Entrepreneurial Orientation, Intangible Assets and Firm Growth: the impact of ‘Spirit and Material’ on the growth of Chinese private firms

This paper has three contributions. First, it shows how field work within small firms in PR Chinese has provided new evidence which enables us to measure and calibrate Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO), as ‘spirit’, and Intangible Assets (IA), as ‘material’, for use in models of small firm growth. Second, it uses inter-item correlation analysis and both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to provide new measures of EO and IA, in index and in vector form, for use in econometric models of firm growth. Third, it estimates two new econometric models of small firm employment growth in PR China, under the null hypothesis of Gibrat’s Law, using our two new index-based and vector-based measures of EO and IA. Estimation is by OLS with adjustment for heteroscedasticity, and for sample selectivity. Broadly, it finds that EO attributes have had little significant impact on small firm growth, and indeed innovativeness and pro-activity paradoxically may even dampen growth. However, IA attributes have had a positive and significant impact on growth, with networking, and technological knowledge being of prime importance, and intellectual property and human capital being of lesser but still significant importance. In the light of these results, Gibrat’s Law is generalized, and Jovanovic’s learning theory is extended, to emphasise the importance of IA to growth. These findings cast new empirical light on the oft-quoted national slogan in PR China of “spirit and material”. So far as small firms are concerned, this paper suggests that their contribution to PR China’s remarkable economic growth is not so much attributable to the ‘spirit’ of enterprise (as suggested by propaganda) as, more prosaically, to the pursuit of the ‘material’.

Commitment vs. Discretion in the UK: An Empirical Investigation of the Monetary and Fiscal Policy Regime

This paper investigates the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy in the post-ERM period in the UK. Using a simple DSGE New Keynesian model of non-cooperative monetary and fiscal policy interactions under fiscal intra-period leadership, we demonstrate that the past policy in the UK is better explained by optimal policy under discretion than under commitment. We estimate policy objectives of both policy makers. We demonstrate that fiscal policy plays an important role in identifying the monetary policy regime.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.