Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals

In many moral hazard problems, the principal evaluates the agent's performance based on signals which the agent may suppress and replace with counterfeits. This form of fraud may affect the design of optimal contracts drastically, leading to complete market failure in extreme cases. I show that in optimal contracts, the principal deters all fraud, and does so by two complementary mechanisms. First, the principal punishes signals that are suspicious, i.e. appear counterfeit. Second, the principal is lenient on bad signals that the agent could suppress, but does not.

A New Index of Financial Conditions

We use factor augmented vector autoregressive models with time-varying coefficients to construct a financial conditions index. The time-variation in the parameters allows for the weights attached to each financial variable in the index to evolve over time. Furthermore, we develop methods for dynamic model averaging or selection which allow the financial variables entering into the FCI to change over time. We discuss why such extensions of the existing literature are important and show them to be so in an empirical application involving a wide range of financial variables.

Liquidity, moral hazard and bank crises

Bank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex ante require costly crises to occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When bank payoffs are partially appropriable, either directly via imposition of fines or indirectly by the use of bank equity as a collateral, we argue that an appropriately designed ex-ante regime of policy intervention involving conditional monitoring can prevent bank crises.