Trade in bilateral oligopoly with endogenous market formation

We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can choose whether to buy or sell the good. We derive conditions under which a non-autarkic equilibrium exists and when the only equilibrium is autarky. Autarky is ‘nice’ (robust to small perturbations in the game) when it is the only equilibrium, and ‘very nice’ (robust to large perturbations) when no gains from trade exist. We characterize economies where autarky is nice but not very nice; that is, when gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place.

On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly

Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ‘partial games’. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is X˜ (B). Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is ˜B (X). The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, ˜B (X˜ (B)) = B. When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences ˜ X(B) does not depend on B and ˜B (X) does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated.

Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders: A Limit Theorem µa la Cournot

In this paper, we consider an exchange economy µa la Shitovitz (1973), with atoms and an atomless set. We associate with it a strategic market game of the kind first proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley and known as the Shapley window model. We analyze the relationship between the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic market game and the Walras equilibrium allocations of the exchange economy with which it is associated. We show, with an example, that even when atoms are countably in¯nite, any Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocation of the game is not a Walras equilibrium of the underlying exchange economy. Accordingly, in the original spirit of Cournot (1838), we par- tially replicate the mixed exchange economy by increasing the number of atoms, without a®ecting the atomless part, and ensuring that the measure space of agents remains finite. We show that any sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic market games associated with the partially replicated exchange economies approximates a Walras equilibrium allocation of the original exchange economy.

Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition

Bilateral oligopoly is a strategic market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, such a game approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied.

Labour Market Imperfections, International Integration and Selection

Although a large body of literature has focused on the effects of intra-firm differences on export performance, relatively little attention has been devoted to the interaction between firms' selection and international performance and labour market institutions - in contrast with the centrality of the latter to current policy and public debates on the implications of economic globalisation for national policies and institutions. In this paper, we study the effects of labour market unionisation on the process of competitive selection between heterogeneous firms and analyse how the interaction between the two is affected by trade liberalisation between countries with different unionisation patterns.

On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking

We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank level. We show that when the market power is low, banks invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of market power, all banks choose the prudent asset to invest in. We further show that a merger of two neighboring banks increases the likelihood of prudent behaviour. Finally, introduction of a deposit insurance scheme exacerbates banks’ moral hazard problem.

Export-market dynamics and the probability of firm closure: Evidence for the UK

This study presents the first empirical analysis of the determinants of firm closure in the UK with an emphasis on the role of export-market dynamics, using panel data for a nationally representative group of firms operating in all-market based sectors during 1997-2003. Our findings show that the probability of closure is (cet. par.) significantly lower for exporters, particularly those experiencing export-market entry and exit. Having controlled for other attributes associated with productivity (such as size and export status), the following factors are found to increase the firm’s survival prospects: higher capital intensity and TFP, foreign ownership, young age, displacement effects (through relatively high rates of entry of firms in each industry), and belonging to certain industries. Interestingly, increased import penetration (a proxy for lower trade costs) leads to a lower hazard rate for exporting entrants and continuous exporters, whilst inducing a higher hazard rate for domestic producers or those that quit exporting.

Both Sides of the Story: Skill-biased Technological Change, Labour Market Frictions, and Endogenous Two-Sided Heterogeneity

This paper presents a stylised framework to examine how skill-biased technological change and labour market frictions affect the relationship between economic expansion and unskilled unemployment. The first part of the analysis focuses on the investment decisions in skill-acquisition and technology adoption activities faced by workers and firms in response to the introduction of an innovative technology. The second part examines how endogenous two-sided heterogeneity in the labour market affects the macroeconomic outcomes in terms of unemployment, technological diffusion, and economic expansion. To conclude, the framework is used to discuss the effects of alternative forms of policy intervention on agents' investment decisions and on the macroeconomic outcomes.

Industrial Structure, Trade and Regional Economics : Market Segmentation

We consider a general equilibrium model a la Bhaskar (Review of Economic Studies 2002): there are complementarities across sectors, each of which comprise (many) heterogenous monopolistically competitive firms. Bhaskar's model is extended in two directions: production requires capital, and labour markets are segmented. Labour market segmentation models the difficulties of labour migrating across international barriers (in a trade context) or from a poor region to a richer one (in a regional context), whilst the assumption of a single capital market means that capital flows freely between countries or regions. The model is solved analytically and a closed form solution is provided. Adding labour market segmentation to Bhaskar's two-tier industrial structure allows us to study, inter alia, the impact of competition regulations on wages and - financial flows both in the regional and international context, and the output, welfare and financial implications of relaxing immigration laws. The analytical approach adopted allows us, not only to sign the effect of policies, but also to quantify their effects. Introducing capital as a factor of production improves the realism of the model and refi nes its empirically testable implications.

An investigation of customer order flow in the foreign exchange market

This paper examines the effect that heterogeneous customer orders flows have on exchange rates by using a new, and the largest, proprietary dataset of weekly net order flow segmented by customer type across nine of the most liquid currency pairs. We make several contributions. Firstly, we investigate the extent to which customer order flow can help to explain exchange rate movements over and above the influence of macroeconomic variables. Secondly, we address the issue of whether order flows contain (private) information which explain exchange rates changes. Thirdly, we look at the usefulness of order flow in forecasting exchange rate movements at longer horizons than those generally considered in the microstructure literature. Finally we address the question of whether the out-of-sample exchange rate forecasts generated by order flows can be employed profitably in the foreign exchange markets

Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument

In this paper we analyse a simple two-person sequential-move contest game with heterogeneous players. Assuming that the heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination, we study the effects of implementation of affirmative action policy, which tackles this heterogeneity by compensating discriminated players, and compare them with the situation in which the heterogeneity is ignored and the contestants are treated equally. In our analysis we consider different orders of moves. We show that the order of moves of contestants is a very important factor in determination of the effects of the implementation of the affirmative action policy. We also prove that in such cases a significant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals. In particular, in contrast to the present-in-the-literature predictions, we demonstrate that as a consequence of the interplay of these two factors, the response to the implementation of the affirmative action policy option may be the decrease in the total equilibrium effort level of the contestants in comparison to the unbiased contest game.

On monetary policy and stock market anomalies

This study utilizes a macro-based VAR framework to investigate whether stock portfolios formedon the basis of their value, size and past performance characteristics are affected in a differentialmanner by unexpected US monetary policy actions during the period 1967-2007. Full sample results show that value, small capitalization and past loser stocks are more exposed to monetary policy shocks in comparison to growth, big capitalization and past winner stocks. Subsample analysis, motivated by variation in the realized premia and parameter instability, reveals that monetary policy shocks’ impact on these portfolios is significant and pronounced only during the pre-1983 period.

The Rise and Fall of the ABS Market

The nancial crisis has raised some concern about the quality of information available on some traded assets on the securities markets to market participants and regulators. Asset-backed securitization in general got partial blame for the paucity of liquidity on bank balance sheets and the consequent credit crunch. After the Asset-Backed Security (ABS) market fell to near inactivity in 2009, the US federal government's Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) provided backing and a boost to the issuance of asset-backed securitization. In this market condition, given the nature of ABS, it is di¢ cult for them not to be relatively illiquid, and this has resulted in unacceptable levels of market risk for most investors. Their liquidity before the crisis was driven by a market in continuous expansion, fed by Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), Conduits, and other low capitalized term-transformation vehicles. Nowadays, the industry is concerned with the ongoing ABS reforms and how these will be implemented. This article reviews the ABS market in the last decade and the possible consequences of the recent regulatory proposals. It proposes a retention policy and the institution of a new nancial body to supervise the quality of the security in an ABS pool, its liquidity, and the model risk implied by the issuer's valuation model.

Forecasting the European Carbon Market

In an effort to meet its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, in 2005 the European Union introduced a cap-and-trade scheme where mandated installations are allocated permits to emit CO2. Financial markets have developed that allow companies to trade these carbon permits. For the EU to achieve reductions in CO2 emissions at a minimum cost, it is necessary that companies make appropriate investments and policymakers design optimal policies. In an effort to clarify the workings of the carbon market, several recent papers have attempted to statistically model it. However, the European carbon market (EU ETS) has many institutional features that potentially impact on daily carbon prices (and associated nancial futures). As a consequence, the carbon market has properties that are quite different from conventional financial assets traded in mature markets. In this paper, we use dynamic model averaging (DMA) in order to forecast in this newly-developing market. DMA is a recently-developed statistical method which has three advantages over conventional approaches. First, it allows the coefficients on the predictors in a forecasting model to change over time. Second, it allows for the entire fore- casting model to change over time. Third, it surmounts statistical problems which arise from the large number of potential predictors that can explain carbon prices. Our empirical results indicate that there are both important policy and statistical bene ts with our approach. Statistically, we present strong evidence that there is substantial turbulence and change in the EU ETS market, and that DMA can model these features and forecast accurately compared to conventional approaches. From a policy perspective, we discuss the relative and changing role of different price drivers in the EU ETS. Finally, we document the forecast performance of DMA and discuss how this relates to the efficiency and maturity of this market.