Expectations, Learning and Monetary Policy: An Overview of Recent Research

Expectations about the future are central for determination of current macroeconomic outcomes and the formulation of monetary policy. Recent literature has explored ways for supplementing the benchmark of rational expectations with explicit models of expectations formation that rely on econometric learning. Some apparently natural policy rules turn out to imply expectational instability of private agents’ learning. We use the standard New Keynesian model to illustrate this problem and survey the key results about interest-rate rules that deliver both uniqueness and stability of equilibrium under econometric learning. We then consider some practical concerns such as measurement errors in private expectations, observability of variables and learning of structural parameters required for policy. We also discuss some recent applications including policy design under perpetual learning, estimated models with learning, recurrent hyperinflations, and macroeconomic policy to combat liquidity traps and deflation.

Who Matters in Coordination Problems?

We consider a common investment project that is vulnerable to a self-ful lling coordination failure and hence is strategically risky. Based on their private information, agents - who have heterogeneous investment incentives - form expectations or 'sentiments' about the project's outcome. We find that the sum of these sentiments is constant across di erent strategy profiles and it is independent of the distribution of incentives. As a result, we can think of sentiment as a scarce resource divided up among the di erent payo types. Applying this nding, we show that agents who bene t little from the project's success have a large impact on the coordination process. The agents with small bene ts invest only if their sentiment towards the project is large per unit investment cost. As the average sentiment is constant, a subsidy decreasing the investment costs of these agents will \free up" a large amount of sentiment, provoking a large impact on the whole economy. Intuitively, these agents, insensitive to the project's outcome and hence to the actions of others, are in uential because they modify their equilibrium behavior only if the others change theirs substantially.

The Dynamics of UK and US Inflation Expectations

This paper investigates the relationship between short term and long term in ation expectations in the US and the UK with a focus on iflation pass through (i.e. how changes in short term expectations affect long term expectations). An econometric methodology is used which allows us to uncover the relationship between in ation pass through and various explanatory variables. We relate our empirical results to theoretical models of anchored, contained and unmoored inflation expectations. For neither country do we find anchored or unmoored inflation expectations. For the US, contained inflation expectations are found. For the UK, our ndings are not consistent with the specifi =c model of contained inflation expectations presented here, but are consistent with a more broad view of expectations being constrained by the existence of an inflation target.

Monetary Policy and Heterogeneous Expectations

This paper studies the implications for monetary policy of heterogeneous expectations in a New Keynesian model. The assumption of rational expectations is replaced with parsimonious forecasting models where agents select between predictors that are underparameterized. In a Misspecification Equilibrium agents only select the best-performing statistical models. We demonstrate that, even when monetary policy rules satisfy the Taylor principle by adjusting nominal interest rates more than one for one with inflation, there may exist equilibria with Intrinsic Heterogeneity. Under certain conditions, there may exist multiple misspecification equilibria. We show that these findings have important implications for business cycle dynamics and for the design of monetary policy.

Does Ricardian Equivalence Hold When Expectations are not Rational?

This paper considers the Ricardian Equivalence proposition when expectations are not rational and are instead formed using adaptive learning rules. We show that Ricardian Equivalence continues to hold provided suitable additional conditions on learning dynamics are satisfied. However, new cases of failure can also emerge under learning. In particular, for Ricardian Equivalence to obtain, agents’ expectations must not depend on government’s financial variables under deficit financing.

The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: Fundamentals, expectations and contagion

We offer a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign debt crisis based on the theoretical model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). We find evidence of a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model before August 2007 to one driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk thereafter. The majority of EMU countries have experienced contagion from Greece. There is no evidence of significant speculation effects originating from CDS markets. Finally, the escalation of the Greek debt crisis since November 2009 is confirmed as the result of an unfavourable shift in countryspecific market expectations. Our findings highlight the necessity of structural, competitiveness-inducing reforms in periphery EMU countries and institutional reforms at the EMU level enhancing intra-EMU economic monitoring and policy co-ordination.

The Stagnation Regime of the New Keynesian Model and Current US Policy

In Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) the intended steady state is locally but not globally stable under adaptive learning, and unstable deflationary paths can arise after large pessimistic shocks to expectations. In the current paper a modified model is presented that includes a locally stable stagnation regime as a possible outcome arising from large expectation shocks. Policy implications are examined. Sufficiently large temporary increases in government spending can dislodge the economy from the stagnation regime and restore the natural stabilizing dynamics. More specific policy proposals are presented and discussed.

The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: fundamentals, expectations and contagion

In a research project conducted while visiting the DG-ECFIN in June 2010, we provided a detailed empirical investigation of the EMU sovereign-debt crisis up to February 2010.

Estimating United States Phillips Curves With Expectations Consistent With The Statistical Process Of Inflation

‘Modern’ Phillips curve theories predict inflation is an integrated, or near integrated, process. However, inflation appears bounded above and below in developed economies and so cannot be ‘truly’ integrated and more likely stationary around a shifting mean. If agents believe inflation is integrated as in the ‘modern’ theories then they are making systematic errors concerning the statistical process of inflation. An alternative theory of the Phillips curve is developed that is consistent with the ‘true’ statistical process of inflation. It is demonstrated that United States inflation data is consistent with the alternative theory but not with the existing ‘modern’ theories.

Domestic Violence and Football in Glasgow: Are Reference Points Relevant?

Much research suggests that sporting events can trigger domestic violence with recent evidence suggesting that pre-match expectations (which can be interpreted as reference points) play an especially important role in this relationship. In particular, unexpectedly disappointing results have been associated with large increases in domestic violence. This paper contributes to this literature using a new data set containing every domestic violence incident in Glasgow over a period of more than eight years. We find that Old Firm matches, where Glasgow rivals Celtic and Rangers play, are associated with large increases in domestic violence (regardless of the timing or the outcome of the match). Non-Old Firm matches tend to have little impact on domestic violence. Furthermore, we fi nd little evidence for the importance of reference points. Matches with disappointing outcomes, relative to pre-match expectations, are found to be associated with unusual increases in domestic violence only in a very limited set of matches.

Expectations Traps and Coordination Failures with Discretionary Policymaking

Discretionary policymakers cannot manage private-sector expectations and cannot coordinate the actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, expectations traps and coordination failures can occur and multiple equilibria can arise. To utilize the explanatory power of models with multiple equilibria it is first necessary to understand how an economy arrives to a particular equilibrium. In this paper we employ notions of learnability and self-enforceability to motivate and identify equilibria of particular interest. Central among these criteria are whether the equilibrium is learnable by private agents and jointly learnable by private agents and the policymaker. We use two New Keynesian policy models to identify the strategic interactions that give rise to multiple equilibria and to illustrate our methods for identifying equilibria of interest. Importantly, unless the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is learnable by private agents, we find little reason to expect coordination on that equilibrium.

Domestic Violence and Football in Glasgow: Are Reference Points Relevant?

Much research suggests that sporting events can trigger domestic violence with recent evidence suggesting that pre-match expectations (which can be interpreted as reference points) play an especially important role in this relationship. In particular, unexpectedly disappointing results have been associated with large increases in domestic violence. This paper contributes to this literature using a new data set containing every domestic violence incident in Glasgow over a period of more than eight years. We find that Old Firm matches, where Glasgow rivals Celtic and Rangers play, are associated with large increases in domestic violence (regardless of the timing or the outcome of the match). Non-Old Firm matches tend to have little impact on domestic violence. Furthermore, we find little evidence for the importance of reference points. Matches with disappointing outcomes, relative to pre-match expectations, are found to be associated with unusual increases in domestic violence only in a very limited set of matches.

Rational Expectations Dynamics: A Methodological Critique

This paper analyses RE macromodels from the methodological perspective. It proposes a particular property, robustness, which should be considered a necessary feature of scienti cally valid models in economics, but which is absent from many RE macromodels. To restore this property many macroeconomists resort to detailed and implausible assumptions, which take their models a long way from simple Rational Expectations. The paper draws attention to the problems inherent in the technique of local linearisation and concludes by proposing the use of nonlinear models, analysed globally.

A Theory of Wage Setting Behavior

Concerns for fairness, workers' morale and reciprocity infuence firms' wage setting policy. In this paper we formalize a theory of wage setting behavior in a simple and tractable model that explicitly considers these behavioral aspects. A worker is assumed to have reference-dependent preferences and displays loss aversion when evaluating the fairness of a wage contract. The theory establishes a wage-effort relationship that captures the worker's reference-dependent reciprocity, which in turn in uences the firm's optimal wage policy. The paper makes two key contributions: it identifies loss aversion as an explanation for a worker's asymmetric reciprocity; and it provides realistic and generalized microfoundation for downward wage rigidity. We further illustrate the implications of our theory for both wage setting and hiring behavior. Downward wage rigidity generates several implications for the outcome of the initial employment contract. The worker's reference wage, his extent of negative reciprocity and the firms expectations are key drivers of the propositions derived.