Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching

We study the incentive to invest to improve marriage prospects, in a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria in models with deterministic returns, and a unique equilibrium exists under reasonable conditions. Equilibrium investment is efficient when the sexes are symmetric. However, when there is any asymmetry, including an unbalanced sex ratio, investments are generically excessive. For example, if there is an excess of boys, then there is parental over-investment in boys and under-investment in girls, and total investment will be excessive.

A Consistent Nonparametric Bootstrap Test of Exogeneity

This paper proposes a novel way of testing exogeneity of an explanatory variable without any parametric assumptions in the presence of a "conditional" instrumental variable. A testable implication is derived that if an explanatory variable is endogenous, the conditional distribution of the outcome given the endogenous variable is not independent of its instrumental variable(s). The test rejects the null hypothesis with probability one if the explanatory variable is endogenous and it detects alternatives converging to the null at a rate n..1=2:We propose a consistent nonparametric bootstrap test to implement this testable implication. We show that the proposed bootstrap test can be asymptotically justi.ed in the sense that it produces asymptotically correct size under the null of exogeneity, and it has unit power asymptotically. Our nonparametric test can be applied to the cases in which the outcome is generated by an additively non-separable structural relation or in which the outcome is discrete, which has not been studied in the literature.

Is the consumption-income ratio stationary? Evidence from linear and nonlinear panel unit root tests for OECD and non-OECD countries

This paper applies recently developed heterogeneous nonlinear and linear panel unit root tests that account for cross-sectional dependence to 24 OECD and 33 non-OECD countries’ consumption-income ratios over the period 1951–2003. We apply a recently developed methodology that facilitates the use of panel tests to identify which individual cross-sectional units are stationary and which are nonstationary. This extends evidence provided in the recent literature to consider both linear and nonlinear adjustment in panel unit root tests, to address the issue of cross-sectional dependence, and to substantially expand both time-series and cross sectional dimensions of the data analysed. We find that the majority (65%) of the series are nonstationary with slightly fewer OECD countries’ (61%) series exhibiting a unit root than non-OECD countries (68%).

Who Ultimately Bears the Burden of Greater Non-Wage Labour costs?

We investigate the effect of a rise in non-wage labour costs (NWLC) on real anufacturing labour costs in OECD countries, taking into account the degree of coordination in the wage bargaining process. We find that, in countries in which wage bargaining is not highly coordinated, 55% of an increase in NWLC appears to be shifted to workers in the long run, whereas in countries operating under a highly coordinated bargaining regime, full shifting occurs. Overall, our results suggest that high NWLC can be associated with a high equilibrium unemployment rate, but only in those OECD countries that do not have highly coordinated wage bargaining.

Improving Students’ Learning Aspirations Beyond Post-Primary Education: A First Account of Two Non-Formal Education Programmes in Middle-Income

Non-formal education programmes are active in a number of developing countries. These programmes offer vulnerable students an opportunity to pursue their education although they were excluded for various reasons from the formal education systems. This paper examines the impact of two programmes (one in Mauritius, and one in Thailand) on their participants’ aspirations towards learning. We develop a methodology to measure the perception of students regarding their learning experience. More than a third of them, for example, believe that there is no barrier to their education. Most acknowledge the role of their teachers in raising their aspirations towards their educational achievement. When compared to male students, female students seem to value more the role of their education.

Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments

In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be- cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one. Keywords: knowledge sharing, strategic knowledge disclosure, multistage contest game, non-cooperative games

The marginal utility of money: A modern Marshallian approach to consumer choice

We reformulate neoclassical consumer choice by focusing on lambda, the marginal utility of money. As the opportunity cost of current expenditure, lambda is approximated by the slope of the indirect utility function of the continuation. We argue that lambda can largely supplant the role of an arbitrary budget constraint in partial equilibrium analysis. The result is a better grounded, more flexible and more intuitive approach to consumer choice.

My Group Beats Your Group: Evaluating Non-Income Inequalities

This paper proposes a new methodology, the Domination Index, to evaluate non-income inequalities between social groups such as inequalities of educational attainment, occupational status, health or subjective well-being. The Domination Index does not require specific cardinalisation assumptions, but only uses the ordinal structure of these non-income variables. We approach from an axiomatic perspective and show that a set of desirable properties for a group inequality measure when the variable of interest is ordinal, characterizes the Domination Index up to a positive scalar transformation. Moreover we make use of the Domination Index to explore the relation between inequality and segregation and show how these two concepts are related theoretically.

Tractable Consumer Choice

We derive a rational model of separable consumer choice which can also serve as a behavioral model. The central construct is [lambda] , the marginal utility of money, derived from the consumer's rest-of-life problem. We present a robust approximation of [lambda], and show how to incorporate liquidity constraints, indivisibilities and adaptation to a changing environment. We fi nd connections with numerous historical and recent constructs, both behavioral and neoclassical, and draw contrasts with standard partial equilibrium analysis. The result is a better grounded, more flexible and more intuitive description of consumer choice.

The Liberal Ethics of Non-Interference and the Pareto Principle

We analyse the liberal ethics of non-interference applied to social choice. A liberal principle capturing noninterfering views of society and inspired by John Stuart Mill s conception of liberty, is examined. The principle captures the idea that society should not penalise agents after changes in their situation that do not a¤ect others. An impossibility for liberal approaches is highlighted: every social decision rule that satis es unanimity and a general principle of noninterference must be dictatorial. This raises some important issues for liberal approaches in social choice and political philosophy.

Genuine savings and future well-being in Germany, 1850-2000

Genuine Savings (GS), also known as ‘net adjusted savings’, is a composite indicator of the sustainability of economic development. Genuine Savings reflects year-on-year changes in the total wealth or capital of a country, including net investment in produced capita, investment in human capital, depletion of natural resources, and damage caused by pollution. A negative Genuine Savings rate suggests that the stock of national wealth is declining and that future utility must be less than current utility, indicating that economic development is non-sustainable (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999). We make use of data over a 150 year period to examine the relationship between Genuine Savings and a number of indicators of well-being over time, and compare the relative changes in human, produced, and components of natural capital over the period. Overall, we find that the magnitude of genuine savings is positively related to changes in future consumption, with some evidence of a cointegrating relationship. However, the relationships between genuine savings and infant mortality or average heights are less clear.

Non-Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities

In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economics with infinitely many commodities by using strategic market games. This setting can be interpreted as a model of oligopoly with differentiated commodities by using the Hotelling line. We prove the existence of an "active" Cournot-Nash equilibrium and show that, when traders are replicated, the price vector and the allocation converge to the Walras equilibrium. We examine how the notion of oligopoly extends to our setting with a countable infinity of commodities by distinguishing between asymptotic oligopolists and asymptotic price-takes. We illustrate these notions via a number of examples.