Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

On the characterisation and measurement of the welfare effects of income mobility from an ex-ante perspective

The paper employs a rank-dependent formulation of the social welfare function with time-separable utilities to evaluate the economic consequences of income mobility from an ex-ante perspective. The resultant class of measures can be decomposed not only in terms of structural and exchange mobility but also in terms of vertical and horizontal mobility, thereby encompassing two of the main approaches in the literature. We illustrate our measurement framework by comparing mobility in the USA and Germany using data from the Cross-National Equivalent File 1980-2005. We find that the pattern of income mobility in the USA was both less pro-poor and more horizontally inequitable than in Germany, but that the latter did not translate into higher levels of exchange mobility given higher levels of absolute inequality and the vertical stance of the growth process.

The names in Spain are mainly not in vain: Intergenerational mobility and the informational content of surnames

The paper presents a (genetic) model of the joint distribution of surnames and income. It shows that we can infer how important background is by looking at how informative surnames are. Extensions of the model allow for the possibility of assortative mating, and the introduction of ethnic differences in the income process (due to discrimination or any other reason).

My Group Beats Your Group: Evaluating Non-Income Inequalities

This paper proposes a new methodology, the Domination Index, to evaluate non-income inequalities between social groups such as inequalities of educational attainment, occupational status, health or subjective well-being. The Domination Index does not require specific cardinalisation assumptions, but only uses the ordinal structure of these non-income variables. We approach from an axiomatic perspective and show that a set of desirable properties for a group inequality measure when the variable of interest is ordinal, characterizes the Domination Index up to a positive scalar transformation. Moreover we make use of the Domination Index to explore the relation between inequality and segregation and show how these two concepts are related theoretically.

Human capital, social mobility and the skill premium

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model to highlight the role of human capital accumulation of agents differentiated by skill type in the joint determination of social mobility and the skill premium. We first show that our model captures the empirical co-movement of the skill premium, the relative supply of skilled to unskilled workers and aggregate output in the U.S. data from 1970-2000. We next show that endogenous social mobility and human capital accumulation are key channels through which the effects of capital tax cuts and increases in public spending on both pre- and post-college education are transmitted. In particular, social mobility creates additional incentives for the agents which enhance the beneficial effects of policy reforms. Moreover, the dynamics of human capital accumulation imply that, post reform, the skill premium is higher in the short- to medium-run than in the long-run.

Intergenerational Mobility and the Informative Content of Surnames

We propose a new methodology for measuring intergenerational mobility in economic wellbeing. Our method is based on the joint distribution of surnames and economic outcomes. It circumvents the need for intergenerational panel data, a long-standing stumbling block for understanding mobility. A single cross-sectional dataset is su cient. Our main idea is simple. If `inheritance' is important for economic outcomes, then rare surnames should predict economic outcomes in the cross-section. This is because rare surnames are indicative of familial linkages. Of course, if the number of rare surnames is small, this won't work. But rare surnames are abundant in the highly-skewed nature of surname distributions from most Western societies. We develop a model that articulates this idea and shows that the more important is inheritance, the more informative will be surnames. This result is robust to a variety of di erent assumptions about fertility and mating. We apply our method using the 2001 census from Catalonia, a large region of Spain. We use educational attainment as a proxy for overall economic well-being. Our main nding is that mobility has decreased among the di erent generations of the 20th century. A complementary analysis based on sibling correlations con rms our results and provides a robustness check on our method. Our model and our data allow us to examine one possible explanation for the observed decrease in mobility. We nd that the degree of assortative mating has increased over time. Overall, we argue that our method has promise because it can tap the vast mines of census data that are available in a heretofore unexploited manner.

Income stratification and between-group inequality

The paper demonstrates that the ratio of the Yitzhaki (1994) to the conventional measure of between-group inequality is in general equal to one minus twice the weighted average probability that a random member of a richer (on average) group is poorer than a random member of a poorer (on average) group, and may therefore be interpreted as an index of stratification in its own right.