Harmful competition in the insurance markets

There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for di erent distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.

Pension reform in a rapidly ageing country: the case of Ukraine

Ukraine has a rapidly ageing and declining population. A dynamic forward-­looking Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model with an explicitly modelled Pay‐As‐You-­Go pension scheme is constructed to perform simulations of different pension reform scenarios and investigate the impact of population ageing on a wide range of macroeconomic variables. It is shown that, changes in age structure will result in a significant negative impact on the economy and stability of the pension system. Analysis of the potential changes to the pension system is limited to modelling an increase of the pension age, keeping either the workers’ contribution rate or replacement rate constant.