Multinational Firms’ Heterogeneity in Tax Responsiveness: the Role of Transfer Pricing

In this paper we show that the ability of multinational firms to manipulate transfer prices affects the tax sensitivity of foreign direct investment (FDI). We offer a model of international capital allocation where firms are heterogeneous in their ability to manipulate transfer prices. Perhaps paradoxically, we show that the ability to shift profits can make parent companies' investment more sensitive to host-country tax rates, as long as investors expect fisscal authorities to use price and profit detection methods. We then offer a comprehensive empirical study to test our predictions in the case of Japanese FDI. We exploit the finding that the unobservable ability to manipulate transfer prices is correlated with whole ownership of a±liates and R&D expenditure. Based on country, parent firm and sector characteristics, we estimate an investment equation on a sample of 3614 Japanese affiliates in 49 emerging countries. We obtain a greater semi-elasticity of investment to the statutory tax rate in a±liates that are wholly-owned and that have R&D intensive parents. We interpret these results as indirect evidence that abusive transfer pricing is one of the determinants of FDI activity.

On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking

We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank level. We show that when the market power is low, banks invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of market power, all banks choose the prudent asset to invest in. We further show that a merger of two neighboring banks increases the likelihood of prudent behaviour. Finally, introduction of a deposit insurance scheme exacerbates banks’ moral hazard problem.

The economics of power and control

John Hardman Moore outlines his joint research with Oliver Hart, looking at the economics of power and control and the foundations of contractual incompleteness

Factors Affecting the Financial Success of Motion Pictures: What is the Role of Star Power?

In the mid-1940s, American film industry was on its way up to its golden era as studios started mass-producing iconic feature films. The escalating increase in popularity of Hollywood stars was actively suggested for its direct links to box office success by academics. Using data collected in 2007, this paper carries out an empirical investigation on how different factors, including star power, affect the revenue of ‘home-run’ movies in Hollywood. Due to the subjective nature of star power, two different approaches were used: (1) number of nominations and wins of Academy Awards by the key players, and (2) average lifetime gross revenue of films involving the key players preceding the sample year. It is found that number of Academy awards nominations and wins was not statistically significant in generating box office revenue, whereas star power based on the second approach was statistically significant. Other significant factors were critics’ reviews, screen coverage and top distributor, while number of Academy awards, MPAA-rating, seasonality, being a sequel and popular genre were not statistically significant.