Incorporating jurisdiction issues into regional carbon accounts under production and consumption accounting principles

Despite increased public interest, policymakers have been slow to enact targets based on limiting emissions under full consumption accounting measures (such as carbon footprints). This paper argues that this may be due to the fact that policymakers in one jurisdiction do not have control over production technologies used in other jurisdictions. The paper uses a regional input-output framework and data derived on carbon dioxide emissions by industry (and households) to examine regional accountability for emissions generation. In doing so, we consider two accounting methods that permit greater accountability of regional private and public (household and government) final consumption as the main driver of regional emissions generation, while retaining focus on the local production technology and consumption decisions that fall under the jurisdiction of regional policymakers. We propose that these methods permit an attribution of emissions generation that is likely to be of more use to regional policymakers than a full global footprint analysis.

Aid and Development: Issues and Reflections

The paper has three main sections. The first is a review of two particular propositions which appear in Dambisa Moyo’s 2009 book Dead Aid which were not subjected to rigorous analysis in the reviews which appeared following its publication. The finding is that neither proposition survives serious scrutiny – that aid is responsible for most of sub-Saharan Africa’s economic woes and that the international bond market represents a viable alternative to foreign aid for the finance of development-oriented investment. The second questions some of the characteristics and uses of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), particularly focussing on the use of an essentially ordinal measure in cardinal applications. The third subjects the UK Department for International Development’s Needs-Effectiveness Index to critical review, concluding that further consideration of its attributes is necessary.

Currency Issues and Options for an Independent Scotland

In this paper we take on the role of a ‘virtual consultant’ to a potentially independent Scotland. What should the exchange rate regime of an independent Scotland look like? We argue that the current proposal of the Scottish government to remain part of the sterling zone is doomed to failure, both because it falls short of a full political and monetary union and because it fails to recognize the reality of the Scottish economy post independence. We argue that the only tenable solution for an independent Scotland is to have a separate currency and for this currency to have some flexibility against Scotland’s main trading partners. One option offered here is managed float or crawl against a basket of currencies.

Decision Errors, Legal Uncertainty and Welfare: a General Treatment

This paper provides a general treatment of the implications for welfare of legal uncertainty. We distinguish legal uncertainty from decision errors: though the former can be influenced by the latter, the latter are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty. We show that an increase in decision errors will always reduce welfare. However, for any given level of decision errors, information structures involving more legal uncertainty can improve welfare. This holds always, even when there is complete legal uncertainty, when sanctions on socially harmful actions are set at their optimal level. This transforms radically one’s perception about the “costs” of legal uncertainty. We also provide general proofs for two results, previously established under restrictive assumptions. The first is that Effects-Based enforcement procedures may welfare dominate Per Se (or object-based) procedures and will always do so when sanctions are optimally set. The second is that optimal sanctions may well be higher under enforcement procedures involving more legal uncertainty.

Legal Uncertainty, Competition Law Enforcement Procedures and Optimal Penalties

In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law enforcement procedures. The first (which is of general interest beyond competition policy) is to clarify the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relating it to ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, but formalising the concept through various information structures which specify the probability that each firm attaches – at the time it takes an action – to the possibility of its being deemed anti-competitive were it to be investigated by a Competition Authority. We show that the existence of Type I and Type II decision errors by competition authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty, and that information structures with legal uncertainty can generate higher welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992). Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects- Based legal standards. In that analysis we considered just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties were exogenously fixed. Here we allow for (a) different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b) endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results: (i) considering all information structures a Per Se standard is never better than an Effects-Based standard; (ii) optimal penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty.

Measuring Tax Complexity

This paper critically examines a number of issues relating to the measurement of tax complexity. It starts with an analysis of the concept of tax complexity, distinguishing tax design complexity and operational complexity. It considers the consequences/costs of complexity, and then examines the rationale for measuring complexity. Finally it applies the analysis to an examination of an index of complexity developed by the UK Office of Tax Simplification (OTS).