Labour Market Imperfections, International Integration and Selection

Although a large body of literature has focused on the effects of intra-firm differences on export performance, relatively little attention has been devoted to the interaction between firms' selection and international performance and labour market institutions - in contrast with the centrality of the latter to current policy and public debates on the implications of economic globalisation for national policies and institutions. In this paper, we study the effects of labour market unionisation on the process of competitive selection between heterogeneous firms and analyse how the interaction between the two is affected by trade liberalisation between countries with different unionisation patterns.

Institutions and Economic Development. New tests and new doubts.

Is institutional quality a major driver of economic development? This paper tackles the question by focusing on the within-country variation of growth rates of GDP per capita. While previous attempts using this methodology have controlled for many of the standard de- terminants of the empirical growth literature, we argue that such ap- proach is not adequate if good institutions are the main reason behind decisions to invest in human or physical capital accumulation or to engage in international trade. Our regressions exclude the proximate causes of growth in order to estimate the overall e¤ect of institutional quality. Perhaps surprisingly, we nd no support for the thesis that institutional quality improves economic growth. These results encourage a reconsideration of the evidence provided elsewhere in the literature.

Trade Costs, International Competition and Selection: The Effects of Unionisation on Market Size

Within a two-country model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms face firm-specific unions, we study the effects of different forms of trade liberalisation on market structure and competitive selection in the presence of inter-country asymmetries in size and labour market institutions. For given levels of trade openness, an increase in a country’s relative unions’ strength reduces the average productivity of its domestic producers but increases that of its exporters. Whilst an unfavourable union power differential, by increasing wages, weakens a country’s firms’ competitive position, the higher wages reinforce standard market access mechanisms to give rise to aggregate income effects. When the initial levels of trade openness are sufficiently low, this ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect can attract industry in the country with stronger unions and also result in an increase in the extensive margin of exports. For sufficiently large inter-country differences in the bargaining power of unions, trade liberalization can then result in a pro-variety effect, with an increase in the total availability of varieties to consumers in both countries, regardless of there being inter-country differences in size.

International Aid to Tanzania – with some comparisons from Ghana and Uganda

This paper has three principal objectives. First, to review the level of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Tanzania over the last two to three decades, and to place this into an economic context. This review includes some comparisons with the experience of Ghana and Uganda. Second, to discuss three major issues for the Tanzanian aid: the position of ODA as budget support, corruption, and alignment with the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Third, to review the literature on the Tanzanian aid experience, including a range of official evaluation reports produced by the Tanzanian government and by the donor community. The conclusions, broadly, are that ODA has been at a sustained high level for most of the period reviewed, funding a significant amount of government development expenditure, and that economic growth has been strong, with poverty reduction ‘flat-lining’ in Tanzania but being significant in Ghana and Uganda. Experience with budget support in Tanzania has been mixed, corruption continues as a major concern, and improvements to public finance management have been difficult to achieve. In this context governance adjustments come slowly, requiring patience on the part of both recipient governments and the ODA donor community.