Chebyshev polynomial approximation to approximate partial differential equations

This paper suggests a simple method based on Chebyshev approximation at Chebyshev nodes to approximate partial differential equations. The methodology simply consists in determining the value function by using a set of nodes and basis functions. We provide two examples. Pricing an European option and determining the best policy for chatting down a machinery. The suggested method is flexible, easy to program and efficient. It is also applicable in other fields, providing efficient solutions to complex systems of partial differential equations.

What Belongs Where? Variable Selection for Zero-Inflated Count Models with an Application to the Demand for Health Care

This paper develops stochastic search variable selection (SSVS) for zero-inflated count models which are commonly used in health economics. This allows for either model averaging or model selection in situations with many potential regressors. The proposed techniques are applied to a data set from Germany considering the demand for health care. A package for the free statistical software environment R is provided.

(Don’t) Make My Vote Count

Proponents of proportional electoral rules often argue that majority rule depresses turnout and may lower welfare due to the 'tyranny of the majority' problem. The present paper studies the impact of electoral rules on turnout and social welfare. We analyze a model of instrumental voting where citizens have private information over their individual cost of voting and over the alternative they prefer. The electoral rule used to select the winning alternative is a combination of majority rule and proportional rule. Results show that the above arguments against majority rule do not hold in this set up. Social welfare and turnout increase with the weight that the electoral rule gives to majority rule when the electorate is expected to be split, and they are independent of the electoral rule employed when the expected size of the minority group tends to zero. However, more proportional rules can increase turnout within the minority group. This effect is stronger the smaller the minority group. We then conclude that majority rule fosters overall turnout and increases social welfare, whereas proportional rule fosters the participation of minorities.