Colonialism, European Descendants and Democracy

This paper advances that the share of European descendants in the population is a major determinant of democracy in former colonial countries. We test this hypothesis using cross-section and panel regressions with 60 developing and developed countries that were once colonies. We find that the share of European descendants can explain more than half of the difference in measures of democracy between the least and the most democratic countries in our sample. We control for other potential determinants of democracy and test for endogeneity bias using instrumental variables.

Export-market dynamics and the probability of firm closure: Evidence for the UK

This study presents the first empirical analysis of the determinants of firm closure in the UK with an emphasis on the role of export-market dynamics, using panel data for a nationally representative group of firms operating in all-market based sectors during 1997-2003. Our findings show that the probability of closure is (cet. par.) significantly lower for exporters, particularly those experiencing export-market entry and exit. Having controlled for other attributes associated with productivity (such as size and export status), the following factors are found to increase the firm’s survival prospects: higher capital intensity and TFP, foreign ownership, young age, displacement effects (through relatively high rates of entry of firms in each industry), and belonging to certain industries. Interestingly, increased import penetration (a proxy for lower trade costs) leads to a lower hazard rate for exporting entrants and continuous exporters, whilst inducing a higher hazard rate for domestic producers or those that quit exporting.

The disadvantage of winning an election

This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages. Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition.