Communication for Public Goods

This paper studies information transmission between multiple agents with di¤erent preferences and a welfare maximizing decision maker who chooses the quality or quantity of a public good (e.g. provision of public health service; carbon emissions policy; pace of lectures in a classroom) that is consumed by all of them. Communication in such circumstances suffers from the agents' incentive to "exaggerate" their preferences relative to the average of the other agents, since the decision maker's reaction to each agent's message is weaker than in one-to-one communication. As the number of agents becomes larger the quality of information transmission diminishes. The use of binary messages (e.g. "yes" or "no") is shown to be a robust mode of communication when the main source of informational distortion is exaggeration.

Optimal Monetary Policy in a New Keynesian Model with Habits in Consumption

While consumption habits have been utilised as a means of generating a humpshaped output response to monetary policy shocks in sticky-price New Keynesian economies, there is relatively little analysis of the impact of habits (particularly,external habits) on optimal policy. In this paper we consider the implications of external habits for optimal monetary policy, when those habits either exist at the level of the aggregate basket of consumption goods (‘superficial’ habits) or at the level of individual goods (‘deep’ habits: see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006)). External habits generate an additional distortion in the economy, which implies that the flex-price equilibrium will no longer be efficient and that policy faces interesting new trade-offs and potential stabilisation biases. Furthermore, the endogenous mark-up behaviour, which emerges when habits are deep, can also significantly affect the optimal policy response to shocks, as well as dramatically affecting the stabilising properties of standard simple rules.

Second-Order Approximation to the Rotemberg Model around a Distorted Steady State

Less is known about social welfare objectives when it is costly to change prices, as in Rotemberg (1982), compared with Calvo-type models. We derive a quadratic approximate welfare function around a distorted steady state for the costly price adjustment model. We highlight the similarities and differences to the Calvo setup. Both models imply inflation and output stabilization goals. It is explained why the degree of distortion in the economy influences inflation aversion in the Rotemberg framework in a way that differs from the Calvo setup.

A Simple Characterization of Dynamic Completeness in Continuous Time

This paper investigates dynamic completeness of financial markets in which the underlying risk process is a multi-dimensional Brownian motion and the risky securities dividends geometric Brownian motions. A sufficient condition, that the instantaneous dispersion matrix of the relative dividends is non-degenerate, was established recently in the literature for single-commodity, pure-exchange economies with many heterogenous agents, under the assumption that the intermediate flows of all dividends, utilities, and endowments are analytic functions. For the current setting, a different mathematical argument in which analyticity is not needed shows that a slightly weaker condition suffices for general pricing kernels. That is, dynamic completeness obtains irrespectively of preferences, endowments, and other structural elements (such as whether or not the budget constraints include only pure exchange, whether or not the time horizon is finite with lump-sum dividends available on the terminal date, etc.)

Comparative Statics of Asset Prices: the effect of other assets' risk

Currently, financial economics is unable to predict changes in asset prices with respect to changes in the underlying risk factors, even when an asset's dividend is independent of a given factor. This paper takes steps towards addressing this issue by highlighting a crucial component of wealth effects on asset prices hitherto ignored by the literature. Changes in wealth do not only alter an agents risk aversion, but also her perceived 'riskiness' of a security. The latter enhances significantly the extent to which market- clearing leads to endogenously-generated correlation across asset prices, over and above that induced by correlation between payoffs, giving the appearance of 'contagion.'