Do institutions matter for economic fluctuations? Weak property rights in a business cycle model for Mexico

This paper shows that introducing weak property rights in the standard real business cycle (RBC) model can help to explain economic fluctuations. This is motivated by the empirical observation that changes in institutions in emerging markets are related to the evolution of the main macroeconomic variables. In particular, in Mexico, the movements in productivity in the data are associated with changes in institutions, so that we can explain productivity shocks to a large extent as shocks to the quality of institutions. We find that the model with shocks to the degree of protection of property rights only - without technology shocks - can match the second moments in the data for Mexico well. In particular, the fit is better than that of the standard neoclassical model with full protection of property rights regarding the auto-correlations and cross-correlations in the data, especially those related to labor. Viewing productivity shocks as shocks to institutions is also consistent with the stylized fact of falling productivity and non-decreasing labor hours in Mexico over 1980-1994, which is a feature that the neoclassical model cannot match.

Climbing to the top? Foreign Direct Investment and Property Rights.

This paper operates at the interface of the literature on the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on host countries, and the literature on the determinants of institutional quality. We argue that FDI contributes to economic development by improving institutional quality in the host country and we attempt to test this proposition using a large panel data set of 70 developing countries during the period 1981 and 2005, and we show that FDI inflows have a positive and highly significant impact on property rights. The result appears to be very robust and is and not affected by model specification, different control variables, or a particular estimation technique. As far as we are aware this is the first paper to empirically test the FDI – property rights linkage.

Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Development in Historical Perspective

Institutions, and more speci cally private property rights, have come to be seen as a major determinant of long-run economic development. We evaluate the case for property rights as an explanatory factor of the Industrial Revolution and derive some lessons for the analysis of developing countries today. We pay particular attention to the role of property rights in the accumulation of physical capital and the production of new ideas. The evidence that we review from the economic history literature does not support the institutional thesis.

Institutions and the Scale Effect

Growth models which imply a scale effect are commonly refuted on the basis of empirical evidence. A focus on the extent of the market as opposed to the scale of the country has led recent studies to reconsider the role that country scale plays when conditioning on other factors. We consider a variant of a simple learning by doing model to account for the potential role for institutions in determining the strength – and direction – of the scale effect. Using cross-country data, we find a significant interaction between property rights institutions and the effect of scale on long-run growth: In countries with poor property rights institutions, scale is positively related with income per capita; where property rights institutions are good, higher scale is associated with lower per capita ncomes. We find no evidence of such role for contracting institutions.

Contracting Institutions and Development

The quality of contracting institutions has been thought to be of second-order importance next to the impact that good property rights institutions can have on long-run growth. Using a large range of proxies for each type of institution, we find a robust negative link between the quality of contracting institutions and long-run growth when we condition on property rights and a number of additional macroeconomic variables. Although the result remains something of a puzzle, we present evidence which suggests that only when property rights institutions are good do contracting institutions appear also to be good for development. Good contracting institutions can reduce long-run growth when property rights are not secured, presumably because the gains from the (costly) contracting institutions cannot be realised. This suggests that contracting institutions can benefit growth, and that the sequence of institutional change can matter.

QWERTY and the search for optimality

This paper shows how one of the developers of QWERTY continued to use the trade secret that underlay its development to seek further efficiency improvements after its introduction. It provides further evidence that this was the principle used to design QWERTY in the first place and adds further weight to arguments that QWERTY itself was a consequence of creative design and an integral part of a highly efficient system rather than an accident of history. This further serves to raise questions over QWERTY's forced servitude as 'paradigm case' of inferior standard in the path dependence literature. The paper also shows how complementarities in forms of intellectual property rights protection played integral roles in the development of QWERTY and the search for improvements on it, and also helped effectively conceal the source of the efficiency advantages that QWERTY helped deliver.

On the FDI-attracting property of privatizatio

In this paper, we provide an explanation of why privatization may attract foreign investors willing to enter a regional market. Privatization turns the formerly-public firm into a less aggressive competitor since profit-maximizing output is lower than the welfaremaximizing one. The drawback is that social welfare generally decreases. We also investigate tax/subsidy competition for FDI and put forward its potentially positive role. On the one hand, it may reduce the negative impact on welfare of an FDI-attracting privatization. On the other hand, it may prevent a welfare-reducing investment by the foreign firm. This sheds light on the substitute/complementary relationship between the two policies and the two objectives of governments.

What drives urban consumption in mainland china? The role of property price dynamics

This paper adds to the literature on wealth effects on consumption by disentangling house price effects on consumption for mainland China. In a stochastic modelling framework, the riskiness, rate of increase and persistence of house price movements have different implications for the consumption/housing ratio. We exploit the geographical variation in property prices by using a quarterly city-level panel dataset for the period 1998Q1 – 2009Q4 and rely on a panel error correction model. Overall, the results suggest a significant long run impact of property prices on consumption. They also broadly confirm the predictions from the theoretical model.