Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals

In many moral hazard problems, the principal evaluates the agent's performance based on signals which the agent may suppress and replace with counterfeits. This form of fraud may affect the design of optimal contracts drastically, leading to complete market failure in extreme cases. I show that in optimal contracts, the principal deters all fraud, and does so by two complementary mechanisms. First, the principal punishes signals that are suspicious, i.e. appear counterfeit. Second, the principal is lenient on bad signals that the agent could suppress, but does not.

Liquidity, moral hazard and bank crises

Bank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex ante require costly crises to occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When bank payoffs are partially appropriable, either directly via imposition of fines or indirectly by the use of bank equity as a collateral, we argue that an appropriately designed ex-ante regime of policy intervention involving conditional monitoring can prevent bank crises.

On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking

We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank level. We show that when the market power is low, banks invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of market power, all banks choose the prudent asset to invest in. We further show that a merger of two neighboring banks increases the likelihood of prudent behaviour. Finally, introduction of a deposit insurance scheme exacerbates banks’ moral hazard problem.

Export-market dynamics and the probability of firm closure: Evidence for the UK

This study presents the first empirical analysis of the determinants of firm closure in the UK with an emphasis on the role of export-market dynamics, using panel data for a nationally representative group of firms operating in all-market based sectors during 1997-2003. Our findings show that the probability of closure is (cet. par.) significantly lower for exporters, particularly those experiencing export-market entry and exit. Having controlled for other attributes associated with productivity (such as size and export status), the following factors are found to increase the firm’s survival prospects: higher capital intensity and TFP, foreign ownership, young age, displacement effects (through relatively high rates of entry of firms in each industry), and belonging to certain industries. Interestingly, increased import penetration (a proxy for lower trade costs) leads to a lower hazard rate for exporting entrants and continuous exporters, whilst inducing a higher hazard rate for domestic producers or those that quit exporting.

Why is it so Hard to Value Intangibles? Evidence from Investments in High-Technology Start-Ups

The paper uses a range of primary-source empirical evidence to address the question: ‘why is it to hard to value intangible assets?’ The setting is venture capital investment in high technology companies. While the investors are risk specialists and financial experts, the entrepreneurs are more knowledgeable about product innovation. Thus the context lends itself to analysis within a principal-agent framework, in which information asymmetry may give rise to adverse selection, pre-contract, and moral hazard, post-contract. We examine how the investor might attenuate such problems and attach a value to such high-tech investments in what are often merely intangible assets, through expert due diligence, monitoring and control. Qualitative evidence is used to qualify the more clear cut picture provided by a principal-agent approach to a more mixed picture in which the ‘art and science’ of investment appraisal are utilised by both parties alike

Testing for Proportional Hazards with Unrestricted Univariate Unobserved Heterogeneity

We develop tests of the proportional hazards assumption, with respect to a continuous covariate, in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity with unknown distribution at the individual observation level. The proposed tests are specially powerful against ordered alternatives useful for modeling non-proportional hazards situations. By contrast to the case when the heterogeneity distribution is known up to …nite dimensional parameters, the null hypothesis for the current problem is similar to a test for absence of covariate dependence. However, the two testing problems di¤er in the nature of relevant alternative hypotheses. We develop tests for both the problems against ordered alternatives. Small sample performance and an application to real data highlight the usefulness of the framework and methodology.

Financial Distress in Chinese Industry: Microeconomic, Macroeconomic and Institutional Infuences

We study the impact of both microeconomic factors and the macroeconomy on the financial distress of Chinese listed companies over a period of massive economic transition, 1995 to 2006. Based on an economic model of financial distress under the institutional setting of state protection against exit, and using our own firm-level measure of distress, we find important impacts of firm characteristics, macroeconomic instability and institutional factors on the hazard rate of financial distress. The results are robust to unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as those shared by firms in similar macroeconomic founding conditions. Comparison with related studies for other economies highlights important policy implications.

Using Effluent Charges in Promoting Investment in Water Pollution Control Technology: A Model of Coordination Failure among Firms

Untreated wastewater being directly discharged into rivers is a very harmful environmental hazard that needs to be tackled urgently in many countries. In order to safeguard the river ecosystem and reduce water pollution, it is important to have an effluent charge policy that promotes the investment of wastewater treatment technology by domestic firms. This paper considers the strategic interaction between the government and the domestic firms regarding the investment in the wastewater treatment technology and the design of optimal e­ffluent charge policy that should be implemented. In this model, the higher is the proportion of non-investing firms, the higher would be the probability of having to incur an e­ffluent charge and the higher would be that charge. On one hand the government needs to impose a sufficiently strict policy to ensure that firms have strong incentive to invest. On the other hand, it cannot be too strict that it drives out firms which cannot afford to invest in such expensive technology. The paper analyses the factors that affect the probability of investment in this technology. It also explains the difficulty of imposing a strict environment policy in countries that have too many small firms which cannot afford to invest unless subsidised.

Universal banking, competition and risk in a macro model

A stylized macroeconomic model is developed with an indebted, heterogeneous Investment Banking Sector funded by borrowing from a retail banking sector. The government guarantees retail deposits. Investment banks choose how risky their activities should be. We compared the benefits of separated vs. universal banking modelled as a vertical integration of the retail and investment banks. The incidence of banking default is considered under different constellations of shocks and degrees of competitiveness. The benefits of universal banking rise in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks to trading strategies and are positive even for very bad common shocks, even though government bailouts, which are costly, are larger compared to the case of separated banking entities. The welfare assessment of the structure of banks may depend crucially on the kinds of shock hitting the economy as well as on the efficiency of government intervention.