounds of tendering for cleaning and catering services of Scottish hospitals in order to assess the long term consequences of this initiative. The experience of the two services was very different. Cost savings for cleaning services tended to increase with each additional round of tendering and became increasingly stable. In accordance with previous results in the literature, DSOs produced smaller cost reductions than private contractors: probably an inevitable consequence of the tendering process at the time. Cost savings from DSOs tended to disappear during the first round of tendering, but they appear to have been more permanent in successive rounds. Cost savings for catering, on the other hand, tended to be much smaller, and these were not sustained.