Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching

We study the incentive to invest to improve marriage prospects, in a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria in models with deterministic returns, and a unique equilibrium exists under reasonable conditions. Equilibrium investment is efficient when the sexes are symmetric. However, when there is any asymmetry, including an unbalanced sex ratio, investments are generically excessive. For example, if there is an excess of boys, then there is parental over-investment in boys and under-investment in girls, and total investment will be excessive.

Co-movements in Real Effective Exchange Rates: Evidence from the Dynamic Hierarchical Factor Model

We analyze and quantify co-movements in real effective exchange rates while considering the regional location of countries. More specifically, using the dynamic hierarchical factor model (Moench et al. (2011)), we decompose exchange rate movements into several latent components; worldwide and two regional factors as well as country-specific elements. Then, we provide evidence that the worldwide common factor is closely related to monetary policies in large advanced countries while regional common factors tend to be captured by those in the rest of the countries in a region. However, a substantial proportion of the variation in the real exchange rates is reported to be country-specific; even in Europe country-specific movements exceed worldwide and regional common factors.

Matching and Sorting in a Global Economy

We develop a neoclassical trade model with heterogeneous factors of production. We consider a world with two factors, labor and .managers., each with a distribution of ability levels. Production combines a manager of some type with a group of workers. The output of a unit depends on the types of the two factors, with complementarity between them, while exhibiting diminishing returns to the number of workers. We examine the sorting of factors to sectors and the matching of factors within sectors, and we use the model to study the determinants of the trade pattern and the effects of trade on the wage and salary distributions. Finally, we extend the model to include search frictions and consider the distribution of employment rates.

Hierarchical Shrinkage in Time-Varying Parameter Models

In this paper, we forecast EU-area inflation with many predictors using time-varying parameter models. The facts that time-varying parameter models are parameter-rich and the time span of our data is relatively short motivate a desire for shrinkage. In constant coefficient regression models, the Bayesian Lasso is gaining increasing popularity as an effective tool for achieving such shrinkage. In this paper, we develop econometric methods for using the Bayesian Lasso with time-varying parameter models. Our approach allows for the coefficient on each predictor to be: i) time varying, ii) constant over time or iii) shrunk to zero. The econometric methodology decides automatically which category each coefficient belongs in. Our empirical results indicate the benefits of such an approach.

Fiscal multipliers in a two-sector search and matching model

This paper evaluates the effects of policy interventions on sectoral labour markets and the aggregate economy in a business cycle model with search and matching frictions. We extend the canonical model by including capital-skill complementarity in production, labour markets with skilled and unskilled workers and on-the-job-learning (OJL) within and across skill types. We first find that, the model does a good job at matching the cyclical properties of sectoral employment and the wage-skill premium. We next find that vacancy subsidies for skilled and unskilled jobs lead to output multipliers which are greater than unity with OJL and less than unity without OJL. In contrast, the positive output effects from cutting skilled and unskilled income taxes are close to zero. Finally, we find that the sectoral and aggregate effects of vacancy subsidies do not depend on whether they are financed via public debt or distorting taxes.