Structural Breaks in the Real Exchange Rate and Real Interest Rate Relationship

In this paper we empirically examine the relationship between the real exchange rate and real interest rate differentials using recent econometric methods robust to potential structural breaks. Generally, our study provides evidence of this relationship in the long-run context. More specifically, we first focus on the UK-US relationship, and interestingly find limited evidence of this long-run relationship using traditional methods. But when an approach robust to endogenously determined structural breaks is employed, we find evidence that the real interest rate differential is an important determinant of the real exchange rate. Secondly, in order to investigate the relevance of structural shifts in a more global context, we carry out multiple country analysis. While providing evidence of this long-run relationship, European data suggest that the presence of structural breaks is not very common across countries and is indeed country-specific.

A New Test of the Real Interest Rate Parity Hypothesis: Bounds Approach and Structural Breaks

We test the real interest rate parity hypothesis using data for the G7 countries over the period 1970-2008. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we utilize the ARDL bounds approach of Pesaran et al. (2001) which allows us to overcome uncertainty about the order of integration of real interest rates. Second, we test for structural breaks in the underlying relationship using the multiple structural breaks test of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). Our results indicate significant parameter instability and suggest that, despite the advances in economic and financial integration, real interest rate parity has not fully recovered from a breakdown in the 1980s.

Interest Rate Co-movements, Global Factors and the Long End of the Term Spread

The disconnect between rising short and low long interest rates has been a distinctive feature of the 2000s. Both research and policy circles have argued that international forces, such as global monetary policy (e.g. Rogoff, 2006); international business cycles (e.g. Borio and Filardo, 2007); or a global savings glut (e.g Bernanke, 2005) may be responsible. In this paper, we employ recent advances in panel data econometrics to document the disconnect and link it explicitly to the existence of a global latent factor that dominates the long end of the term spread for the recent period; the saving glut story emerges as the most likely contender for the global factor.

Currency Forecast Errors at Times of Low Interest Rates: Evidence from Survey Data on the Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate

Using survey expectations data and Markov-switching models, this paper evaluates the characteristics and evolution of investors' forecast errors about the yen/dollar exchange rate. Since our model is derived from the uncovered interest rate parity (UIRP) condition and our data cover a period of low interest rates, this study is also related to the forward premium puzzle and the currency carry trade strategy. We obtain the following results. First, with the same forecast horizon, exchange rate forecasts are homogeneous among different industry types, but within the same industry, exchange rate forecasts differ if the forecast time horizon is different. In particular, investors tend to undervalue the future exchange rate for long term forecast horizons; however, in the short run they tend to overvalue the future exchange rate. Second, while forecast errors are found to be partly driven by interest rate spreads, evidence against the UIRP is provided regardless of the forecasting time horizon; the forward premium puzzle becomes more significant in shorter term forecasting errors. Consistent with this finding, our coefficients on interest rate spreads provide indirect evidence of the yen carry trade over only a short term forecast horizon. Furthermore, the carry trade seems to be active when there is a clear indication that the interest rate will be low in the future.

Exchange Rate Predictability in a Changing World

An expanding literature articulates the view that Taylor rules are helpful in predicting exchange rates. In a changing world however, Taylor rule parameters may be subject to structural instabilities, for example during the Global Financial Crisis. This paper forecasts exchange rates using such Taylor rules with Time Varying Parameters (TVP) estimated by Bayesian methods. In core out-of-sample results, we improve upon a random walk benchmark for at least half, and for as many as eight out of ten, of the currencies considered. This contrasts with a constant parameter Taylor rule model that yields a more limited improvement upon the benchmark. In further results, Purchasing Power Parity and Uncovered Interest Rate Parity TVP models beat a random walk benchmark, implying our methods have some generality in exchange rate prediction.

Exchange rate forecasters’ performance: evidence of skill?

This paper sheds new light on a long-standing puzzle in the international finance literature, namely, that exchange rate expectations appear inaccurate and even irrational. We find for a comprehensive dataset that individual forecasters’ performance is skill-based. ‘Superior’ forecasters show consistent ability as their forecasting success holds across currencies. They seem to possess knowledge on the role of fundamentals in explaining exchange rate behavior, as indicated by better interest rate forecasts. Superior forecasters are more experienced than the median forecaster and have fewer personnel responsibilities. Accordingly, foreign exchange markets may function in less puzzling and irrational ways than is often thought.

Nominal Interest Rates and Stationarity

This paper investigates the (break) stationarity null hypothesis using data for 25 interest rates with different maturities and risk characteristics in Canada and the US. In contrast to a large part of the literature, this paper reports strong empirical evidence in favour of the null hypothesis of stationarity for the interest rate series.

Stock Market Reaction to Fed Funds Rate Surprises: State Dependence and the Financial Crisis

This paper examines the impact of Federal Funds rate (FFR) surprises on stock returns in the United States over the period 1989-2009, focusing on the impact of the recent financial crisis. We find that prior to the crisis, stock prices increased as a response to unexpected FFR cuts. State dependence is also identified with stocks exhibiting larger increases when interest rate easing coincided with recessions, bear stock markets, and tightening credit market conditions. However, an important structural shift took place during the financial crisis, which changed the stock market response to FFR shocks, as well as the nature of state dependence. Specifically, during the crisis period stock market participants did not react positively to unexpected FFR cuts. Our results highlight the severity of the recent financial turmoil episode and the ineffectiveness of conventional monetary policy close to the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates.

How Optimal is US Monetary Policy?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis assume that policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow policy to be described by various forms of optimal policy - commitment, discretion and quasi-commitment. We find that, even after allowing for Markov switching in shock variances, the inflation target and/or rule parameters, the data preferred description of policy is that the US Fed operates under discretion with a marked increase in conservatism after the 1970s. Parameter estimates are similar to those obtained under simple rules, except that the degree of habits is significantly lower and the prevalence of cost-push shocks greater. Moreover, we find that the greatest welfare gains from the ‘Great Moderation’ arose from the reduction in the variances in shocks hitting the economy, rather than increased inflation aversion. However, much of the high inflation of the 1970s could have been avoided had policy makers been able to commit, even without adopting stronger anti-inflation objectives. More recently the Fed appears to have temporarily relaxed policy following the 1987 stock market crash, and has lost, without regaining, its post-Volcker conservatism following the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

US Monetary and Fiscal Policies - Conflict or Cooperation?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis ignores fiscal policy and assumes that monetary policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow both fiscal and monetary policy to be described by rules and/or optimal policy which are subject to switches over time. We find that US monetary and fiscal policy have often been in conflict, and that it is relatively rare that we observe the benign policy combination of an conservative monetary policy paired with a debt stabilizing fiscal policy. In a series of counterfactuals, a conservative central bank following a time-consistent fiscal policy leader would come close to mimicking the cooperative Ramsey policy. However, if policy makers cannot credibly commit to such a regime, monetary accommodation of the prevailing fiscal regime may actually be welfare improving.

Dynamic Option Adjusted Spread and the Value of Mortgage Backed Securities (Draft 1)

We extend a reduced form model for pricing pass-through mortgage backed securities (MBS) and provide a novel hedging tool for investors in this market. To calculate the price of an MBS, traders use what is known as option-adjusted spread (OAS). The resulting OAS value represents the required basis points adjustment to reference curve discounting rates needed to match an observed market price. The OAS suffers from some drawbacks. For example, it remains constant until the maturity of the bond (thirty years in mortgage-backed securities), and does not incorporate interest rate volatility. We suggest instead what we call dynamic option adjusted spread (DOAS). The latter allows investors in the mortgage market to account for both prepayment risk and changes of the yield curve.

Expectations, Learning and Monetary Policy: An Overview of Recent Research

Expectations about the future are central for determination of current macroeconomic outcomes and the formulation of monetary policy. Recent literature has explored ways for supplementing the benchmark of rational expectations with explicit models of expectations formation that rely on econometric learning. Some apparently natural policy rules turn out to imply expectational instability of private agents’ learning. We use the standard New Keynesian model to illustrate this problem and survey the key results about interest-rate rules that deliver both uniqueness and stability of equilibrium under econometric learning. We then consider some practical concerns such as measurement errors in private expectations, observability of variables and learning of structural parameters required for policy. We also discuss some recent applications including policy design under perpetual learning, estimated models with learning, recurrent hyperinflations, and macroeconomic policy to combat liquidity traps and deflation.

Common and Idiosyncratic Factors of the Exchange Risk Premium in Emerging European Markets

Existing empirical evidence suggests that the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIRP) condition may not hold due to an exchange risk premium. For a panel data set of eleven emerging European economies we decompose this exchange risk premium into an idiosyncratic (country-specific) elements and a common factor using a principal components approach. We present evidence of a stationary idiosyncratic component and nonstationary common factor. This result leads to the conclusion of a nonstationary risk premium for these countries and a violation of the UIRP in the long-run, which is in contrast to previous studies often documenting a stationary premium in developed countries. Furthermore, we report that the variation in the premium is largely attributable to a common factor influenced by economic developments in the United States.