The Expenditure Impacts of London-based Individual Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and their Students on the Economy of England: Homogeneity or Heterogeneity?

This paper replicates the analysis of Scottish HEIs in Hermannsson et al (2010a) to identify the impact of London-based HEIs on the English economy in order to provide a self-contained analysis that is readily accessible by those whose primary concern is with the regional impacts of London HEIs. When we treat each of the 38 London-based Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) that existed in England in 2006 as separate sectors in conventional input-output analysis, their expenditure impacts per unit of final demand appear rather homogenous (though less so than HEIs in Wales and Scotland), with the apparent heterogeneity of their overall impacts being primarily driven by scale. However, a disaggregation of their income by source reveals considerable variation in their dependence upon general public funding and their ability to draw in income/funding from external sources. Acknowledging the possible alternative uses of the public funding and deriving balanced expenditure multipliers reveals large differences in the net-expenditure impact of London HEIs upon the English economy, with the source of variation being the origin of income. Applying a novel treatment of student expenditure impacts, identifying the amount of exogenous spending per student, modifies the heterogeneity of the overall expenditure impacts. On balance this suggests that the impacts of impending budget cut-backs will be quite different by institution depending on their sensitivity to public funding. However, predicting the outcome of budget cutbacks at the margin is problematic for reasons that we identify.

Sharp Bounds on Heterogeneous Individual Treatment Responses

This paper discusses how to identify individual-specific causal effects of an ordered discrete endogenous variable. The counterfactual heterogeneous causal information is recovered by identifying the partial differences of a structural relation. The proposed refutable nonparametric local restrictions exploit the fact that the pattern of endogeneity may vary across the level of the unobserved variable. The restrictions adopted in this paper impose a sense of order to an unordered binary endogeneous variable. This allows for a uni.ed structural approach to studying various treatment effects when self-selection on unobservables is present. The usefulness of the identi.cation results is illustrated using the data on the Vietnam-era veterans. The empirical findings reveal that when other observable characteristics are identical, military service had positive impacts for individuals with low (unobservable) earnings potential, while it had negative impacts for those with high earnings potential. This heterogeneity would not be detected by average effects which would underestimate the actual effects because different signs would be cancelled out. This partial identification result can be used to test homogeneity in response. When homogeneity is rejected, many parameters based on averages may deliver misleading information.

Decision Errors, Legal Uncertainty and Welfare: a General Treatment

This paper provides a general treatment of the implications for welfare of legal uncertainty. We distinguish legal uncertainty from decision errors: though the former can be influenced by the latter, the latter are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty. We show that an increase in decision errors will always reduce welfare. However, for any given level of decision errors, information structures involving more legal uncertainty can improve welfare. This holds always, even when there is complete legal uncertainty, when sanctions on socially harmful actions are set at their optimal level. This transforms radically one’s perception about the “costs” of legal uncertainty. We also provide general proofs for two results, previously established under restrictive assumptions. The first is that Effects-Based enforcement procedures may welfare dominate Per Se (or object-based) procedures and will always do so when sanctions are optimally set. The second is that optimal sanctions may well be higher under enforcement procedures involving more legal uncertainty.