Interest Rate Co-movements, Global Factors and the Long End of the Term Spread

The disconnect between rising short and low long interest rates has been a distinctive feature of the 2000s. Both research and policy circles have argued that international forces, such as global monetary policy (e.g. Rogoff, 2006); international business cycles (e.g. Borio and Filardo, 2007); or a global savings glut (e.g Bernanke, 2005) may be responsible. In this paper, we employ recent advances in panel data econometrics to document the disconnect and link it explicitly to the existence of a global latent factor that dominates the long end of the term spread for the recent period; the saving glut story emerges as the most likely contender for the global factor.

An issue with own-rates: Keynes borrows from Sraffa , Sraffa criticises Keynes, and present-day commentators get hold of the wrong end of the stick

Scholars who in recent years have studied the Sraffa papers held in the Wren Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, have concluded from Sraffa’s critical (but unpublished) observations on Chapter 17 of Keynes’s General Theory that he rejected Keynes’s central proposition that the rate of interest on money may come to ‘rule the roost’, thus dragging the economy into recession. While Sraffa does indeed express dissatisfaction with Chapter 17, the commentators have, we believe, misunderstood his concern: we suggest that he was unhappy with the ‘own-rates’ terminology employed by Keynes rather than with the substance of the theory developed in Chapter 17.

A Case of Framing Effects: The Elicitation of Time Preferences.

We compare three methods for the elicitation of time preferences in an experimental setting: the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure (BDM); the second price auction; and the multiple price list format. The first two methods have been used rarely to elicit time preferences. All methods used are perfectly equivalent from a decision theoretic point of view, and they should induce the same ‘truthful’ revelation i dominant strategies. In spite of this, we find that framing does matter: the money discount rates elicited with the multiple price list tend to be higher than those elicited with the other two methods. In addition, our results shed some light on attitudes towards time, and they permit a broad classification of subjects depending on how the size of the elicited values varies with the time horizon.