Horizontal Agreements and R&D Complementarities: Merger versus RJV

We study the decision of two rms within an oligopoly concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complementarities between their R&D activities and, if so, whether to merge or form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger, there is a probability that an RJV contract will fail to enforce R&D sharing. We nd that a horizontal agreement always arises. The insiders' merger/RJV choice involves a trade-o : While merger o ers certainty that R&D complementarities will be exploited, it leads to a pro t-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market, where competition is Cournot. Greater brand similarity and contract enforceability (\quality") both favour RJV, while greater R&D complementarity favours merger. Interestingly, the insiders may choose to merge even when RJV contracts are always enforceable, and they may opt to form an RJV even when the likelihood of enforceability is negligible.

On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking

We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank level. We show that when the market power is low, banks invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of market power, all banks choose the prudent asset to invest in. We further show that a merger of two neighboring banks increases the likelihood of prudent behaviour. Finally, introduction of a deposit insurance scheme exacerbates banks’ moral hazard problem.

Both Sides of the Story: Skill-biased Technological Change, Labour Market Frictions, and Endogenous Two-Sided Heterogeneity

This paper presents a stylised framework to examine how skill-biased technological change and labour market frictions affect the relationship between economic expansion and unskilled unemployment. The first part of the analysis focuses on the investment decisions in skill-acquisition and technology adoption activities faced by workers and firms in response to the introduction of an innovative technology. The second part examines how endogenous two-sided heterogeneity in the labour market affects the macroeconomic outcomes in terms of unemployment, technological diffusion, and economic expansion. To conclude, the framework is used to discuss the effects of alternative forms of policy intervention on agents' investment decisions and on the macroeconomic outcomes.